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The 2008 Global Financial Crisis represents a conjunctural moment, highlighting the emergent 
conditions of social and political conflict at the outset of the twenty-first century. It is through 
the dynamics of public discourse that the crisis is thematized and given meaning in order to justify 
a response to it, and to propose a way forward through its aftermath. In this context, focusing on 
the development of the crisis at a national level, Ireland presents a valuable case study. From the 
economic miracle of the Celtic Tiger to one of the first ‘victims’ of the Great Recession, to 
eventually becoming the success story of the European economic recovery, its path through the 
crisis and its aftermath is unique. Ten years on from the crisis, however, despite the fact that 
economic growth has returned, Ireland is now suffering the political and social consequences of 
adopting short-term solutions to long-term structural problems, and it is becoming increasingly 
clear that whatever lessons may have been learned in the throes of the crisis itself have quickly 
been forgotten in the wake of its aftermath.  
The idea of lessons learned, which, in this context, would pertain to the Irish experience of 
dealing with the social and political devastation entailed in the economic cycles of boom-to-bust 
capitalism, is only a single dimension of a wider picture. Learning, in this sense, suggests that 
once mistakes are recognised and addressed, a return to the same socio-economic model may 
be the only legitimate way forward. The concept of learning, however, also contains a radical-
critical transformative dimension, revealing an unlimited horizon of potentiality. When viewed 
from this perspective, learning in the aftermath of the crisis is not restricted to the lessons 
presented by the immanent context itself. Counterfactual considerations may be brought into 
play, which question the very conditions of learning and the deeper cultural logic, reflected in 
the crisis discourse, which maintain and reproduce these conditions. The normative foundations 
of the work are, therefore, rooted in the possibility of democratization, realized through forms 
of learning and normative innovation. The critique developed here will contend that these 
processes are blocked in the Irish case, thus exposing contradictions through the indeterminate 
and conflict-ridden communicative setting of the response to the crisis.  
2 
 
A basic conceptual premise here is that the crisis is understood as a situation of heightened 
contingency. In this sense, the aftermath of the crisis is not to be understood as a simple 
inevitability, but as a specific outcome of a series of events and decisions which were construed 
and contested in public discourse. These processes of construction and contestation represent 
the ‘discursive mediation’ of the crisis, reflecting attempts, on behalf of the public, to understand 
and make sense out of what was taking place. The crisis is framed as a discursive conflict over the 
‘thematization of the crisis’, represented in relation to the unfolding of a series of path-shaping 
moments of political interventions and crisis-management strategies, as they became manifest 
in public discourse. The institutional response to the crisis, as embodied in the development of a 
‘public narrative’ in Ireland is, therefore, the empirical focus of the proceeding analysis. The key 
questions, which this distinctly communicative approach seeks to address, concern the idea of 
learning and the related possibility of social and political change, exposed by the context of 
uncertainty and conflict. From this perspective, the crisis is not just mediated through discursive 
struggles over the meaning and significance of what is taking place, and how to get through and 
re-establish the normative order, it also represents an opportunity for different narratives to 
enter the discursive space of the public sphere, projecting the possibility of alternative futures in 
its aftermath. The objective of the thesis, therefore, perhaps contrary to conventional 
approaches, is to understand that which has not been learned from Ireland’s experience of the 
financial crisis. This focuses attention away from reflecting upon the potential ‘lessons’ learned 
over the past ten years, to a deeper analysis of the conditions of learning in Ireland, as exposed 
in a moment of profound crisis.  
The theoretical and methodological premises of this thesis are based in the tradition of Frankfurt 
School Critical Theory. Following the stated objective, which seeks to develop a critique of the 
response to the Irish financial crisis on the basis of something that is not explicitly present in the 
discourse, but yet, is normatively anticipated as an undisclosed potentiality, the Critical Theory 
approach presents an appropriate ‘empirical-theoretical’ framework. The relevance of this 
framework corresponds to several interrelated theoretical domains raised in the proceeding 
analysis. Firstly, Critical Theory engages with a theory of capitalism and, by extension, comes into 
its own in the analysis of crises of capitalism. Particularly from the 1970s onwards – Habermas 
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published ‘Legitimation Crisis’ in 1973 – this theoretical focus applied to the analysis of the crises 
of ‘late capitalism’, in which a new conflict between the processes of capitalism and democracy 
began to emerge. A second domain, which requires a perspective on the tradition of Critical 
Theory, is communication. The crisis is understood from the perspective of the way in which it is 
constructed and mediated through processes of public communication. Habermas’ work, 
therefore, on the development of the concept of the public sphere, and the associated 
mechanisms of public discourse, up to the later work on ‘The Theory of Communicative Action’, 
are the building blocks of the social scientific approach adopted. A third domain relates to Critical 
Theory’s fundamental concern with the theory of democracy. This constitutes the ‘normative 
bedrock’ for a communicative understanding of society and reflects the foundation for the 
diagnostic, reconstructive and explanatory forms of critique pursued here. Democracy, from this 
perspective, is contingent upon the interpretation and description of ‘transcendent’ normative 
principles or ‘ideas of reason’ which allow for the regulation of discursive mechanisms that 
ultimately establish and reproduce the possibility for a democratic form of public 
communication. A fourth domain, which contributes to bridging the gap between Critical Theory 
and its sociological application in an empirical context, relates to the theory of learning. Learning 
presupposes the possibility of change through the realization of the potentials harboured by 
normative democratic principles. In the context of the proceeding analysis, the sociological 
approach to the theory of learning takes up the critical task of trying to identify and expose those 
discursive mechanisms that interfere with and thereby block or distort the learning process.  
There is one more important theoretical premise guiding the thesis, which seeks to bridge these 
critical theoretical domains with a sociological perspective appropriated for empirical inquiry. 
This leads to the presentation of a cognitive sociology with a critical capacity. A latent dimension, 
already very much present in Critical Theory, extrapolated in the work of Piet Strydom, Klaus 
Eder, Max Miller and Patrick O’Mahony, this ‘critical-cognitive’ sociological approach is still very 
much in its infancy in the domain of social scientific application. The current thesis, therefore, 
devotes significant time to theory-building and reflects, perhaps, more of an illustration of how 
an empirical-theoretical framework may be applied to a specific context. One of the main 
difficulties in approaching the analysis of Ireland from an advanced social theoretical perspective 
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relates to the general lack of contemporary and sustained critical analyses from such a 
perspective on the subject. A conventional thesis structure, therefore, following distinctions 
concerning a clear separation between a theoretical literature review, methodological 
application and analysis of findings, is not deemed suitable for the task at hand. The thesis will 
therefore proceed in an empirical-theoretical register, drawing insights from theoretical 
approaches, increasing in complexity as they are advanced, which are then brought to bear on 
the empirical problem.  
The methodological approach of thesis follows the reconstructive orientation of Critical Theory, 
guided by the concept of ‘immanent-transcendence’. This will take the form of a ‘methodology 
of inquiry’, utilizing a combination of different methods that reflect the empirical-theoretical 
emphasis of the overall project, rather than a traditional systematic methodology, which typically 
involves a specific set of social-scientific research tools. Immanent transcendence, which refers 
to Critical Theory’s fundamental interest in rooting out the relevant normative principles or socio-
practical ideas of reason in a given situation, directs the approach through a focus on the 
dialectical tension between the accumulated historical potential of socio-practical ideas of 
reason, contained within ‘cultural models’, and the ongoing process of constitution, reproduction 
and transformation of society (Strydom, 2011: 135). Critical Theory, therefore, proceeds with a 
reconstructive-explanatory form of critique that is backed up with social theory. Although 
Habermas is an important proponent in the development of a ‘reconstructive social science’, the 
specific procedure of reconstruction pursued here follows the work of Axel Honneth. The reason 
for this is that Honneth focuses on the diagnosis and critique of ‘social pathologies’, those 
disruptive elements in the conditions of learning that block access to transcendent ideas of 
reason. Given the empirical focus of the thesis, therefore, which effectively represents the Irish 
case as a situation of ‘non-learning’, this approach offers a perspective on those normative 
principles which are appealed to but remain unrealized in the situation itself. 
The first two chapters lay out the empirical dimensions of the analysis. Chapter 1 introduces the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis as it became manifest in the Irish context. The objective here, 
adopting a critical sociological perspective on the crisis, is to identify the discursive trajectory of 
the crisis in Ireland, and by doing this represent the thematization of the crisis in the form of a 
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public narrative. The purpose of framing the crisis in these terms is to highlight the justifications 
given for the response to the crisis in public discourse. Therefore, the concept is employed from 
a critical standpoint in order to highlight the emergence of dominant public justification for what 
is taking place. In this sense, whatever institutional response is put forward to deal with the crisis, 
it must resonate with this narrative, thus, containing and restricting any dissenting social 
positions, which may challenge that response on the basis of alternative, democratic ideas of 
justice, equality, responsibility and legitimacy. The chapter follows the composition of the Irish 
crisis narrative through an observation of public discourse, which charts the key political 
interventions, from the Bank Guarantee in 2008, to the establishment of the National Asset 
Management Agency (NAMA), to the imposition of ‘Bailout’ terms with the European Union and 
the International Monetary Union in 2010, up until the beginning of a ‘recovery narrative’, which 
distinguishes Ireland as a unique case. The final section of Chapter 1 highlights the forms of public 
resistance which emerged in opposition to the Irish government’s response to the crisis. This is 
intended to show that there was learning taking place, but this failed to resonate to any 
significant extent with the wider public, to generate an alternative narrative and perhaps to 
propose a different response.    
Chapter 2 presents a clarification of the context, placing Ireland in the wider European setting 
through a discussion of the major political and economic transformations that led up to the crisis 
in 2008. There is an important distinction highlighted here, between the chaotic and uncertain 
conditions of a crisis and its ‘aftermath’. It is in the context of the latter that discursive struggles 
over the nature and significance of events actually take place, social positions are adopted and 
the possible projections for the future are elaborated and promoted in competing narratives. The 
chapter broadens the approach, contextualizing the crisis as a culmination point in the long-run 
strategy of European integration, driven by a commitment to the processes of financialization. 
By placing the 2008 crisis into this historical structural context, the institutional response, 
therefore, in the Irish case becomes clear. The second section of this chapter deals with the way 
in which developments in Ireland paralleled the processes of financialization at the European 
level, and it is then placed in a comparative context in which the responses of two other small, 
peripheral European states, Greece and Iceland, to the crisis are examined. The intention here is 
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to identify the way in which both Greece and Iceland illustrated responses that present a contrast 
to the Irish experience of the financial crisis. Chapter 2 concludes with a hypothesis, an abductive 
insight, that guides the proceeding analysis. This relates to the fundamental question, what has 
been learned in the aftermath of the Irish response to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis? And, 
furthermore, on the broader critical plane, what mode of learning is reflected in this response?   
There is a crucial distinction that is emphasized throughout the work, between the immanent, 
conservative reality of Irish normative culture and the reconstructive horizon of democratization. 
Chapter 3 argues that Ireland reflects an embedded conservative culture which reflexively blocks 
the ability of the Irish public sphere to grasp reconstructive possibilities, which are potential 
learning opportunities in the crisis aftermath. In the case of the 2008 financial crisis, this is 
realized by means of a learning pathology, reflected in the non-thematization of possible 
alternatives. This chapter returns to the empirical analysis and attempts to elaborate the 
conditions of Irish public discourse, which are encapsulated in the development of a mode of 
learning that reflects a distinctive normative culture. Central to this analysis, and to the 
framework in general, is the concept of the ‘cultural model’, following the work of Alain Touraine, 
which operates in this sense as a mediating selectivity structure. The crisis is, therefore, 
represented as a learning opportunity, to expose the problems with a system that had led to this 
point and to generate possible alternatives. Learning in the Irish context is blocked in two 
distinctive ways, which are explicated in this chapter. Firstly, through the reproduction of the 
Irish cultural model along lines which are formed around the elements of nationalism and class, 
and, in a second sense, staying at the level of the cultural model, learning is essentially blocked 
at a crucial moment. 
Chapter 4 introduces the principles of legitimation and responsibility as the key normative 
components that have emerged from an observation of the Irish crisis narrative. The critical 
thrust of the work is characterized in the rooting out of these normative-democratic principles, 
denied in the actual situation, which ultimately provide the elements for a reconstructive 
critique. Drawing on the theoretical work of Habermas, but also following its methodological 
application in the work of Theo Van Leeuwen, I conceptualize legitimacy in relation to how it is 
communicatively generated in the crisis situation, following four distinct modes of legitimation 
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emerging out of public discourse. What is observed in this case is a non-normative mode of 
legitimation, in which restrictive forms of thematization constrain the normative democratic 
possibilities discernably available to the public. The principle of responsibility, also introduced in 
this chapter, reflects a second key discursive feature of the narrative. Revealed in a critical-
dialectical fashion through an exposition of the prevalence of blame in Irish public discourse, 
responsibility represents a generally important principle in the context of the crisis. By identifying 
key moments in which blame, or blame-avoidance, obscures the normative principle of 
responsibility, the cultural-political conditions of conservatism are shown to reflexively block the 
necessary modes of learning to adopt a democratic reading of the principle.  Legitimacy and 
responsibility will be conceptualized in the following as ‘cognitive’ principles. That is, the 
normative culture shaping their immanent realization in the Irish context will be interpreted 
through the framework of a critical-cognitive sociology.  
Chapters 5 and 6, drawing from recent social theoretical developments, bring forward a cognitive 
sociology approach with a critical capacity, thus culminating in the possibility of a reconstructive-
explanatory critique of Ireland’s response to the crisis. A macro-cultural cognitive theory of 
society is introduced, within which the principles of legitimacy and responsibility are then dealt 
with in relation to one another. The principles are contextualized within the broader cognitive 
order of society, to be conceptualised as cognitive principles, operating as part of a wider macro-
cultural structure. The ‘cognitive order’ constitutes the key explanatory concept in the work, 
which allows for the development of cognitive reconstruction of the problem. This approach 
allows for a specification of the communicative-learning pathologies at the heart of the critique. 
By integrating social learning processes, which conceptualizes the potential outcomes of cultural 
innovation and normative change in the communicative dynamics of the cognitive order, the 
location of specific learning pathologies, blocking the possibility of a co-responsible form of 
legitimation in the Irish context, is made possible.  
Chapters 7 and 8, finally, combine the theoretical and empirical observations which have been 
laid out in the preceding chapters within an advanced critical-cognitive sociological framework. 
One of the main purposes of the present work is to re-frame the analysis of the crisis and, in 
doing so, postulate the significance of its aftermath in a much more general sense. Based, 
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fundamentally, in a concern for the prospects for democracy, reflected here in the principles of 
legitimation and responsibility, the core features of the empirical approach have been to put 
forward a critique of the re-establishment of the crisis-prone conditions, characteristic of the 
specific phase of capitalism, and, secondly, to explicate the restrictive discursive conditions which 
limited the public thematization of the possibility of imagining and realizing an alternative, 
democratic response.  
To summarize, analyzed from the perspective of the critical-cognitive framework, the response 
to the crisis illustrates the incongruent relationship between the cultural model of Irish 
conservatism and conditions of learning necessary for further democratization in the aftermath 
of the Global Financial Crisis. Democratization is a process that depends on a vibrant public 
discourse, guided by communicative structures that facilitate the continuous exploration of 
differences and, in times of crisis, constitutes a repertoire of cognitive potentials from which 
society can draw from in overcoming systemic failures. In contrast, the conservative cultural 
model characterizes a mode of public discourse, reflected in the unfolding of the Irish crisis 
narrative, which encapsulates a repressive communicative environment that seeks to contain 
and restrict the exploration of alternatives. It is a condition that is deeply embedded in Irish 
culture, that is beleaguered with contradiction and a society unable, and unwilling, to grasp the 














    Thematizing the Global Financial Crisis:                                                                               
A Critical Observation of Public Discourse in Ireland 
 
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis signalled a decisive end to a period of rapid and intensive 
economic growth in Ireland. The collapse of what had become known as the ‘Celtic Tiger’ along 
with the realisation that, contrary to the impression of a new and successful ‘Ireland Inc.’, a crisis 
of unprecedented scale was immanent, precipitating a series of institutional responses which 
would unfold over the course of the proceeding number of years. In the following pages, the 
crisis will be framed in narrative form, correlating empirically to specific path-shaping moments 
of crisis-management as they became manifest in public discourse. The objective is to describe 
the communication of a distinctive narrative to the Irish public and, by doing so, theorise 
specifically how the institutional response to it was legitimated.   
From a sociological point of view, the global financial crisis is understood as presenting a situation 
that bears significant implications in domains well beyond the economic system in which it was 
initially generated. It is absurd, to paraphrase Alain Touraine, to claim that sociologists should 
confine themselves to studying the non-economic factors of an economic crisis (Touraine, 2010). 
As a moment of rupture in a social order, the crisis signifies the acceleration of a long-term trend 
towards a separation between the economic system, driven primarily by the global processes of 
financialization and hyper-capitalism, and the social actors who, as Touraine points out, then 
become the excluded, the unemployed victims of the crisis, “transformed into actors who are 
defined more in universal, moral or cultural terms than social ones” (2010: 2). Due to the extent 
of the disrupting impact of the crisis on the established socio-economic order, society has tended 
to fall back on its most vital integrative principles, constituting the very basis of modern society 
itself. Therefore, by linking the analysis of the crisis to the context of long-term historical trends, 




The term ‘narrative’ here assumes a distinct critical reading and will be employed as a key 
concept operating throughout the work. As crises expose the vital integrative principles of a 
society, ‘narratives of justification’ emerge which seek to preserve the relations of power that 
maintain the given social order. In this sense, the crisis reveals not just the coordinating principles 
at stake in such a situation, but also, the societal positions revealed in attempts to justify these 
principles. In a complex sequence of events, as in the case of the response to the Irish financial 
crisis, social relations become justified so that a social order comes to be accepted as an order of 
justification, or a ‘justification narrative’ (Forst, 2013). Therefore, relations and orders of power 
persist so long as they are integrated into distinct narratives of justification. Furthermore, when 
it is said that ‘narratives compete’ to construe the crisis, these narratives must also make sense 
and be integrated into a broader justification narrative, or order of justification, to resonate with 
the listening public. Eder (1999), in relating the concept of narrative to the elementary societal 
conditions of learning, speaks of the ‘narrative foundations of a social order’, which refers to the 
way in which social actors, in the course of interaction, establish basic narratives in order to 
provide the common ground for reciprocal understanding and communication.  
The crisis will be normatively framed according to the principles of legitimacy and responsibility. 
The crisis narrative will be shown to reflect the conservative orientation of Irish public discourse, 
through which these principles, and the correlating discursive forms of legitimation and 
responsibility, are restrictively thematised. As this narrative, therefore, reflects the exercise of 
hegemonic power through the conditions of discourse, it nevertheless provokes the emergence 
of counter-narratives. As Forst (2017) points out, “however self-enclosed such an order of 
justification may be, it always presents points of attack for critique through its claim to 
legitimacy” (Forst, 2017: 34). The crisis situation, by creating conditions of uncertainty and 
conflict, presents a context in which the social order has to publicly justify its legitimacy. In the 
Irish case it will be shown that ethical (principally communitarian-national and often self-serving 
ideological purposes) and functional justifications dominate over moral justifications of the kind 
that would be proposed from a normative-democratic point of view. The present chapter, 
ultimately, delineates the construction of a dominant narrative, but reconstructively, accounts 
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for the possibility of changes in the Irish model of legitimation, carried by the resistance 
movements that sprang up in opposition to the government’s response.  
The concept of crisis, which will be taken up in the proceeding section, is multi-faceted and 
demands consideration of numerous entry-points for analysis. It is understood here, following 
one pivotal distinction, as an unbalanced communicative conjuncture in which political actors 
compete to publicly interpret and construe what is taking place. In the undercurrents of political 
communication, the crisis is variably represented. It is through the analysis of public 
communication processes that the institutional response and the society in which such a 
response takes place, may be comprehensively understood. An analysis of the public discursive 
contestation over the meaning of crises, through which an institutional response is brought 
forward, results in the management of the crisis aftermath in such a way as to restore the 
hegemonic conditions of the already existing system. It is, according to this perspective, the most 
resonant interpretations or crisis-construals that will be selected as the basis for an institutional 
response. Whether such a response takes the form of restoration, piece-meal reform or radical 
innovation, the normative selectivity, or resonance conditions are always the critical factor in 
navigating the analysis of crises.  
Ireland certainly represents one of the countries most severely affected by the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2008. Between 2007 and 2012, national income fell by more than 10% as a result of three 
interrelated elements that reflect the main causes of the crisis in Ireland; the collapse of an 
unprecedented property bubble, a calamitous banking crisis and, ultimately, a deep fiscal 
adjustment imposed as part of an Economic Adjustment Programme, which was the basis of a 
‘bailout’ agreement with the European Union (EU) and International Monetary Union (IMF) (ESRI, 
2013: 1). It is necessary to understand these events, which contributed to severe recessionary 
forces in the aftermath of the financial crisis, against the backdrop of the extraordinary economic 
growth in the preceding years. An ESRI study identifies that between 1994 and 2004, economic 
growth in Ireland was among the highest in the OECD, “an annual average growth rate in real 
GDP of over 7%” (ESRI 2013: 2). This growth in the Irish economy was accompanied by a sustained 
increase in the numbers in employment, rising from 1.2 million in 1994 to 2.1 million by 2007, 
and an unemployment trend that fell to just over 4% in 2000 and remained around this level until 
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2008 (ESRI, 2013:2). A key element, therefore, which reflects the significance of impact of the 
crisis is the sharp rise in unemployment, 4% to 14% in only four years (2008 to 2012), and this 
also coincided with sharp increases in taxations, reduction and restrictions on social welfare 
payments, and structured reduction in public sector pay (ESRI, 2013: 2).  
Ireland presents an exceptional case in terms of the analysis of the Global Financial Crisis as it 
was one of the first countries to officially enter recession in 2008, yet it was also one of the first, 
according to GDP growth figures (4.8%), to successfully exit recession and enter a recovery phase 
in 2014. Although this is clearly a positive development, it merely presents a part of the whole 
picture. The financial crisis, and the austerity approach which was adopted by way of response, 
has left a deeply unequal society in its wake. Those that were forced to bear the most brunt of 
the responsibility for the huge retrenchment Ireland has experienced since 2008 constitute those 
within a lower and middle-income stratum. The impact of the crisis was therefore felt most 
severely by the most vulnerable in Irish society (i.e. those groups that are at a higher risk of 
poverty and social exclusion); the homeless, the long-term unemployed, elderly persons, those 
with special needs, etc. Social Justice Ireland have found that income inequality in Ireland 
increased significantly between 2008 to 2011, “with the Gini coefficient, a common measure of 
inequality, rising from 29.3 in 2009 to 31.3 in 2011” (Social Justice Ireland, 2013: 4). This study 
indicates a widening gap between low and middle-income Ireland on the one hand, and the 
richest 20% of the population on the other.  
The following sections map the discursive construction of a public narrative which correlates with 
the justification of key events in the unfolding of the crisis in Ireland. This approach will draw 
extensively from recent empirical research on the financial crisis, along with a selection of 
primary source material, such as government statements and newspaper publications. By 
identifying and mapping the trajectory of public discourse, the proceeding sections account for 
the sequence of events which provide the elements that allow for the discursive composition of 
a dominant narrative, with which all other public discourse must ultimately resonate. From the 
guaranteeing of all bank deposits in Irish financial institutions in September 2008, to the 
establishment of the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) in 2009, to the ‘Bailout’ 
agreement with EU institutions and the IMF in November 2010, up to the emergence of a 
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‘recovery discourse’ in the context of an austerity programme with EU institutions and the IMF; 
each crisis-response, and indeed the public reaction to it, signifies a path-shaping moment and 
prelude to what would become the next episode of the crisis. By capturing these nodal 
moments1, and decoding the way in which they were construed, and (un)contested, in public 
discourse through the use of crisis-rhetoric and attempted crisis-management strategies, a 
sequential discursive impression of the crisis emerges. It is through an outline observation of this 
sequential development that the parameters of the discursive mediation of the crisis is 
delineated, and critically, how the response to it was legitimated and those who were to be held 
responsible for it determined.  
 
1.1 Framing the Crisis Response in Ireland: The Unfolding of a Narrative  
The phenomenal economic growth in Ireland from the late 1990s up to 2007, referred to as ‘the 
Celtic Tiger’, was primarily a consequence of property construction, inflated house prices and 
their speculative, underlying financing. The term ‘neo-liberalism’ captures the complex set of 
institutional arrangements that facilitated these developments in the context of the 
transformation of capitalist society over the past four decades or so. Associated with specific 
Anglo-American political trends, it designates extensive intellectual attention, incorporating 
perspectives which seek to delineate the emergence of a whole new ideological orientation. At 
a most basic level, it emphasizes principles to do with the extension of competitive market 
relations to all areas of social life, re-tasking the role of the state, and placing a certain form of 
individual responsibility at the forefront of the value system of society.  
The ideology of neo-liberalism may be characterized as a political project aimed towards the 
reconstruction of society in accord with the demands of unrestrained global capitalism. The 
difficulty with using such a term in any exact sense relates to its sheer scope. It represents a 
descriptive concept which resonates with such a diverse range of state projects (public-private 
partnership, for example), policy objectives, and general socio-political ideas, that require sharp 
                                                          
1 Drawing on developments in frame theory, ‘nodal moments’ refer here to significant instances in the thematization 
of the crisis in public discourse. This point will be developed further in 1. (b)  with specific reference to the three 
path-shaping moments of the crisis response in Ireland  
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analytical distinctions on the theoretical level, thus making empirical application somewhat 
difficult. The ubiquitous nature of the term, however, and its conceptual challenges, by no means 
require it be avoided, on the contrary, it is essential for understanding an important frame within 
which the 2008 crisis is interpreted. This will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 3 in relation 
to the strategy of European integration and the process of financialization in the Irish context.     
Understood in discursive terms, neo-liberalism, as a political, economic and social project, 
constitutes an encompassing meta-narrative, comprising discourses about the past and the 
present which are, particularly in the context of a crisis, linked to ideas and predictions of, and 
prescriptions for, the future. A multifaceted, yet still incomplete, project which seeks to seize 
upon crises as opportunities to extend market principles across society – here roughly following 
Naomi Klein’s ‘Shock Doctrine’ thesis – narrative is deployed as a symbolic resource2. Fairclough 
(2000) identifies the ‘narrative of progress’ as an explicit instance of the neo-liberal discourse; 
“the globalized world offers unprecedented opportunities for ‘growth’ through intensified 
‘competition’, but requiring unfettered ‘free trade’ and the dismantling of ‘state bureaucracy’ 
and ‘unaffordable’ welfare programmes, ‘flexibility’ of labour, ‘transparency’,’ modernization’, 
and so forth” (Fairclough, 2000: 148). The discursive elaboration of such a narrative contributes 
to the institutionalization of new forms of economic activity and social relations, and at another 
level, to collective identities and values. Crucially, however, discourses of neo-liberalism are not 
just neo-liberal discourses; there is, as Fairclough points out, a new structuring of diversity in the 
development of such language, not a homogenization, which contributes to it being particularly 
difficult to analytically pin down.     
The conceptualization and analysis of crisis proposed here, lends a specific focus to the meso-
level of discursive communication. The purpose of the approach is to identify those discursive 
mechanisms, related to the construction of a particular narrative, which determines the 
reproduction and/or transformation of a given social formation, made explicit in the crisis 
context, when ‘repair work’ is required to temporarily stabilize the system. There is a distinct 
                                                          
2 Following Jessop (2004), symbolic resources relate to the identifiable semiotic features of discourse and the 
associated practices in ordering, reproducing and transforming capitalist social formations   
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evolutionary logic associated with this approach. The emergence of such narratives poses key 
questions in relation to both the regularization of practices in what may be considered ‘normal’ 
conditions and the possible sources of radical transformation in periods of crisis. A crisis, 
however, is never a purely objective phenomenon or moment that automatically produces a 
particular response or outcome. It is a condition that develops when established patterns of 
dealing with structural contradictions, their crisis-tendencies, and dilemmas no longer operate 
as expected. According to Jessop, “crises are most acute when crisis-tendencies and tensions 
accumulate across several interrelated moments of the structure or system in question, limiting 
room for manoeuvre in regard to any particular problem” (Jessop, 2004: 167). A situation in 
which established modes of crisis-management no longer resonate may lead to a potential 
moment of decisive transformation, and an opportunity for decisive intervention. In this sense, 
a crisis is an unbalanced situation. It is, following Debray (1973), objectively overdetermined but 
subjectively indeterminate. An acute crisis may, therefore, constitute a potentially path-shaping 
moment during which the space for determined strategic interventions to significantly re-orient 
the course of events is opened up to the public. It may also constitute a moment of strategic 
innovation through the proliferation of alternative visions, invoking and re-articulating genres, 
discourses and styles by way of cultivating a ‘poetry for the future’ which resonates with the 
emergence of new potentialities3.     
In moments of major social restructuring, initiated by the conditions of acute crises, the 
emergence of competing economic, political and socio-cultural narratives seek to give meaning 
to what is taking place by construing problems in relation to past failures and future possibilities. 
In the next section, adopting insights from Jessop’s approach to the analysis of crisis, focusing in 
on the meso-level dimension of public discourse, this perspective will be brought to bear on the 
Irish case. Through a critical observation of the discursive arrangement of three key moments of 
political intervention, and the identification of specific key instances of public resistance, the 
elements of a narrative will be delineated, according to which the response to the crisis in Ireland 
would become justified. The former instances, following the discursive mechanisms in the 
                                                          
3 Marx and Engels (1852), “The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot take its poetry from the past but 
from the future” – The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte  
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semiotic construction of public narratives, highlight the selection and retention of specific 
discourses to justify the crisis-response, while in relation to the latter, the reinforcement of these 
discourses may be exemplified by reference to the relatively weak public resistance observed in 
the Irish case, and the general lack of alternative ideas promoted in public discourse. Jessop’s 
approach, ultimately, offers an entry into a diagnostic frame in which the 2008 financial crisis 
may be critically understood. This diagnostic frame will guide the following empirical 
observations, thus allowing for the identification of a distinctive set of elements which constitute 
the construction of a narrative to justify the crisis-response in Ireland.   
By late 2009, Europe had certainly become the main stage of the crisis narrative. The imagined 
recovery peculiarly claimed to have been achieved through the method of ‘growth through 
austerity’ was shattered by the collapse of Greek public finances. Fossum and Menendez (2014) 
explain, “the financial crisis mutated (or better, seemed to mutate) into a fiscal crisis which 
dragged the whole Eurozone and indeed the entire European Union down” (2014: 2). Just as EU 
institutions, and many scholars and pundits, were celebrating the first decade of the Euro 
currency, the crisis, ‘imported from America’, was exposing deep structural defects in the 
European Monetary Union (Fossum and Menenndez, 2014). These defects were further 
highlighted and emphasized by the increasing divide between core and periphery, between the 
central Eurozone countries of Germany, France, the Netherlands, etc, and the peripheral, mainly 
Mediterranean countries, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain (the PIGS, or GIPSI if one includes 
Ireland in the disparaging acronym). Despite a whole suite of policy decisions and an array of 
structural reforms aimed at decisively resolving the crisis in Europe, the entire notion of a 
transnational political union hung (and still, in light of the Brexit phenomenon, hangs) in the 
balance.  
The response to the global financial crisis, which became concentrated in the United States and 
Europe in late 2008, may be defined by the coordinated imposition of ‘necessary economic 
reforms’ or, perhaps more accurately described, austerity. Initially justified as exceptional and 
temporary measures to address the immediate symptoms of the crisis, this response was 
certainly path-shaping, precipitating sustained reductions in public expenditure and such policy 
approaches as ‘fiscal consolidation’, despite considerable public unrest. In the US, for instance, 
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Noam Chomsky (2011) criticizes such an approach from the perspective of the legitimacy of the 
financial system itself and its function within state capitalism. Recognising the extent of state 
intervention in the historical development of the modern economy, he argues that, contrary to 
the neo-liberal idea of the free market successfully operating independently of state regulation 
and interference, financial systems have always depended heavily on the existence of strong 
state institutions. Therefore, when the financial crash occurred in 2008, following the collapse of 
the US property market, it should have come as no surprise that governments would intervene 
to rescue, ‘bailout’, the entire financial industry (Chomsky, 2011: 55).  
The next section concentrates on the representation of the key crisis events in Irish public 
discourse. The legitimacy of the response taken to the crisis, reflected in the following through 
the political communication of crisis-management, will be normatively contested from the 
perspective of an account of the public resistance that follows. In anticipation of this 
contestation, which takes the form of discursive struggles over the nature and significance of the 
crisis, and challenges the proposed solutions to it, dissenting voices are also shown to emerge 
and become integrated as part of the narrative that gives a coherent meaning to the seemingly 
chaotic events. The mobilisation of students and the politically-engaged elderly population will 
be introduced below in order to draw attention to elements of public resistance in Ireland. These 
resistance movements, which will also be considered in their transnational context, appealing to 
an opposing position on such principles as legitimacy and responsibility, sought to defend what 
they conceived to be the real democratic interests of the public. 
 
1.2 A Timeline of Crisis and Recovery: Key Political Interventions in Ireland 
Ireland’s financial crisis may be understood as a very local crisis, which shared general features 
with the global crisis. The Irish case, O’Riain (2017) explains, was driven primarily by lending to 
large property developers and massively inflated property prices. Contrary, for instance, to what 
happened in the US, the crisis in Ireland was not triggered by mortgage defaults – although this 
would become a significant feature as the crisis evolved. A distinctive institutional response to 
the crisis, therefore, may be identified. There are three key moments, identified in public 
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discourse, which indicate key political interventions on behalf of the Irish government during the 
development of the 2008 financial crisis. Reflecting a distinctive experience of a country’s 
response to such a crisis, these interventions represent an attempt to contain and construe 
events, principally through the calculated management of public discourse.  
The key political interventions will be presented here according to four sequential phases of 
discourse, each corresponding to a specific measure constituting the unfolding of a narrative over 
time. Each phase contributes to the dominant Irish mode of legitimation, seizing the opportunity 
to frame the crisis in a way that would justify the response taken to maintain order. This initial 
framing process reflects the crisis-management strategy of the Irish government, from the 
implementation of the highly controversial ‘bank guarantee scheme’ in September 2008, through 
the debate around the setting up of the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) in 2009, to 
the signing of a ‘bailout’ agreement with the EU and IMF in November 2010. The intention here 
is to identify a consistent trajectory of discourse that corresponds to a narrative of justification. 
This sets the parameters for how the crisis was initially communicated to the Irish public, 
therefore also establishing the relevant frame for the public’s response. 
Ireland’s economic boom in the early 2000s must be understood in a broader historical context. 
Following years of stagnation associated with a political commitment to economic nationalism 
and protectionism in the post-WWII era, it was the adoption of trade liberalization policies during 
the 1960s that facilitated accelerated processes of economic development in the line with the 
rest of Europe. As Powell points out, “Ireland’s freer trade policies merely allowed it to cash in 
on the generally good growth rates the rest of Europe was experiencing” (Powell, 2003: 433). 
Ireland joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, thus making further advances 
in trade liberalization and fiscal expansion, yet, due to extenuating global financial conditions, 
specifically the inflation crisis resulting from the oil price shock of the early 1970s, Irish overall 
rate of economic growth remained comparatively dismal. It was a radical policy shift in the late 
1980s, implemented by Charles Haughey’s Fianna Fail government, that precipitated vital 
structural economic change in Ireland, most notably in relation to a significant reduction in the 
state’s role in the management of the national economy (Powell, 2003: 435). It is from here that 
Ireland’s exceptional rate of economic growth in the 1990s, leading to the development of an 
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economic model characterized by the Celtic Tiger phenomenon in the 2000s, thus constituting 
the roots of the 2008 financial crisis, may be contextualized and understood. In a very short 
period of time (1960s-1990s), Ireland had transitioned from an insular, agriculturally-based 
national economy into an outward-looking, finance-based, internationally integrated economy 
in a global system.    
Ireland would, however, prove to become a world leader in financialization (O’Riain, 2012: 498). 
In line with the indicative features of the process outlined in the previous section, following Fine, 
Ireland followed suit in relation to adopting an ever-increasing role for financial motives, markets, 
actors and institutions in the operation of its economy. Sean O’Riain (2012) explains that financial 
expansion pursued by successive Irish governments was just one dimension of a triple process of 
financialization in this context, including also a close connection with Anglo-American financial 
systems and, as outlined in the preceding section, financialization as associated with the 
European integration strategy, and the introduction of the Euro currency in the 2000s (O’Riain, 
2012: 499). During the 1990s, Ireland, following the liberal market economies of the US and UK, 
lowered its personal and corporate tax rates dramatically, along with tariff rates. Powell explains 
that “in 1989 the standard income tax rate was lowered from 35 percent to 32 percent, and the 
top marginal rate was lowered from 58 percent to 56 percent” (Powell, 2003: 436). Although 
these policy decisions undoubtedly led to a significant increase in overall prosperity and rise in 
general living standards, O’Riain contends “the dynamic of economic growth in Ireland shifted 
firmly from an export-led expansion of employment and domestic demand in the 1990s to an 
economy fuelled by domestic consumption and, particularly, construction in the 2000s” (O’Riain, 
2012).   
As construction took the form of a dominant ‘growth machine’ in Ireland from the late 1990s and 
through the 2000s, O’Riain identifies the long-established connections between land-based 
elites, property developers, and political elites as a key element in reinforcing the system. This 
growth machine, moreover, which had relied heavily upon state funding in the past (O’Riain 
points to the social housing expansion in the 1930s and the state office expansion in the 1970s), 
was now linked to the speculative financing of private residential and commercial property. In 
the ten years between 1997 and 2007, a period which may be defined globally by asset price-
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explosion associated with the de-regulation of financial markets, bank lending in Ireland grew to 
200 per cent of the national income (Kelly, 2009). According to Morgan Kelly’s assessment, “Irish 
banks were lending forty per cent in real terms to property developers alone in 2008 than they 
had been to everyone in Ireland in 2000, and seventy per cent more as mortgages” (Kelly, 2009: 
2). The resultant credit bubble inflated to the extent that its inevitable end would coincide with 
the deepest economic collapse of any developed country since the Great Depression. As Patrick 
Honohan (2009) explains, it was the combined activities of the construction industry and the 
banking system regarding property-related lending that were chiefly responsible for propelling 
one another to inflate the property bubble to a catastrophic extent.  
The institutional response to the 2008 financial crisis in Ireland may be characterized by the state 
assuming responsibility for a vast amount of private debt in order to save the banking system 
from total collapse. Ultimately, the approach which encouraged the development of the ‘growth-
machine’ mentioned above, associated with persistent trust in the processes of financialization 
that contributed to the crisis in the first place, was now forming the basis of the Irish 
Government’s response. Understood in the broader context of the European response, however, 
this is not exceptional. Portugal, Spain, Cyprus and Greece followed a similar path, unable to 
refinance their government debt due to the socialization of private debt, and then entering into 
‘bailout’ agreements with the EU, the European Central Bank and the IMF in order to continue to 
fund state activities. What is unique about the Irish case is contained in the aftermath, in the 
manner in which it was represented as a success in recovering from the crisis through the diligent 
and devoted application of a severe austerity programme. Recovery in this context refers 
narrowly to Ireland’s trading position, determined by financial rating agencies, and its ability to 
continue to engage in and borrow from international markets. It is, therefore, only a recovery in 
the sense that it is recognised as such by the financial system.   
 
• September 2008 – March 2009: The Bank Guarantee  
On 25 September 2008, Ireland became the first EU country to officially slip into recession. Having 
been anticipated for some time, as reflected in the Governor of the Irish Central Bank’s speech 
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the previous April (Hurley, 2008), which made reference to ‘trouble on the horizon’, the crisis 
was rapidly mutating from a ‘slowdown’ in the economy to a fully blown economic catastrophe. 
In reaction to the banking systems exposure to the crumbling property market, Finance Minister 
and deputy leader of the ruling party Fianna Fail, Brian Lenihan presented the Credit Institutions 
(Protection) Bill 2008 to the Irish Parliament on 30 September. The intention of the bill, which 
would become known as ‘the bank guarantee’, was to enable the government to take a stake in 
any financial institution that was in need of support; essentially, to provide a state guarantee on 
all bank deposits up to €100,000, cumulatively, about €440bn. Crucially, however, unaware of 
the banking system’s actual level of exposure to existing property development loans, the 
financial institutions to whom the government offered the protection of the guarantee were 
Allied Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, Anglo Irish Bank, Irish Life and Permanent, Irish Nationwide 
Building Society and Educational Building Society (Masters, 2009: 128).  
Two days after Lenihan announced the details of the bank guarantee, the Taoiseach, Brian Cowen 
gave an unusually impassioned and illuminating speech at a Business Council Dinner at Trinity 
College in Dublin. Undoubtedly aimed at the wider public, the key message communicated in this 
dramatic speech act was that Ireland was confronting a serious crisis and that ‘we’ must all face 
it together (Cowen 2008). Drawing a sharp distinction between ‘right choices’ – government 
policy – and ‘catastrophic consequences’ – anything else, Cowen here sets out the terms for the 
initial framing of the crisis by the government. In this sense, the bank guarantee is to be 
understood as the first of a number of measures, ‘tough decisions’, which will be implemented 
in response to the global financial chaos, and the latter must be seized as a unique opportunity 
to reform ‘dysfunctional’ public services and implement important structural change in the Irish 
economy (Masters, 2009: 146). Evoking memories of ‘the troubles’ in Northern Ireland, Cowen 
emphasized the way in which ‘good’ leadership had allowed ‘us’ to overcome problems in the 
past (Cowen, 2008). In attempting to generate a national sense of collective accountability, 
particularly through his consistent use of the pronoun ‘we’, the financial crisis was characterised 




We face an unprecedented financial crisis, much of it rooted in the excesses of the United 
States money system but we have major problems across Europe, and Ireland was never 
going to be immune (Cowen, 2008) 
According to Master’s (2009) analysis, Cowen’s attempt to frame the crisis in a way that 
supported his incumbent government on the one hand, representing the largest conservative 
and nationalist party, Fianna Fail, and justified Lenihan’s implementation of the guarantee 
scheme, on the other, were relatively successful. It was also perhaps significant in explaining the 
public’s relatively muted reception of the severe budget that was announced in October of the 
same year. By December however, despite this, the open, export and service-driven economy of 
Ireland continued to deteriorate, and, contrary to government rhetoric, it was becoming 
increasingly clear, especially given the substantial rise in unemployment figures, that the 
problems being faced were certainly not exclusively exogenous (Masters, 2009).  
Following the announcement, on 9 January 2009, that the chief executive of the Irish Financial 
Services Regulatory Authority, Patrick Neary, resigned following allegations that his staff were 
involved in the fraudulent transferring of loans for the former chairman of Anglo Irish Bank, Sean 
Fitzpatrick4. At this point, public attention had been dominated by allegations of institutional 
corruption over the previous two months (Masters, 2009). The crisis was now developing at a 
rapid pace, and a severe economic recession was looming. Nonetheless, through sophisticated 
techniques of blame avoidance and deflection, and crisis-exploitation in political communication, 
responsibility for causing the crisis itself was still very much unresolved and would be deflected 
on to various parties, most notably, public servants.    
 
                                                          
4 Anglo Irish Bank and its former Chairman, Sean Fitzpatrick, and Chief Executive, David Drumm, have come to 
epitomize the corruption and irresponsibly connected to both the sources of and response to the Irish financial crisis. 
According to Regling and Watson’s (2010) Report on the sources of the Irish banking crisis, governance and risk 
management practices within the institution were systematically corrupt – this had initially come to light following 
the dramatic nationalization of Anglo in 2009. An investigation later found that Fitzpatrick, while Anglo Chairman, 
had borrowed more than €100 million from the bank and hidden the loans from auditors for eight years. Drumm, it 
would also be later revealed, in a series of articles published in the Irish Independent, had knowledge of the hidden 




• April 2009 – October 2009: The National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) 
As the banking crisis worsened in early 2009, particularly after the nationalisation of Anglo-Irish 
Bank, the actual extent of the property bubble and the possible depth of the resultant financial 
collapse were becoming increasingly clear. The level of property-related debt that Irish banks 
were responsible for, especially in regard to large residential developments, was far beyond what 
the state, now projecting a dire economic outlook for the future, was in any way capable of 
guaranteeing. Following a severe emergency budget on 7 April, which included significant tax 
rises and massive reductions in public spending, special advisor to the Minister of Finance, Alan 
Ahearne, along with special advisor to the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA), Peter 
Bacon, were charged with the task of drafting a proposal to deal specifically with the property 
development loans, which were now acknowledged to be at the very root of Ireland’s banking 
crisis. The result of their proposal would lead to the establishment of NAMA, a semi-state owned, 
property-management agency, which, it was intended, would manage and dispose of ‘toxic-
assets’, therefore facilitating the restructuring of relevant financial institutions for which the Irish 
state had made itself fully responsible (Ahearne, 2015).  
Although the details of how NAMA would actually be implemented changed over time, primarily 
as a result of the sheer volume of debt being transferred, and also, increasingly volatile global 
economic conditions, the initial proposal was, basically along the following lines. The six 
guaranteed credit institutions faced a cumulative impairment on their land and development 
loans of about €80-90bn, NAMA would acquire the assets associated with this debt for €54bn, a 
discount of approximately 30 percent, and then resell them once market conditions had 
improved, therefore recouping the outlay of the state, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
allowing the banking system to continue to function in the short term (Bacon, 2009). Designed 
as a financial instrument, a ‘special purpose vehicle of temporary duration’, NAMA was based on 
the speculative long-run valuation of Irish property and a projected return to economic growth 




Ireland followed international best practice by setting up NAMA, an asset management 
agency to run down the bad assets of the Irish banks. Releasing bad assets from banks’ 
balance sheets is instrumental in the path to recovery (Ahearne, 2015: 2)   
NAMA was a prevalent feature of public debate and discussion in 2009. Although it was widely 
accepted that government measures were necessary to resolve the banking crisis, the most vocal 
critics of NAMA – chiefly, economists Morgan Kelly and Ronan Lyons, who are widely regarded 
as leading Irish property experts – found that the valuations upon which the agency based its 
assessment were far too optimistic. At the time the proposal was being drafted, a 47 percent 
decline in property prices was understood to be the bottom of the market, and the banks’ assets 
were therefore valued accordingly. However, based on Kelly’s (2009) evidence, a fall of between 
40 and 60 percent in Irish house prices was to be expected over the following eight to nine years, 
and therefore the overall fall in value from peak to trough would be more in the region of 70 
percent, far more than that envisaged by those designing NAMA. Kelly’s pointed conclusion was 
that in paying an average of two-thirds of the face value for these toxic assets, where one third 
is appropriate, the government was risking the imposition of severe losses on the Irish public, in 
the order of €30bn.   
NAMA was officially established by September 2009 and would begin transferring the first 
tranche of loans in early 2010. Putting aside the technical issues related to the consequent 
recapitalisation schemes and, more generally, the restoration of the economic conditions which 
led to the crisis in the first place, what was of fundamental concern was the evident lack of 
alternative approaches considered at this vital point and, from a moral point of view, the role 
NAMA would be likely to play in relation to the continuation of dangerous financial practices and 
non-democratic political collusion. 
 
• November 2010 – EU/IMF Bailout 
Following yet another austere budget at the beginning of December 2009, the third of its kind in 
fourteen months, which saw further cuts to public spending, most notably to public service pay 
and to vital social welfare programmes, it was now proclaimed by the Finance Minister, Lenihan, 
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that Ireland had ‘turned a corner’ in overcoming the crisis (Irish Times, 2010). Elaborating upon 
the same narrative which began by way of justification for the bank guarantee almost two years 
earlier, Lenihan, in defence of this latest budget, also emphasised the need for the ‘Irish people’ 
to ‘work together’ and ‘share the burden’ of responsibility for what was happening (Irish Times, 
2010). By late 2010, despite this recovery-rhetoric and the various responses to the financial crisis 
up to then, Ireland was unable to service its ever-increasing level of debt and, similarly to Greece 
the previous May, would have to request external financing, i.e. a ‘bailout’.  
Having witnessed the Greek government agree terms with the Troika – comprising of the 
European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)- 
to borrow from the newly-established European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), and as the debt 
situation in Ireland continued to deteriorate throughout 2010, an Irish bailout seemed inevitable. 
On 18 November, amidst rising levels of public discontent, especially among the elderly and 
student populations, which will be highlighted below, EU and IMF officials arrived in Dublin and 
were photographed entering government buildings to begin negotiations, though this, peculiarly, 
was denied by the Taoiseach, Cowen (Cahill et al, 2010). The charade of denial that the Irish 
government was requesting a financial bailout continued in political discourse for three days 
before it was officially announced, on 21 November, that a ‘rescue package’ had been agreed 
with the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF (Doyle, 2010). A 
‘National Recovery Plan’ was also published in this month, which outlined actions to implement 
a fiscal policy aimed at maintaining a government deficit at not more than 3% of GDP in line with 
the Stability and Growth Pact – the agreement between European member states to protect the 
European Economic and Monetary Union. 
According to the official Irish government statement, the bailout would total €85bn, with €17½bn 
contributed domestically from the National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF) and the remaining 
€67½bn, externally, from the EFSF, bilateral loans from the UK, Sweden and Denmark, and also 
the IMF. The primary objective of the bailout agreement, referring to the same statement, was 
‘to rebuild international market confidence in the Irish banking system, to enable the banks to 
revert to normal market funding in due course and reduce progressively their reliance on funding 
from the Eurosystem and guarantees and other financial support from the Exchequer’ 
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(Department of Finance, 2010). Although the focus was clearly on re-financing the collapsed 
banking system, the consequences of entering what was officially termed the ‘Economic 
Adjustment Programme’ raised grave concerns for the wider society. Under the heading, 
‘Structural Reforms in the Programme’, the grounds for such concerns are clearly reflected; for 
example, ‘Labour market adjustments’, which pertain to reductions in the national minimum 
wage and to ‘reforms’ in the employment benefit system in order to ‘incentivise’ the 
unemployed.  
Despite the official reason given for requesting a bailout being the general ‘financing of the State’, 
the dominant theme in public discourse was initially ‘the loss of sovereignty’ (Mercille, 2014). 
Mercille (2014), in his analysis of the Irish media’s role in the crisis, describes the dominant 
language in the press at this time as moving quickly from this issue of sovereignty, focusing on 
the adverse implications of the development, to ‘it’s what is needed’, which by establishing a 
sense of certainty and stability, provided a justification for ongoing fiscal austerity. The 
consistency in the political approach taken in response to the crisis in Ireland, is reflected in the 
circumstances of adopting the bailout agreement, a strategy that epitomises the lack of 
alternatives considered at the time. The commitment to a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ with 
the EU and IMF would ultimately determine Ireland’s economic and, to a significant extent, social 
future for the medium-to long-term, and it reflected the nature of Irish public culture that such 
a fateful event could happen in a manner cloaked from public scrutiny.  
The overarching objective of the bailout programme in Ireland required actions to address fiscal 
consolidation, financial sector reforms, and structural reforms. These reforms were specifically 
aimed at resource conservation and improving competition to drive economic recovery. Robbins 
and Lapsley (2014) provide useful data that illustrates the economic impact of the austerity 
programme; by 2011, Ireland had the third highest debt to GDP ratio in the EU behind Greece 
and Italy. In the period 2002 to 2008, the 17 countries within the Eurozone sustained an average 
debt to GDP per cent that was close to 70%, before rising over the preceding three years to stand 
at 87.2% in 2011 (Eurostat, 2011). Robbins and Lapsley anticipate that “Ireland’s debt/GDP ratio 
will peak at 120.3% in 2013 before falling to 117.4% in 2015” (2014: 93). By the time Ireland will 
exit the bailout agreement, the extent of the retrenchment imposed by the Irish government, 
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and under the direction of the Troika, is staggering. However, it would be portrayed as a success 
story, one that others, particularly those southern peripheral states, ought to learn from. As 
Christine Lagarde stated in a speech to the IMF in 2013; 
Ireland is setting standards and what has been done has been huge by any standards. More 
than two-thirds of the work has been done in terms of fiscal policies (Lagarde, 2013) 
 
• Turning a Corner: Exiting the Bailout and the Beginning of a Recovery Narrative  
In December 2013, Ireland would become the first Eurozone country to exit the bailout 
programme. Just three years after committing to the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ with the 
Troika, which oversaw a deep retrenchment of the Irish economy, the government had 
succeeded in guiding the country out of what would be remembered as one of the most difficult 
periods in the history of the state, and a new phase of the public narrative would now begin to 
represent this. As reflected in Lagarde’s quote above, Ireland was deemed to be ‘setting 
standards’ in its response to the crisis. Manuel Barrosa, the president of the European 
Commission was also quick to commend Ireland on its discipline and commitment to the bailout 
programme, "Ireland's success sends an important message – that with determination and 
support from partner countries, we can and will emerge stronger from this deep crisis" (The 
Guardian, 2013). At the time this statement was made, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus were still 
involved in bailout programmes with the Troika and the Irish experience was therefore becoming 
an important exemplar in relation to the appropriate measures to be pursued in the aftermath 
of the crisis – sacrifice and commitment to the programme will lead to redemption. In essence, 
Ireland’s response to the 2008 financial crisis has become the most crucial piece of evidence in 
support of austerity policies. 
Ireland sets itself apart from the other ‘bailout countries’ in Europe in relation to the fact that its 
government had embarked upon a series of deep public expenditure cutbacks prior to entering 
the Troika agreement. Moreover, as Robbins and Lapsley explain, “while in Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy, national governments in their strategies of retrenchment failed to connect 
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cutback management to ambitious administrative modernization programmes, the response of 
the Irish government was to prioritize cutbacks in public services and new taxes” (2014: 96). As 
will be outlined in the next chapter in relation to a specific mode of discursive legitimation, the 
crisis, and subsequent bailout response, were used as an opportunity for public sector reform, 
and would in fact became a priority of the Irish government, reflected in the establishment of the 
Department of Public Expenditure and Reform in July 2011. The ‘prudent’ management of the 
public finances would become an imperative for successive governments in Ireland, who would 
consistently declare their commitment to not repeat the mistakes of the mid-2000s, when the 
economy was left vulnerable to external shocks (O’Riain, 2017: 220). The emergence of a ‘new 
politics’ in the aftermath of the crisis in Ireland consists of technical disagreements about budget 
balances and the fiscal space within which the government can operate, however, as O’Riain 
(2017) points out, this is “always within ‘moral’ rhetoric of fiscal responsibility and conservatism” 
(2017: 220).   
Far from constituting a break with the practices of the past, proclaimed by the notion of ‘new 
politics’, Ireland’s recovery from crisis represents a continuation of a specific socio-economic 
approach, characterized by “high inequality linked to property and other assets, flexible labour 
markets, the mobilization of foreign investment and a tentatively emerging domestic business 
class across a range of sectors supported by public agencies” (O’Riain, 2017: 220). Although 
Ireland may appear to be the only peripheral European country to emerge successfully from the 
economic wreckage of the financial crisis, its increased GDP and employment growth obscure a 
more complex picture, as O’Riain points out, “data on growth, trade and productivity is 
exceptionally difficult to understand given distortions introduced by the accounting practices of 
foreign firms located in Ireland (2017: 225). What is celebrated as a ‘recovery’, therefore, may in 
contrast be viewed as merely a return to the conditions that were a root cause of the financial 
collapse itself, specifically in regard to the rapid re-inflation of the property sector in aftermath 
of the crisis in Ireland, which has led to a burgeoning crisis of housing supply, rising and 
unaffordable rents and growing statistics on family homelessness. Although there has certainly 
been an economic recovery in the Irish case, particularly when compared to the southern 
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periphery, the old political and economic dilemmas remain, and Irish political discourse seems 
unable to address it, let alone resolve it.  
Austerity is framed as the centre-piece of Ireland’s recovery narrative. Whelan (2010) depicts the 
austerity policies adopted by the Irish government as one of the most extensive in world 
economic history. The Finance Minister of the Fine Gael-led coalition government (formed in 
February 2011), Michael Noonan, compared the recovery from the crisis, which had pushed the 
state to financial disaster, to the Great Famine of the mid-19th century, in which millions lost their 
lives (McDonald, 2013). There was indeed a dramatic tone set in framing the significance of 
Ireland’s exit from the bailout with the Troika. The recovery narrative, however, aimed to strike 
a balance between proclaiming triumphant success in the face of the troubling socio-economic 
conditions left in the wake of austerity and a cautious optimism, as Noonan also stated, “This 
isn’t the end of the road. This is a very significant milestone” (McDonald, 2013).  
A key feature of the transition to a recovery narrative was the congratulatory rhetoric directed 
towards the Irish public. Ireland, according to this narrative, had stoically endured sacrifice and 
suffering for the greater good, accepting three years of deep cuts to social welfare, state jobs and 
public sector wages as part of an austerity programme that imposed 270 separate reductions in 
state budgets. Following the announcement of the end of the bailout programme, cabinet 
ministers lined up to praise the Irish people for the way they had accepted their newly straitened 
circumstances without taking to the streets, as in Greece and Portugal, with Richard Bruton, new 
Employment Minister acclaiming the “patriotism in the way people approached the crisis” 
(McDonald, 2013). The patronising tone of this rhetoric is perhaps best summarised by quoting 
Noonan once more, “The real heroes and heroines are the Irish people!”, he exclaimed at a press 
conference (McDonald, 2013). The stoic acquiescence, by which political elites characterized the 
Irish public’s acceptance of austerity, was certainly not universal.  
In summary, the present chapter has set out the empirical parameters of the analysis. In doing 
so, it has also introduced some of the key ideas that will guide the development of the theoretical 
framework, which will be brought forward in the proceeding critique. The institutional response 
to the Irish financial crisis is understood through the unfolding of a narrative which is identified 
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in the domain of public discourse. This conceptualization will be normatively developed in 
relation to the principles of legitimacy and responsibility, and the trajectory of discourse itself as 
a narrative that sought to justify a specific response, thus restricting the thematization of 
alternatives, allowing for the reproduction of the same social and political conditions at the very 
root of the crisis. The dominant narrative, which was delineated by following the public 
communication of the government’s crisis-management strategy, reflects the resonant 
conditions of a distinctive mode of learning. The next chapter will contextualize the Irish case in 
a European setting. This places Ireland into the long-run historical and structural developments 
that shaped the conditions which led to the crisis in the first place, and establishes a comparative 
context, in relation to which one may equate the experience of crisis and the prospects for the 

















Contextualizing the Aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis: 
A Comparative European Perspective on Ireland 
 
The previous chapter put forward an account of the institutional response to the 2008 financial 
crisis in Ireland, as represented through an observation of public discourse. The present chapter 
will now broaden this focus, discuss the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis at the European 
level and highlight some specific national responses to it which will serve as the basis for a 
comparative assessment with the Irish case. The objective here will be to outline the conditions 
left in the wake of such a profound crisis, identify the parameters of the resultant social conflict 
in specific contexts and account for the learning processes that are initiated in different societies 
which form the bases of the various responses.  
The use of the term ‘aftermath’, which comprises a key contextual element of the thesis, requires 
some clarification at this point, especially given the fact that an argument could certainly be made 
that the crisis only began in 2008, and has in fact continued in multifaceted economic, political 
and social forms up to the present. Although, for example, what is enduringly referred to as the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, which spread throughout the periphery of the EU in the years 
after the financial crash, may indeed be causally linked back to the implications of ‘bailout’ 
agreements signed by member-states, there is an important distinction to be highlighted here. 
This refers to the spatio-temporally fixed events of the financial crisis of 2008 itself, which 
includes the institutional responses taken to it in various contexts, and its aftermath, which in 
turn refers to the conditions following the initial occurrence of the crisis. In essence, the 
conditions which characterise the aftermath of the crisis refer to the economic and social 
devastation left in its wake and, from a discursive point of view, the distinctive socio-cultural 
elements that have given shape to the resonant narratives put forward in public to resolve it.  
In this crisis, some people are trying to go back, and other people are trying to discover 
what the future could be. What doesn’t work anymore is the present, for anyone. That’s 
why we refer to the aftermath (Castells, 2015)   
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Manuel Castells (2011) depicts the 2008 crisis as heralding the end of an era of economic activity 
which may be characterized by the development of a system of easy credit and an ever-increasing 
level of debt dependence. The aftermath, following that end point, marks an uncertain stage of 
transition and conflict that distinguishes one phase of social formation from another that is yet 
to fully take shape. The context of this aftermath, therefore, involves discursive struggles over 
the nature and significance of what is taking place. Played out through the dynamics of public 
discourse, this constitutes a mediation process which involves the construction of ‘public 
narratives’, as identified in Chapter 1, which seek to give meaning to the disturbing events taking 
place and provide the basis for a justification in relation to how it ought to be resolved. There 
may be a number of competing narratives which enter the discursive space of the public sphere, 
each projecting a potential opportunity for some form of learning. The plausibility of these 
narratives, in terms of defining the problematic situation, depend to a significant extent upon 
wider resonance in relation to economic, political and ideological conditions. It is the resonance 
of a given narrative regarding these ‘extra-discursive’, political and cultural conditions of the 
given society, which will determine whether that narrative is successful in either changing the 
system through a form of transformational learning process or, as the case may be, reinforcing 
the existing order through decisive political interventions, thus re-stabilizing the existing system. 
The aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis has set the stage for a fundamental confrontation. The 
process of publicly narrating the crisis response has revealed distinctive positions being taken up 
in the formation of a new social conflict. These positions, often rooted in various ideological 
traditions, are adopted and revealed in public discourse through the development of competing 
narratives. This process sets the stage for the key struggles that will determine the future 
direction of the emerging social conflict. What is of specific interest in the present analysis is the 
emergence of the ‘new social movements’, those developments that propose innovative ideas 
that resist falling back on the ideologies of the past, which represent one side of the conflict. In 
attempting to overcome the apparent fear of the future, which has contributed to the 
perpetuation of hateful movements and the re-emergence of xenophobic and racist forms of 
politics in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, these new social movements reflect the emergence of 
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more hopeful changes that endeavour to seize the crisis aftermath as an opportunity for 
normative learning and democratic transformation.  
In much of the analyses of the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath, the actual implications for 
society have remained a relatively neglected dimension, that is in comparison to the 
predominant focus on the implications in political and economic domains. John Thompson et al. 
(2018) offer a perspective which examines the human and social costs of the crisis response, 
using the concept of ‘suffering’ as the basis for their analysis5. Unemployment statistics are taken 
as a measure to quantify the impact of the crisis, providing an initial indication of the extent to 
which peoples’ lives have substantively changed; “the unemployment rate across the EU soared, 
rising from 6.7 per cent in 2008 to 10.8 per cent in 2013 across the twenty-eight member 
countries, putting 9 million more people out of work, while in the Eurozone it reached 12 per 
cent” (Thompson et al., 2018: 148).  This sharp increase in unemployment correlates with a 
significant increase in the percentage of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion. Thompson 
et al. provide an examination of the crisis which shows the social devastation left in its wake; “in 
many of the countries that have been hardest hit by the crisis, such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain 
and Portugal, unemployment rates remain high, inequality is increasing and there are growing 
numbers of individuals, families and children living in poverty” (2018: 149). By focusing in on the 
experiences of the crisis in the specific instances of Greece and Italy, Thompson et al. develop a 
qualitative, bottom-up approach to compliment what the quantitative research indicates. 
Through a series of detailed interviews with actors from varying sections of the respective 
societies, this approach highlights how the crisis affected people on both physical and emotional 
levels and also how the new material and symbolic reality – the new ‘lived reality’ – has become 
incorporated into their daily lives. This qualitative perspective reveals the way in which suffering 
in the aftermath of the crisis is infused with a great deal of anger and resentment towards 
politicians and political elites who “are seen as distant, untrustworthy, incapable of 
understanding the lives of ordinary people and condescending towards them” (2018: 174).  
                                                          
5 The concept of suffering is here drawn from Pierre Bourdieu (1993) 
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This research draws attention to conditions that are indicative of a depression, conducive to an 
outlook on the world that is bleak, despondent and in general filled with despair. These 
conditions reflect a form of suffering that mark a significant feature of the present crisis 
aftermath. The sense of suffering is, as Thompson et al. observe, characterized by a deep and 
pervasive sadness associated with the “collapse of dreams and the loss of any sense of hope 
about the future” (2018: 174). The loss of hope, associated with the absence of a common 
purpose in relation to which people may develop forms of collective action, also results in a sense 
of frustration among a population that feel totally detached from and ignored by the political 
process. It is pointed out, however, that feelings of suffering and resentment can yet find 
expression in collective and unpredictable ways, as groups are given the opportunity to make 
their voices heard, for instance in the case of a referendum. In this sense, political processes are 
seen to be as much about affect and emotion as they are about reason and interest, “and when 
strong feelings are coupled with deep distrust and growing resentment of established political 
elites, the results can be particularly disruptive” (2018: 176). This point will be elaborated upon 
later in the chapter in relation to the Greece.  
Understanding the suffering of others is an indispensable part of thinking through the 
impact of the economic crisis on people’s lives, but it is also essential if we want to make 
sense of the dramatic upheavals that are shaking the political establishment and 
overturning many taken-for-granted beliefs in Europe and elsewhere today (Thompson et 
al., 2018: 176) 
The dramatic upheavals, which have taken place in many Western liberal democracies since the 
Global Financial Crisis, may be understood as elements of a general response to the neglect of 
the category of society itself6. The emphasis on the efficiency of financial markets and the 
sovereignty of nation-states has come to overshadow all else and highlights this widespread 
negation in the post-crisis context (Offe, 2012). As Eder explains in relation to a critique of the 
                                                          
6 This idea of the neglect of society relates to a key feature of the ideological regime of neo-liberalism for the past 
forty years. It is reflected in a famous quote of Margaret Thatcher’s:  "They are casting their problems at society. 
And, you know, there's no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families. And 
no government can do anything except through people, and people must look after themselves first. It is our duty 
to look after ourselves and then, also, to look after our neighbours" 
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neo-liberal form of governance in the EU context, “the model of the state and the market has a 
significant blind spot: people forming something that we call society… it lacks the third element 
in the dualistic conceptual world of state and market, i.e. society” (Eder, 2014: 220). The 
aftermath of the crisis, understood from this perspective, represents a moment in which society 
is attempting to reassert itself and reconnect with the political system. It constitutes the 
beginning of what may be a long historical transition involving the struggle to reconstruct a new 
form of politics, and it is at this point that new social movements come to the fore as the 
expression of the neglected category.  
The years since the financial crisis have certainly coincided with an increase of social mobilization 
in all European countries (Ortiz et al., 2013). Although it is difficult to establish a direct causal link 
between the various protest demonstrations, occupations, and grassroots meetings, and the 
specific conditions of the crisis aftermath – particularly as there are a myriad of other factors that 
would warrant consideration in this respect, related to opportunity structures, resources and 
social networks – it is undeniable that the two processes are fully interlinked. Oritz et al. (2013) 
have made an important contribution in establishing this link, conducting a study of protest 
activities between 2006 and 2013, in which they found that, in the aftermath of the crisis, “there 
is a major increase in protests beginning 2010 with the adoption of austerity measures in all world 
regions” (Ortiz et al., 2013: 2). This research also indicates that the reasons for protest are linked 
to issues of economic justice, to the related imposition of austerity programmes and to failure of 
the traditional systems of political representation. The latter point, which is also associated with 
a general loss of confidence in traditional political institutions, is highlighted as playing a 
particularly significant role in triggering protest. In the European context, the upsurge in protest 
was most pronounced on the southern periphery. Ortiz et al. found that one third of Greek 
respondents to a transnational survey had participated in demonstrations against austerity, while 
in Spain, the figure was 23.8 per cent. These figures are reflective of the sustained period of 
struggle against austerity in these countries, which has over time resulted in the ability of new 
political parties (Syriza and Podemos) to capitalize on the discontent and propose an alternative 
response to the prolonged crisis.   
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The response to the 2008 crisis, from an EU perspective, has resulted in an increasingly tenuous 
relationship between states and citizens, all within the conditions of a highly complex set of 
transnational political arrangements. European political elites, in the context of the crisis 
aftermath, have committed themselves to this Faustian pact with financial institutions 
(confidence in the market), which involves the imposition of austerity on smaller peripheral 
member-states, on the one hand, and the maintenance of democratic legitimacy throughout the 
national contexts of the union as a whole on the other. Joerges and Glinski (2014) characterise 
this seemingly anomalous approach as representing a position somewhere between 
‘authoritarian managerialism’ and ‘democratic governance’. At the EU level, the general crisis-
management strategy adopted in response to the financial crisis has, in turn, precipitated 
another more protracted crisis, that has now spread well beyond the economic domain. The 
following section will now discuss the aftermath of the crisis within the wider context of the 
project of European integration. 
 
2.1 A Critical Perspective on European Integration: Financialization and the Conditions of 
a Crisis Response  
To understand Europe’s response to the 2008 financial crisis, and to contextualise the approach 
that has been adopted by the EU to the multifaceted crises thereafter, one must take account of 
the wider processes of European integration which have led up that point. Although the previous 
chapter identified the development of a narrative within a specific national setting of public 
discourse, Ireland’s membership of the EU constitutes a vital component in fully grasping the 
institutional response to the crisis. What have been identified as key moments in this case are 
set within, and often a reflection of, processes taking place at the higher European level, 
particularly in relation to the responses of other peripheral EU member-states. The following 
paragraphs will, therefore, outline the direction of European integration as it proceeded towards 
an ever-increasing reliance upon financialization and market-based solutions to crises and, 
leading into the next section, how this corresponds to parallel developments in the Irish case 
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which, although often a reflection of the EU standpoint, will be shown to warrant isolated analysis 
in the context of the crisis aftermath.  
Over the course of the past sixty years, since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the choice 
of pursuing European integration along a path which has prioritized an economic route, heavily 
reliant upon market forces, has become evident. This route has been prioritized ahead of other, 
political forms of integration, as it was anticipated that this approach would initiate a process of 
‘cumulative integration’, creating a ‘positive chain reaction’ which would eventually bring the 
entire continent closer together (Bouin, 2018: 12). Olivier Bouin (2018) points out that a focus on 
advanced processes of trade liberalization, which was aimed at significantly reducing national 
opportunistic behaviours within the European community and the better allocation of resources 
– land and labour – was directed towards achieving a model of sustainable economic cooperation 
and growth.  
A narrative, therefore, developed around the integration of Europe along certain successive 
steps, pertaining to the positive side of this ‘chain reaction strategy’. Bouin, however, raises two 
grounds upon which this narrative may be fundamentally challenged, “the first dealing with 
effectiveness, legitimacy and sustainability of such an integration strategy, the second 
considering the economic and political end point of the European integration process” (2018: 12-
13). The former point is associated with what Bouin identifies as “the darker version of the chain 
reaction strategy” of European integration, which concerns the increasing number of economic 
problems facing EU member-states. Such problems concern the slowing down of economic 
growth since the 1980s and issues associated with the transition to a post-industrial economic 
system, added to this, the mounting evidence of social hardship, specifically on the European 
periphery, such as rising unemployment and increasing levels of inequality over the past thirty 
years (2018: 13). This darker side of the chain reaction strategy of integration can be explicated 
as follows; “when some economic integration created (or was not able to avoid) economic and 
social imbalances and disruptions across Europe, the response to these problems would be more 
integration” (2018: 13). In relation to the second point above, the end point of European 
integration, Bouin points out there is a very significant uncertainty about where this process will 
lead member-states, a dimension which has revealed deep division regarding the future direction 
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of the EU, a dispute which was highlighted most explicitly in the referendum on the UK 
membership of the EU in 2016.    
The agenda of the European integration process, which was pursued along a distinctive economic 
route, initially ran contrary to the policy orientation of the national economies of member-states, 
which remained through the 1960s and 70s a mixture of social democratic welfare state and a 
significant degree of regulation along the lines of Keynesian macroeconomic intervention (Bouin, 
2018: 14). However, by the end of the 1970s/early 80s, a progressive change at the national level 
began to orient more towards liberal, free market and private property-based economic systems, 
generally in line with the agenda of building the EU. This reorientation towards a more pro-
market approach was signalled in 1986 by the Single European Act, which transformed what had 
previously been known as the ‘Common Market’ into the ‘Single Market’, initiating a new phase 
of economic integration promoted by the European Commission. Bouin argues that is was at this 
point that Europe became fully aligned with the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’, which is 
synonymous with the long-run process of economic liberalization, deregulation and privatization 
on a global scale (2018: 14).  
The end point of the European economic integration changed progressively from a social 
market economy (whether of Beveridgian or of Bismarckian origin) into a capitalist market 
economy (in the 1990s) into a capitalist market society (in the 2000s) (Bouin, 2018: 15)   
Polanyi (1944) identified a link between the rise of finance in the economy and the progressive 
rise of a market society, in which markets come to dominate the social structures in which they 
ought to be embedded. Setting this route towards the financialization of the economy as the 
guiding strategy of European integration is particularly evident over the past thirty years. 
Although, the processes of financialization have always played some role in capitalist economies, 
this period has witnessed a deepening and broadening of finance as the foundation of economic 
activity. Epstein (2005), in developing an inclusive definition of the process, describes it as “the 
increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions 
in the operation of the domestic and international economies” (Epstein, 2005: 3). A process that 
is often understood to be synonymous with the rise of neoliberalism and globalization, Ben Fine 
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(2012) provides a more precise definition, which delineates financialization according to eight 
distinctive features that have developed over the course of the past three decades; i. the 
exponential growth in financial assets and financial activities relative to the rest of the economy; 
ii. the proliferation of different types of financial assets and derivative products; iii. the rise of 
speculative investment in place of real investment, coupled with the maximization of shareholder 
value as main target; iv. the increasing domination of finance over industry; v. the increasing 
weight of credit- and asset-inflation-led consumption; vi. the penetration of finance into all areas 
of economic and social life, such as pensions, education and health; vii. the spread of a ‘financial 
market’ anthropology; viii. the re-definition of the role of the state in relation to the promotion 
of financialization. Fine’s definition indicates the complexity and extent of this process, and its 
manifestation in the context of European integration will be shown to reflect many of these 
dimensions.  
Quantitatively, there are three important measures, identified by Jayadev et al (2018), which 
indicate the acceleration of financialization, combined with de-regulation and liberalization, 
trends in Europe since 19707. Firstly, incomes in the financial sector have grown faster than in 
any of the rest of the economy, the ‘total-economy’ value of the sector rose from 8.5% in 1970 
to 15.1% in 2007 (Jayadev et al., 2018: 9). This growth is constitutive of a broader process 
involving the expansion of financial systems globally, as researched extensively by the multi-
disciplinary group, ‘Financialization Economy Society and Sustainable Development’ (FESSUD). A 
second measure that reflects the trend of financialization in Europe is the growth in ‘domestic 
bank assets’, which increased from 51% of GDP in 1970 to 130% in 2007 (2018: 9). The size of the 
banking sector, measured in terms of the ratio of bank deposits to GDP, has therefore grown 
exponentially, resulting in the emergence of a vast ‘shadow banking system’, which was at the 
core of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The last measure relates to the issue of financial debt, as 
Jayadev et al. explain, “European households and non-financial firms hold more debt than in the 
past: private non-financial sector debt rose from 65 per cent of GDP in 1970 to 142 per cent in 
2007” (2018: 9). FESSUD, as part of a research project on ‘variegated financialization’, observed 
                                                          
7 Jayadev et al., for the purposes of the article, analyse the countries that make up the European Economic Area, 
which is essentially all those that are involved in the Single Market 
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that “the rising indebtedness of households is common across all the countries examined” 
(Sawyer et al. 2016: 6). In all, the interrelated processes of de-regulation, liberalization and 
European integration stimulated the rapid expansion of the financial sector and cross-border 
banking well before the introduction of the Euro currency in 1999. Since then European banks 
may be regarded as spearheads of the financialization process. Jayadev et al. point out that by 
2008 “the median assets-to-equity ratio of the 20 largest European banks had climbed to 32” and 
that “European investors accounted for the largest financial flows to the US prior to the crisis and 
held the largest chunk of private label mortgage-backed securities” (2018: 13).  
It is perhaps in the realm of ideas that the trend of financialization, and the gradual transition 
towards the marketization of society, is perhaps most decisive. A core feature of this ‘ordo-
liberal’ economic doctrine – the distinctive European adaptation of neo-liberalism – is that 
“rational financial markets can be harnessed to impose budgetary discipline on irrational 
sovereigns” (Jayadev et al., 2018: 11). The essence of this approach, in line with other versions 
of market liberalism, is reflected in the need for governments to be controlled by the financial 
markets, in direct contrast to the post-war, social democratic arrangement, in which strict 
controls on international financial market activity was seen as necessary to preserve national 
autonomy in the conduct of economic policy. The distinctive feature of ordo-liberalism, which 
sets it apart as a variety from neoliberalism, relates to the positive role assigned to the state in 
creating the conditions to sustain a market economy, and crucially, its part in responding to 
crises. Schnyder and Siems (2013) argue that the ‘ordo-institutional’ perspectives emanating 
from this ideological tradition have gained in appeal since the 2008 financial crisis because “they 
seem to attenuate extreme views of market libertarianism, while still accommodating broadly 
neo-liberal, anti-Keynesian and anti-socialist ideas” (Schnyder and Siems, 2013: 270). It therefore 
represents an ideological position which acknowledges the need for the market economy to be 
somehow ameliorated, or even embedded within a functioning society, while simultaneously 
maintaining the core neoliberal message, that ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA).  
Contrary to this ideological tradition becoming weakened, or the process of financialization 
coming into question as the guiding strategy of European integration, these elements would in 
fact form the justificatory basis of the institutional response to the 2008 financial crisis in Europe, 
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and, therefore, continue as key structuring forces in the crisis aftermath. One might have 
expected the crisis as heralding the end of European integration as we knew, yet it reflected the 
extent of the deep commitment to this strategy which has been adopted and developed over the 
past thirty years or so. The breaking point of the Global Financial Crisis, which resulted in a 
contagion effect that spread throughout world markets, came in mid-September 2008 with the 
collapse of the US bank, Lehman Brothers, which had been preceded by a series of other notable 
bank failures, including Northern Rock in September 2007 and Bearn Sterns in March 2008. This 
initial, and most dramatic phase of the crisis revealed significant systemic weaknesses in the EU’s 
financial system, which was heavily exposed to various ‘toxic assets’ that originated both 
domestically and in the US.  
The crisis quickly uncovered some painful truths about the fragility of this financial system and 
Europe’s response was initially chaotic and mostly implemented on the national level, despite 
the cross-border implications (Dabrowski, 2009: 43). Dabrowski explains that the factors involved 
in complicating policy coordination in Europe’s early response to the crisis were “the various 
speeds and strengths of individual economies to shocks, the uneven capacity and resources to 
provide rescue, the sometimes hasty and nervous reactions on a national and the temptation to 
free ride” (2009: 43). The principle ultimately guiding the EU’s response to the crisis was that of 
containment. The integrity of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the Single Market were 
coming under threat from economic nationalism and an intensifying conflict between troubled 
banks and their international depositors. To address these threats and attempt to contain the 
further contagion effects the crisis was having, the institutions of the EU, with assistance from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), began coordinating ‘rescue packages’, or bailouts, for 
member-states that had assumed responsible for the debts of private financial institutions, in 
exchange for the implementation of strict fiscal controls and supervision at that national level, 
which would become known as austerity programmes.  
The politics of bailouts has become a central feature of the crisis aftermath in Europe. With the 
extraordinary sums of public funding made available to commercial banks, often dwarfing the 
budgets of many other policy areas, the question of bailouts certainly leaves few people 
indifferent. On the one hand, public intervention was justified to prevent the entire European 
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banking system from collapsing and to prevent the risk of further contagion throughout the 
Union, while on the other hand, this particular form of intervention constituted an unacceptable 
level of risk to be assumed on behalf of the public, gifting private, in some cases delinquent, 
financial institutions vast sums of money, thus sustaining unreasonable investments decisions 
into the future. Understood in the broader context of the strategy of European integration 
outlined above, the bailout approach adopted reflects the extent to which the EU had become 
dependent on the functioning of its financial system. However, the increasing accumulation of 
debt on the periphery, which may be seen as a direct consequence of the long-run processes of 
financialization and de-regulation, with the consistent flow of capital from the larger core 
economies outwards, indicated an entirely unsustainable approach. The sheer size of the credit 
bubbles inflated in these peripheral states, for example, the property sector in Ireland, reflected 
this and ultimately necessitated some drastic forms of intervention. The coordination, or perhaps 
more accurately, the imposition of bailout agreements in Europe, which were perceived as a 
means of allowing for the continuation of an inherently unsustainable and unfair system, would 
become a fundamental point of public contention and opposition.  
The sheer scale of the bailouts mirrors the severe extent to which the crisis was affecting such 
countries as Iceland, Ireland, Spain and Greece. National schemes, such as the Bank Guarantee 
Scheme dealt with in the previous chapter, were introduced, and would be supplemented by 
liquidity support to banks, recapitalizing them and setting up mechanisms to relieve banks of 
toxic assets, in order to try and prevent individual bank failures from developing into broader 
financial crisis. The outcome of this was that individual states became responsible for a vast 
amount of private debt. Grossman and Woll (2014), in their comparative research, quantity the 
height of expenditures engaged by the various national schemes, which would be reflected in the 
scale of the resultant bailout arrangements. In the US, bailout costs had passed $1 trillion by the 
summer of 2009, in the UK it had reached $718 billion, and in Ireland, the expenditure on national 
schemes to rescue the banking sector reached $614 billion (Grossman and Woll, 2014: 279). To 
put this in context, Grossman and Woll explain, “for a country like Ireland, such an amount 
represented 230% of its GDP” (2014: 279). Smaller countries were shown to suffer tremendously 
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in the aftermath of the crisis, principally because the financial sector had far outgrown the actual 
capacity of national economies. 
The next section will proceed by placing Ireland into this context as a small peripheral European 
state, and a comparative assessment of crisis experience will be brought forward in relation to 
two other specific cases. Firstly, Greece will be presented as an example of the extent of the 
catastrophe that was the 2008 financial crisis and the response adopted to it. The devastation in 
this case reaches far beyond the economic and political domains, as Stuckler and Basu’s (2013) 
important research has shown in relation to the effects of the imposition of Greek austerity 
programmes on public health. Secondly, the case of Iceland will be introduced which represents 
an isolated example of an alternative, democratic response to the financial crisis. Both these 
cases constitute appropriate modes of comparison with Ireland, exemplifying the fact that 
although the crisis unfolded in these regions at the same time, the degree of variation in national 
responses and experiences of the aftermath are significant. Of key importance in the proceeding 
comparative assessment is the role of different publics in the context of learning how to respond 
to the crisis, specifically, that of coordinated dissent in resisting certain responses and the 
narrative this contributed to at the transnational level in the crisis aftermath.    
 
2.2 A Comparative Perspective on Ireland’s Crisis-Response 
The latest phase of European integration, outlined above, which may be defined by the directed 
strategy of financialization, is very much mirrored by developments in Ireland. Following a similar 
timeline, a political focus on the transformation in the domain of financial services from the late 
1980s onwards has resulted in Ireland becoming a ‘tax haven’, a crucial hub in a global network 
of offshore financial centres. As Conor McCabe argues, “Ireland has shaped its monetary policy 
and tax laws to serve the international monetary system and has spent decades building up the 
International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) as the ‘jewel in the crown’ of its strategy of foreign 
direct investment (FDI)” (McCabe, 2018: 58). Similar to the processes at work on the European 
level, the conditions leading up to the crisis in Ireland must be understood as part of the unfolding 
of a distinctive global trend.  
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There is no set definition of ‘austerity’; it is a term, predominantly used critically, to describe a 
set of policy commitments related to ‘fiscal consolidation’ and public sector reform. Mark Blythe 
(2013) provides a useful description; “[A] form of voluntary deflation where the economy adjusts 
through the reduction of wages, prices and public spending to restore competitiveness, which is 
(supposedly) best achieved by cutting the state’s budget, debts and deficits” (Blythe, 2013: 2). To 
illustrate the debt-burden on the Irish state following the 2008 crisis, between 2007, when debt 
to GDP ratio stood at a relatively sustainable level of 25%, and 2012, following the bank 
guarantee, the establishment of NAMA and the bailout agreement, Ireland had conscripted itself 
to becoming one of the most indebted countries in the world, reflected in a debt to GDP ratio of 
120% (Roche et.al., 2017: 2). The austerity programme embarked upon by the Irish government, 
which would run in two successive stages from 2008 to 2015, entailed a total financial 
‘adjustment’ of 32billion EUR, “consisting of 20.5billion euros in expenditure cuts and 11.5 billion 
euros in tax increases” (2017: 3). The ‘sacrifice of the Irish people’, as it was sometimes referred 
to, following Roche et al., aside from reflecting a commitment to massive reductions in debt and 
government spending, also included significant structural reforms, involving labour market and 
social welfare ‘adjustments’, which would ultimately take much longer to recover from.  
It is difficult to properly quantify the social and political impact of austerity in Ireland, and it is 
not the intention here to attempt to do so. However, there are some important indicators to be 
considered in contextualizing the comparative statements that follow. One exceptional factor in 
the Irish case is certainly emigration. A trend which is evident throughout Irish history, Glynn and 
O’Connell (2017) identify a dramatic rise in emigration during the economic recession that 
followed from the financial crisis, which peaked at 89,000 in 2012-13. Significantly relieving the 
unemployment figures in the aftermath of the crisis, in all 610,000 Irish nationals emigrated 
between 2008 and 2015. Beyond the quantitative statistics, emigration also involves an 
emotional cost, as Glynn and Connell observe in relation to families left behind by migrants, 
“parents could suffer depressive symptoms and loneliness and communities were affected by 
falling numbers in clubs and social activities” (Glynn and Connell, 2017: 7). A second, less 
exceptional, impact of austerity in the Irish case relates to the rise of unemployment numbers in 
the aftermath of the crisis. Barrett and McGuiness (2012) observe that, “in terms of the labour 
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market, employment fell steeply (14 percent decline between 2007 and 2011), the rate of 
unemployment soared (an increase of 10 percentage points between 2007 and 2011) and net 
outward migration resumed” (Barrett and McGuiness, 2012: 33). These figures include a 
significant degree of long-term unemployment, which have been shown to become much 
exacerbated in conditions of fiscal austerity. It is also important to bear in mind that the 
measurement of unemployment figures by means of the ‘live register’ (a national monthly series 
recording the numbers of those registered for welfare allowances) often disguises other 
structural problems related to the number of people in forms of precarious employment (i.e. 
those workers who are denied permanent employee rights) and those engaged in social welfare 
schemes that do not appear in the official statistics.    
Perhaps the most significant impact of austerity as a response to the financial crisis in Ireland is 
the overall rise in economic and social-class inequality.  As Lynch et al. argue, it is through the 
continuing rise in inequality in the crisis aftermath that fears about unemployment, emigration 
and debt have found expression (Lynch et al, 2017: 252). The harms caused by the imposition of 
a severe austerity programme, they claim, “have been visible on the streets through increased 
homelessness and begging, in the distressed calls to national radio and help lines, in letters, 
comments and articles in newspapers and social media, and in Dáil questions and expositions” 
(Lynch et al, 2017: 252). The evidence is clear that the impoverished and dispossessed members 
of society have suffered disproportionally from the effects of austerity. Following Central 
Statistics Office (CSO) figures, the percentage of the Irish population experiencing basic 
deprivation has doubled since the introduction of austerity policies, increasing from 13.7% in 
2008 to 30.5% in 2013. There was, moreover, a marked increase in the level of consistent poverty 
from 4.2% to 8.2%, over the same period. Lynch et al. observe from this evidence that the most 
severe deprivation was experienced by lone parents; “their 63 per cent deprivation rate is nearly 
double that of 2008” (2017: 259). Finally, on the significance of inequality, there has been a 
dramatic increase in the number of homeless people in Ireland since the beginning of austerity. 
According to Focus Ireland, a national homeless charity, “there were 9,753 people homeless in 
the week of December 24th-30th 2018 across Ireland”. This figure reflects a consistent and 
ongoing trend in the aftermath of the crisis response, as O’Sullivan (2016) observes, “the number 
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of adult homeless persons in designated homelessness accommodation increased by over 80% 
from June 2014 to October 2016 – an increase of nearly 100% in Dublin and 60% outside of 
Dublin” (O’Sullivan, 2016: 18).  
Despite this evidence, and the other indicative factors mentioned above, which reveal the 
devastating impact of the financial crisis and the imposition of austerity, Ireland, as touched upon 
in the previous chapter, is nonetheless held as the exemplar of recovery from the 2008 crisis, or 
as some commentators have referred to it, the ‘poster child for austerity’. Kinsella (2017), and 
Barry and Bergin (2017) claim that Ireland’s experience of austerity was unique in the sense that 
the deep cuts in public expenditure were “offset by a robust demand for exports in a way that 
could not be replicated in other Troika programme countries, or indeed more generally” (Kinsella, 
2017: 9). Furthermore, Barry and Bergin contend that the Irish business system recovered quickly 
from the crisis due particularly to its distinctive export orientation and high levels of foreign direct 
investment, coupled with its close economic ties to countries outside of the Eurozone, which 
suffered a prolonged sovereign debt crisis. Although these authors stress the exceptional nature 
of Ireland’s experience of austerity, they are in agreement that the timing and extent of Ireland’s 
relative recovery, as measured from the perspective of a return to economic growth, was in no 
way associated with the policies of austerity. Indeed, there is a unique character to the Irish case 
of austerity, but this must be understood in a comparative context, in which the experiences of 
other peripheral states are considered. 
The Irish government’s decision to adopt austerity by way of response to the crisis may be directly 
connected to the long-running process of financialization and its associated politics and policies. 
In many ways, it could be argued, Irish political and administrative elites embraced austerity as 
an opportunity to further projects aimed at the marketization of public services and public 
management, given justificatory support through the ideological platform of neo-liberalism. 
O’Riain (2012), Roche et al. (2017) and Kinsella (2017) all observe that Ireland opted for a form 
of ‘auto austerity’, in that the government had committed to an austerity programme before 
reluctantly agreeing to accept the Troika’s support. This leaves open a fundamental question at 
the heart of the present thesis, how was support for the austerity programme sustained despite 
the negative affect it would almost certainly have a large portion of the population? It is in 
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relation to the accommodation of austerity that Ireland is set apart in the aftermath of the crisis 
from other ‘programme countries’, where resistance, political volatility and capital flight have 
been much more pronounced (Roche et al, 2017: 9). The confrontational forms of political and 
social dissent generated in Southern peripheral European states were, in comparison, muted 
and/or contained in the Irish context. What is perhaps most illustrative of this point is the fact 
that all major political parties accepted the need for austerity and sought to accommodate the 
bailout programme with the Troika. Moreover, as Roche et al. explain, “rather than acting as 
agents of protest and dissent, unions in Ireland opted for accommodation with the agents of 
austerity, seeing this as the lesser of evils” (Roche et al., 2017: 9).  
The experience of austerity in Greece, and the continuing political reaction to it, presents a stark 
contrast to Ireland. Although many of the same features of the financial crisis are also evident in 
this case, such as rising unemployment, emigration, poverty and social exclusion, the Greek 
situation is exceptional in presenting the unfolding of a catastrophe, which was precipitated by 
an extreme reduction in GDP (25% in all), equivalent to that of a war period, and will have long-
lasting consequences associated with deep uncertainty regarding social and economic prospects. 
From the comparative European perspective being adopted here, Greece may be cast as the ‘bad 
child’ to contrast Ireland’s ‘poster child’. 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 initially effected Greece in much the same way as it did 
other fragile peripheral economies, exposing domestic weaknesses associated with low exports 
and high levels of corruption, along with an unsustainable public debt to GDP, which had been 
showing signs of deterioration since 2004 (Mavridis, 2018). However, it wasn’t until October 2009 
that the true extent of the budget deficit was exposed by the newly elected government, debt in 
relation to GDP had reached 109.4% (Mavridis, 2018: 3). The financial markets subsequently lost 
all confidence in the Greek economy, and with over 70% of its debt held by foreign investors, 
primarily European banks, the country faced default and bankruptcy on a national scale. In May 
2010, adopting the approach Ireland would later follow, Greece officially sought financial help 
from the Troika, resulting in a ‘Bailout Loan Agreement’ which would eventually total 239 billion 
EUR. In contrast to Ireland, however, Greece would sign three Memorandums (Economic 
Adjustment Programmes), which committed the government to much more intensive and long-
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term implementation of austerity measures, structural reforms and privatization of government 
assets. Mavridis explains, “According to these Memoranda, the fiscal crisis had to be faced 
through a tough consolidation process, while the most important instruments to meet the 
competitiveness crisis were drastic wage and salary cuts, liberalization of the labour market and 
services market liberalization” (2018: 2). This drastic approach, despite the extent of the 
structural reforms, the cutting of wages, raising of taxes and overall reduction in public 
investments, did not succeed in recovering the Greek economy and ultimately would result in 
the deepest and longest recession in European history (Matsaganis, 2018: 49) 
The exceptional tragedy of the Greek crisis relates to the election of an anti-austerity coalition 
government, led by the radical left SYRIZA party, with the nationalist right Anel (‘Independent 
Greeks’), in January 2015. This coalition came to power on the back of a single commitment, 
made by the leader of SYRIZA Alexis Tsipras on the eve of the election, “to end austerity with a 
single Act of Parliament on Day 1 from taking power” (Matsaganis, 2018: 50). In a referendum, 
which took place on 5 July 2015, the Greek public voted to reject the Troika’s ‘unbearable’ 
austerity conditions, by a margin of 61.31% to 38.69%. However, despite the overwhelming 
result, in May 2016 the Greek government was eventually forced to accept the entire list of ‘prior 
actions’ demanded by creditors and enshrined in the bailout agreement from the year before – 
“the third of its kind since the Greek crisis began six years earlier” (2018: 49). Following years of 
mass mobilization in opposition to austerity, 2010-2015, this moment was epitomised by a 
numbing resignation. Matsaganis describes the capitulation of the Greek government as follows, 
“the morning after the intoxicating experience of the anti-austerity rising felt like a hangover” 
(2018: 50). The situation looked unmistakably grim, with a quarter of the population 
unemployed, businesses struggling to survive and young educated Greeks emigrating in droves.  
It looked as if the dream of a quick fix to the hardship and humiliation of recent years, a 
dream at once noble and ugly, had been shattered for good (Matasganis, 2018: 50) 
Greece has come to represent a cautionary tale to other European countries, like Ireland. The 
economic and social damage left in the wake of the financial crisis in this case, by almost any 
measure, is devastating. Klaus Offe (2018) depicts the Greek experience of austerity as part of a 
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‘narrative of responsibility’ played out in the context of Europe, as a contrast to Germany. Offe’s 
distinction seeks to determine how responsibility in such a complex situation becomes 
attributed, understanding it as a clash of two essentially incompatible frames. On the one hand, 
he claims, it is through an agency-focused interpretation of the dismal situation and its origins 
(German), and, on the other, it is the fault of institutions at the structural level (Greece). Offe 
observes that from this basic distinction two conflicting narratives emerge, which animate the 
conflict, ultimately guiding it to a conclusion. In this depiction, the dominant German narrative, 
which attributed responsibility for the financial crisis on Greece for not following ‘the rules’ as 
they should, won out. Therefore, the Greek referendum, which sought to democratically resist 
the institutional response of the EU to impose an austerity programme and propose an 
alternative response to the crisis failed, and ultimately came to personify the ‘bad child’ of 
Europe.  
This idea of punishing Greece for breaking the rules, which correlates with certain responsibility 
narratives, may be contrasted with the development of a ‘good child’ narrative in relation to 
Ireland in the wake of the crisis. Keeping to the rules in this context is thus considered virtuous 
and therefore appropriately rewarded, and their violation, as in the case of Greece, represents a 
clear sign of moral inferiority, which must be appropriately sanctioned. Offe makes the point 
that, from this view of responsibility, wherever disturbances of the normal, rule-bound course of 
affairs emerge, its causes are assumed to be found on the spot, “not in mechanisms of long- 
distance-causation extending in time and space” (2018: 285). The introduction of the principle of 
responsibility shifts the problem to a moral dimension. However, as it will be described in the 
Irish context later, in Chapter 4., responsibility appears only in a highly restricted sense through 
the discourse of blame. In the Greek case, Germany, the enforcer of sanctions for rule-breaking, 
was engaged in a process of blame-avoidance; it was constructed as an imperative that brutal 
sanctions must be enforced for fear of moral hazard in Europe. Offe argues that blame-avoidance 
was a “driving motive of the ECB” at this time, “The ECB’s decision to grant Greece’s banks just 
enough funds to see them through the end of the day is part of a broader strategy to avoid having 
blood on its hands” (2018: 285). The principle of responsibility, and its degradation in the context 
of the crisis response, reflects a central normative element of the proceeding critique.  
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By way of a final comparative point, if Greece is understood as a cautionary tale in the European 
context, the case of Iceland’s response to the financial crisis presents an important paradigmatic 
alternative that reflects a somewhat troublesome comparison with both cases above. Although 
the circumstances in relation to the relatively insignificant population size (338,349 according to 
Eurostat) and its status as a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), but not the Eurozone 
or the EU more generally, it is argued here, Iceland presents an appropriate comparison. Firstly, 
the causes of and path towards the crisis in the national context are similar to that of other 
peripheral European states, i.e. an aggressive programme of financial liberalization and 
privatization from the early 1990s, followed by a highly leveraged and hyper-paced period of 
economic growth, fuelled by massive stock market and housing bubbles. Secondly, to illustrate 
the extent of Icelandic bank debt, which, similarly to the cases of Greece and Ireland, was owned 
predominantly by foreign banks, Hart-Landsberg (2013) makes the point that when the three 
largest Icelandic banks failed within the first two weeks of October 2008, their bankruptcies 
(Kaupthing; $83 billion, Landsbanki; $50 billion and Glitnir; $49 billion) would, cumulatively, have 
ranked third in the U.S history of bankruptcies, after Lehman ($691 billion) and Washington 
Mutual ($328 billion) (Hart-Landsberg, 2013: 32). To further place this in perspective, following 
Hart-Landsberg’s observations, the currency (krona) fell by more than 80% in 2008, real wages 
fell by 4.2% in the same year and 8% the next, unemployment soared from 1% to 8% between 
2007 and 2009, and lastly, Iceland suffered one of the world’s deepest economic declines in the 
same period, with GDP falling by 9.3%.  
The most important point of comparison with the cases of Ireland and Greece, however, is that 
the Icelandic government, amidst a worsening banking and currency crisis in late October 2008, 
turned to the International Monetary Fund for help. Of course, the IMF’s assistance was 
conditional, Iceland had to reimburse the governments of the UK and the Netherlands for debt 
they had guaranteed in one of the three bankrupted institutions (Icesave, a branch of 
Landsbanki). This condition would require the implementation of austerity measures, sizable tax 
hikes and significant cuts in government spending. The Icelandic government, as with the 
decisions taken by the Irish and Greek, agreed to the terms, and in exchange would receive a $2.1 
billion loan from the IMF, and an additional $3 billion from the Nordic Countries and Russia (2013: 
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43). By late October 2008, the Icelandic public began coordinated protests against the proposed 
bailout agreement with the IMF, anchored by weekly rallies in Reykjavik’s main square and 
meetings in its main theatre. The objective of the movement, which was termed the ‘pots and 
pans revolution’ was to force the resignation of the Prime Minister and to elect a new 
government. In contrast to the outcome of protests in Greece, the Iceland movement not only 
succeeded in its primary objective, coinciding with the election of a coalition between the Social 
Democratic Alliance and the Left-Green Movement, but it was followed through in rejecting the 
IMF’s proposals. As Hart-Landsberg points out, Iceland’s is the only government to have actually 
resigned as a result of the global financial crisis and “it is also the only country to have shifted 
decisively to the left in the aftermath of September 2008” (2013: 34). 
In stark contrast to the experiences of both Greece and Ireland, Iceland’s new progressive 
government adopted a series of policy actions which, rather than attempting to resuscitate 
existing structures and patterns of economic activity through austerity measures, sought to 
actively intervene in financial, housing and currency markets, also increasing public spending on 
social programmes that protected the majority interests. Although this response was certainly 
unconventional by international standards, it has proven to be more successful in promoting 
economic recovery and protecting majority well-being than the more conventional approaches 
of other European governments. What is most significant and why the popular movement in 
Iceland, which rejected the austerity conditions of the IMF, deserves greater recognition is the 
fact that, in a time of profound crisis and uncertainty, the public succeeded in building a project 
that initiated a meaningful social and political transformation. It is, therefore, the symbolic 
significance of this moment that is of greatest importance in confronting the idea that ‘there is 
no alternative’, and that the only response to the financial crisis was the re-establishment of the 
same system that led to the conditions of crisis in the first place. 
To conclude, the accounts of both Greece and Iceland illustrate responses that present a contrast 
to the Irish experience of the financial crisis. In relation to the former, a broad-based popular 
movement succeeded in electing a government that brought forward and passed a referendum 
to reject the Troika’s bailout terms, however, this ended in tragedy as the government were 
eventually forced to accept the terms and impose the austerity measures prescribed, leading to 
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a catastrophic economic and social aftermath. In the case of Iceland, the public, in a similar 
fashion, generated a movement that forced the resignation of one government and the election 
of another that rejected the austerity conditions of a bailout agreement with the IMF, however, 
the outcome was much more positive and reflects the viable possibility of a democratic response 
to the crisis. Although, as noted in the latter section of the previous chapter, the Irish public did 
generate a significant resistance to the introduction of austerity measures in the earlier phase of 
the crisis and succeeded in some instances in forcing the government to roll back on proposed 
measures, the extent of the political and social change witnessed in the above comparisons does 
not seem to be evident in this case. This brings us to the key problem of the thesis, which will 
provide the focus of the proceeding chapters; what is unique to the Irish experience and how is 





















The Development of a Conservative Cultural Model:                                                  
Irish Political Culture and the Conditions of Public Discourse 
 
Public discourse is the manifest expression of underlying cultural conditions. The 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis in Ireland is analysed here as the discursive crystallization of a public narrative 
that emerged to justify the institutional response. The key discursive moments, therefore, which 
were identified as forming elements of this narrative, reflect mechanisms that draw their 
justificatory power from a deeper source. The focus of the present chapter will be to explicate 
this source, employing the concept of the cultural model, following the work of Alain Touraine, 
to theorize the way in which culturally embedded learning patterns become established in line 
with the development of a conservative ideology in the Irish case. This presents a critical 
approach to understanding the way in which certain discourses and justifications become 
selected over others in a historically specific context.  
As a mediating selectivity structure, the cultural model may be understood here as somewhat of 
a filtration system, operating at a meso level, in between micro and macro, retaining those 
discourses deemed relevant in a situation and eliminating or ‘filtering out’ those that are 
irrelevant. Crucially, the concept allows for a recognition of the dominant self-perception of 
society at work in a specific historical context, as Touraine explains, which is organised around 
certain representations of social life according to notions of “social movement, structural conflict 
and cultural stakes” (Touraine, 1985: 765). These ‘stakes’ refer to the “social control of the main 
cultural patterns, that is, of patterns through which our relationship with the environment are 
normatively organised” (1985: 755). Ultimately, the cultural model represents the dominant 
image of a society, and therefore, determines the mediating environment within which social 
movements and conflicts, which present alternative projections of the what the society could 
potentially be, may challenge the reproduction of a given social formation.   
The financial crisis of 2008 is represented here as an exceptional moment in which the Irish 
cultural model, set within the broader European context, is exposed and challenged. Important 
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‘repair work’, revealed in the course of public discursive struggles over the significance of events 
and specific crisis management strategies on the part of the Irish government, was carried out to 
shore up the cultural model – to re-establish and maintain the dominant image of Irish society in 
a post-Celtic Tiger era, and restrain alternative discourse from substantially threatening this. The 
institutional response to the crisis, therefore, which is encapsulated in the public narrative 
outlined above, discloses an impression of the Irish cultural model in the process of repairing its 
essential integrative principles. In Chapter 4, two of these integrative principles, legitimacy and 
responsibility, will be rooted out of the narrative through the process of a critique of the public 
discourse, and accordingly reconstructed in order to disclose the normative democratic 
potentials they contain. It is through the processes of collective learning that these potentialities 
may become realized. The cognitive theory of social learning, at the centre of which lies a 
conceptualization of the cultural model, details the discursive mechanisms involved in these 
processes and, as in the case of Ireland, allows for the identification of learning blockages that 
stand in the way of discursive and normative innovation. 
The crisis is essentially framed as an opportunity for learning. This initiated a process of reflection 
on the legitimacy of the response to it, revealed in the discursive repair work captured in the 
public narrative, and, in a second sense, the way in which the principle of responsibility is then 
construed in the situation through the negative dialectic of blame. In the case of Ireland, 
therefore, a learning opportunity presents itself in the context of the crisis, however, it is not 
seized upon as a moment of transformation, as in the cases of Greece and Iceland – of course, as 
outlined in Chapter 2, both with varying degrees of success. This leads to a critical juncture in the 
present thesis, which demands the identification and explication of the specific processes of 
blocked learning in the Irish context. The chapter will, therefore, proceed by arguing for the 
development of an impression of the Irish cultural model that is dominated by the ideology of 
conservatism or, following Mannheim, a dominant mode of thought pertaining to the domain of 
political economy. A cultural model will be constructed which is essentially resistant to social and 
political change, reflected in the realization of such principles as legitimacy and responsibility. 
Importantly, however, the Irish cultural model may not be simply categorized as representing a 
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conservative hegemony, it therefore requires further clarification at this point to delineate what 
is an ambiguous context and to elucidate the perspective adopted in the proceeding critique.   
Ireland has undoubtedly experienced a significant wave of progressive-liberal transformations 
over the last twenty years. The achievement of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which was 
an innovative political solution to sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, may be taken as a 
beginning point in this sense. A peace deal, which has had a lasting impact on approaches to 
conflict resolution on an international scale – serving as a template to resolutions in such regions 
as Sudan, Bosnia and South Africa – it heralded a new era in Irish politics, decisively moving 
beyond the old civil war politics of the early twentieth century. The establishment of peace in 
Northern Ireland provided the political facility for the acceleration of economic growth and 
prosperity, manifested in the form of the ‘Celtic Tiger’. Perhaps two of the most symbolically 
powerful events in this stream of liberalization in Ireland actually occurred in the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis itself, namely, two referendums that were passed on the issues of same-
sex marriage in 2015 and the regulation of abortion in 2018. The results of these recent 
referendums, which were convincingly passed by 62% in the case of the former and 66% the 
latter, are certainly indicative a major shift in Irish society, away from the dogmatic teachings of 
the Catholic Church as the primary source of moral guidance on social and cultural matters. A 
final example of the way in which Ireland has progressed in a decisively liberal direction relates 
to the domain of parliamentary politics and the emergence of a ‘new politics’ in the aftermath of 
the crisis. Beginning in May 2016, the Irish government has been held together by virtue of an 
unlikely alliance between the two major centre-right parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. This new 
arrangement for governing parliamentary politics, which seemed to transcend the old nationalist, 
civil war divisions, reflects further the establishment of a liberal consensus that has become 
embedded in Irish political culture over the course of the past two decades or so.  
These developments, which some have claimed, echoing Fukuyama, signaled the end of Irish 
history (Coulter and Coleman, 2003), however, do not reflect the full picture of Irish political 
culture, as it is understood here from the perspective of the cultural model. Indeed, liberal 
progress has been made in significant areas of Irish society, specifically in the domains of civil and 
political rights, but when the issues of socio-economic rights and class inequality are taken into 
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account, a more complicated impression begins to emerge. Although the Celtic Tiger boom in 
Ireland, which, as discussed in Chapter 2, coincided with an embrace of the processes of 
financialization, produced a vast overall increase in wealth, it also generated a significant increase 
in wage inequality, reflecting the degree to which this newly discovered wealth was not fairly 
distributed across the society during the period of rapid economic growth. Voitchovsky, Maitre 
and Nolan (2012), through a quantitative analysis of wage inequality in Ireland between 1994 
and 2007, make the argument that the Irish case presents a valuable example of the way in which 
inequality can actually evolve during a period of exceptional economic growth. Their conclusion 
suggests that the benefits of a such a rapid and vast increase in overall economic prosperity is 
not reflected in the earnings of those at the lower level of the socio-economic spectrum, 
particularly in the period 2000 to 2007. The progressive liberal developments, therefore, which 
may rightly be heralded as clear indications of the ‘opening up’ of a conservative society that was 
once dominated and repressed by the Catholic Church, in fact disguises a more complex pattern 
of sustaining and reproducing contradictions in the underlying cultural model. 
These unavoidable contradictions are exposed in the context of the 2008 financial crisis and its 
aftermath. The Celtic Tiger marked a transformative phase in Irish society at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, buoyed by a liberal political agenda, the integrated processes of 
financialization and the emergence of a young and well-educated population. This period of 
economic boom presented Ireland as a satisfactory combination of old traditions and new liberal 
values, however, the conservative pillars of the society, most notably the Catholic Church and 
Fianna Fail, were in no way swept aside and remained a strong presence. Therefore, when the 
Irish construction industry collapsed and the economy became fully exposed to the global 
financial crisis, the tension in what was represented in this combination became clear. It was 
latently maintained during the period of economic prosperity as it served to sustain the existing 
power structure, however, as the crisis presented a threat to this underlying structure, the 
conservative forces emerged to re-establish order. The imposition of austerity, as explained in 
Chapter 2, exemplifies the way in which the responsibility for the crisis was to be shared, in this 
sense, political elites emphasizing the nationalist ‘we’ in accepting the government’s approach. 
The aftermath of the crisis also represents the attempt to re-establish the same unsustainable 
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economic conditions of the Celtic Tiger (an average of 6% GDP growth between 2000 and 2008), 
specifically focusing on such policies that prioritize the re-inflation of property prices, taken as a 
primary indication of economic recovery, which has already shown to have disastrous socio-
economic effects, reflected in the record levels of homelessness.  
The conditions of learning which are, therefore, shaped in this cultural complex of a national 
setting become discernible when faced with having to thematize and respond to a crisis. 
Following the cognitive sociological theory of learning, developed in Chapter 5., which develops 
the idea of varying ‘modes’ of learning that may constitute a spectrum of relevance in a specific 
context and also a mechanism to ‘filter out’ irrelevant discourses, the objective here is to 
postulate those elements within the Irish cultural model, preventing, for instance, the generation 
of alternative narratives in responding to the crisis. Given that this reflects a distinctly 
conservative model, which is therefore capable of sustaining deeply problematic contradictions, 
the lack of public recognition and understanding of the problems faced in the context of the 
financial crisis reflects this engrained structure standing in the way of normative learning. The 
development of a public sphere in the context of the Irish national setting coincides with the 
emergence of a form of hegemonic nationalism, reflected in the distinctive form of power that 
bears on the conditions of public discourse and the related prospects for further participation in 
the democratic process. Moreover, the normative culture, highlighting in particular the issue of 
social class and the unequal distribution of political power, identifies the generative features of 
the Irish social structure which is rarely given explicit analytical treatment. In what follows, I will 
explicate the distortions and contradictions produced in the conservative Irish cultural model, 
firstly through the development of a political culture that reflects an order of normative 
repression and, in a subsequent section, through an account of the socio-cultural implications of 
conservatism as a dominant political ideology.    
 
3.1 Delineating a Cultural Model: Irish Political Culture, Nationalism and Class 
The cultural model concept, which is key to the critical sociological approach adopted here, 
comprises political culture as an element within a wider structural arrangement. The analysis of 
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political culture in Ireland presents a research tradition that will, therefore, be drawn upon in 
delineating a crucial dimension of the cultural model at stake here, specifically in relation to 
understanding the way in which a certain ‘order of discourse’ can emerge out of distinctive 
conditions. These conditions will be shown to reflect the existence of a ‘form of consciousness’ 
or mode of thought in the Irish case, a context in which a dominant ideology functions to support, 
stabilize and legitimize certain kinds of social institutions and practices. To guide the proceeding 
analysis, the Critical Theory approach is reintroduced with reference to the problem of ideology 
in the proceeding section. This will be brought forward through the idea of ‘normative repression’ 
or ‘Herrschaft’ (loosely translated as ‘authority’), often employed by Habermas to delineate an 
ideology as a ‘world-picture’ that serves to stabilize and/or legitimize domination or hegemony. 
The narrative identified in the opening empirical chapter, resulting from an observation of public 
discourse, reflects a complex of underlying normative political conditions. Eve Chiapello and 
Norman Fairclough (2002), through a transdisciplinary combination of the ‘new sociology of 
capitalism’ and critical discourse analysis, explicate the dialectical relationship between the 
mechanism of discourse, which constitutes the basic elements of any public narrative, and the 
development of an ‘order of discourse’ or, more generally, a normative order. From this 
perspective, therefore, what is referred to as an ‘order of discourse’ constitutes a process of 
social structuring, as Chiapello and Fairclough put it, “a social structuring of semiotic difference 
– a particular social ordering of relationships amongst different ways of making meaning, i.e. 
different discourses, genres and styles” (Chiapello and Fairclough, 2002: 194). One important 
aspect of this ordering process is dominance, which reflects a situation in which a certain way of 
‘making-meaning’ is dominated by a particular order of discourse, a mainstream, thus rendering 
other discourses as ‘marginal’, oppositional or, as in the context of the present case, ‘alternative’. 
Fairclough (1992) claims that, in this context, the political concept of ‘hegemony’ may be useful 
in the analysis of such an order of discourse, as the structuring process has become part of 
legitimating what may be understood as ‘common sense’, thus sustaining relations of 
domination.     
The distinctiveness of Irish political culture may be attributed to a range of historical processes, 
most of which, in some way or another, relate to the role of the British state. Three of the main 
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characteristics, often highlighted as central to this distinctiveness, are the interrelated, 
historically rooted factors of Irish nationalism, the role of the Catholic Church and a rural-based, 
agricultural economy. The political culture that emerged from this basic arrangement, which 
would provide for a projection of an ideal image of Irish society, is probably best summarised in 
Eamon de Valera’s 1934 speech: “The Ireland which we have dreamed of would be the home of 
a people who valued material wealth only as a basic of right living, of a people who were satisfied 
with frugal comfort and devoted their leisure to things of the spirit; a land whose countryside 
would be bright with cosy homesteads, whose fields and villages would be joyous with the sounds 
of industry, with the rompings of sturdy children, the contests of athletic youths, the laughter of 
comely maidens; whose firesides would be forums for the wisdom of serene old age. It would, in 
a word, be the home of a people living the life that God desires that men should live” (Girvin, 
1993: 383). Given the liberal secular developments in Ireland over the past twenty years, 
mentioned in the last section, however, the proceeding analysis will not emphasize the role of 
the Church, and will instead focus on the issues of nationalism, specifically the emergence of 
distinctive national identity, and on the issue of class, a socio-economic category which tends to 
be a more stabilized component of a cultural model and thus, less susceptible to change over a 
relatively short period of time. 
Tom Garvin (1996) maps the development of an Irish political culture from a critical democratic 
perspective. Focusing on the early 1920s and the struggle for the formation of a new Irish state, 
Garvin seeks to explain a complex process, “far from being a squalid squabble between 
conspirators who envied and distrusted each other, as it appeared certainly to many English and 
Irish eyes, the conflict echoed a deep division in the Irish political mind” (Garvin, 1996: 139). The 
distinction between the opposing sides, pro- and anti-Treaty, in the civil war (1922-23) becomes 
particularly significant, as Garvin argues, the differences were based, not on some ethnic, settler-
versus-native dimension, but rather on class and “elite differences of a non-sociological nature; 
mutual distrust, envy and contempt amounted to a paranoia that had long underlain formal 
friendship and ties of loyalty and affection – an emotional set of collective relationships now 
unreconstructable” (Ibid, 1996: 142-3). This distinction would have profound cultural 
implications for the development of the Irish state;  
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…it tended to follow a divide that separated those who saw the Republic as a moral and 
transcendental entity analogous to the Church of Christ, and entity whose citizens were 
duty-bound to defend it with their purses and their lives, from those who saw the Republic 
as a bargaining device in achieving rational-legal self-government for as much of Ireland 
as possible, regardless of formal political labels (Garvin, 1996: 143) 
From this distinction, building upon an earlier study of Jeffery Praeger’s, Garvin develops two 
categories to differentiate the dominant ‘subcultures’ or ‘collective political styles’ which 
constitute the parameters of Irish political culture at this formative period; ‘republican moralism’ 
and ‘nationalist pragmatism’ (1996: 145). In relation to the former, moralism of political style, 
similar to O’Malley’s observation of the ‘authoritarian attitude’, refers to an inability “to handle 
the political ideas of those who thought differently, and a related tendency to see disagreement 
as necessarily motivated by unworthy considerations” (1996: 145). The idea of ‘nationalist 
pragmatism’, on the other hand, relates to an indifference to political convictions and promotes 
a certain political minimalism; he explains, politics is seen from this perspective as “a process by 
which large numbers of people settled their differences non-violently, rather than a process by 
which human beings become better people” (1996: 145). Moralism, Garvin explains, is associated 
with a form of ‘communalism’, a political community rooted in the local, it is “supervised as a 
shepherd might supervise his flock, is caring, values personal contact, and is profoundly 
distrustful of change or of individual thought” (1996: 145). In contrast, he describes the 
pragmatist’s political system as resembling “an impersonal, unloved, and unloving machine that 
processes demands from citizens impersonally and in a rule-bound way” (1996: 146). It is the 
political culture of a certain idealised citizen, the bourgeois, the well-off, and the literate. The 
conditions within which this oppositional structure of political mentalities would evolve are 
summarised by Garvin in the following; 
Irish society at the time of the founding of the modern Irish democracy was essentially 
peasant, although it was evolving rapidly into a classic western free-farmer society. It was 
also a society that had an inherited terror of poverty and had rather good levels of 
elementary education but very few highly educated people. The destruction of so much of 
the Anglo-Irish culture that occurred during the revolution exacerbated the problem any 
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democratic government would have had: that of running the country. In some ways, 
independent Ireland had a serious problem of mentality (Garvin, 1996: 152) 
Patrick O’Mahony and Gerard Delanty (2001) make the case that to critically examine the 
consequences of previous decisions and actions in terms of understanding the establishment of 
discernible goals for a society, one must deal with the genesis and institutionalization of its 
identity, or more precisely, its national identity. Critically reflecting upon the development of 
such a process, and considering the mode of reasoning it engenders, they find Irish national 
identity to appear as fragile, defensive and ultimately dismissive in the face of any criticism; “the 
society has felt afraid of finding problems with itself and of exposing contradictions” (O’Mahony 
and Delanty, 2001: 1). O’Mahony and Delanty offer a distinctive sociological approach, pursuing 
reasons beyond the limits of historical research to present a synthetic approach that facilitates 
reflection on how an emphasis on nationalism, reproduced and carried by this distinctive class 
structure, has had a significant effect on the process of democratization in the society. 
Ireland’s path through the twentieth century may be characterized as something of a moral 
maze. Often, British responsibility for ‘colonial exploitation’ is the argument put forward against 
taking a critical perspective on Ireland. However, following O’Mahony and Delanty, it is 
understood here “that Irish nationalism was sufficiently successful in its goal of achieving national 
self-determination as to deserve responsibility, positively or negatively, for shaping this century 
in the southern part of Ireland, allowing of course for the nature of the resources it historically 
inherited and the continuing effect of events beyond its borders” (2001: 2). In other words, 
responsibility should not be deflected away from the choices made in one way or another by 
social groups in society. The sociological perspective advanced below allows for crucial links to 
be made between (middle) class interests and values, and national identity, the 
institutionalization of a conservative political culture and Irish nationalism, and ultimately, 
between the unfolding of and response to the 2008 financial crisis and the weakened role of 
democracy in an extremely dependent and repressive state.  
It is through understanding Irish national identity that the context of the political choices made 
over time can be revealed, which are often shown to be beyond those that were perceived as 
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‘forced’ by the existing situation and the logic of events. O’Mahony and Delanty argue, “Irish 
nationalism on the whole did choose the kind of society it wanted, albeit in a conflictual, 
constrained and uncertain way, and its choices are revealed in the fluctuating fortunes and 
evolution of its code of national identity” (2001: 2). National identity is here understood as the 
“cultural outcome of a discourse of the nation”, serving the purposes of providing a sense of 
collective belonging, the basis for a form of citizenship in the nation-state context, determining 
the character and goals of that nation-state, and producing a corresponding form of political 
identity, which transfers the substance of cultural identity into values that underpin political 
activity (2001: 3). Existing alongside a multitude of other identities in modern democracies but 
holding a special position among them due to its close connection to the notion of state 
citizenship, national identity is reproduced in an unstable field between, O’Mahony and Delanty 
explain, “cultural discourses of common bonds and practices and political discourses of interests 
and rights” (2001: 3). Generating also a form of symbolic mobilization, are two main components 
that make up this mode of identity; a national cultural identity is constructed around values and 
rules of collective belonging, which become embedded in the nation’s social institutions, such as 
the family, education, healthcare; and, a national political identity, which is built upon the values 
and rules that guide political practice and institutions. It is, they contend, the tension between 
the cultural discourses of the nation and the broader civic values constituting that political culture 
that can allow for contradictions in the given social order to come to the surface; 
If political identity is shaped by cultural discourses of the nation and not by other sources of 
political values, the introduction or preservation of norms that guarantee the fairness and 
impartiality of democratic institutions may be threatened. This may arise if shifts in national 
cultural identity that follow the wishes of a majority are too rapidly institutionalized. In this 
scenario, the rights of minorities, for example, may be rapidly diminished if a racist or 
xenophobic cultural attitude becomes widely diffused and political significant (O’Mahony and 
Delanty, 2001: 4) 
Nationalism, in some form, is central to the identity of all nation-states. With its emphasis on 
defining oneself according to what one is not, as opposed to what constitutes group solidarity, 
nationalism often manifests itself in a chauvinistic sense, leading to racism and a general distrust 
63 
 
of ‘foreigners’; “Irish nationalism might reasonably have been defined as anti-Britishness rather 
than ‘Irishness’… (O’Malley, 2011: 112). Conservatism, a second feature O’Malley highlights, 
refers broadly to the relationship between the state and society, and the extent to which the 
former tends to ‘interfere’ in the latter. While this idea will be developed later in relation to the 
cultural evolution of conservatism, for present purposes conservatism may be understood as 
placing emphasis on individual, personal responsibility and general distrust of the state.  
Conservatism, and the values associated with it, provides support for ‘traditional’ view of society. 
In the Irish context, these have manifested themselves in support for the historical role of the 
Catholic church in social life, which, O’Malley points out, represents a key factor that he terms 
an ‘authoritarian attitude’; “Though this type of authoritarian attitude is declining, it does 
demonstrate the tendency of Irish people to feel that people should be able to impose their views 
on others” (Ibid, 2011: 113). Lastly, the persistence of a peasant culture, encapsulated in the 
landlord/tenant relationship, represents an important element in the development of Irish 
political culture. Although, similarly to the idea of ‘Catholic authoritarianism’, it may no longer 
saliently exist in the society, it is persevered in the present through an emphasis on such 
principles as loyalty (2011: 113). O’Malley discusses the importance of loyalty to one’s own group 
in relation to the Irish political phenomenon of Fianna Fail, which characterizes a culture of loyalty 
in which dissent would never be shown to party outsiders (2011: 113); this is, more generally, 
related to the problem of clientelism and political brokerage in Irish politics.      
The development of Irish national identity, which may also be viewed as consistent with the 
general European experience regarding the formation of nation-states, signifies the development 
of a political culture characterised by a cultural anti-modernism and a distinctive form of political 
authoritarianism, embodied, as noted above, in the positioning of the two dominant conservative 
political parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. Although these factors, which appear antithetical to 
the development of a modern democratic social order, have faded over time with the general, 
albeit reluctant, acceptance of a growing secularisation, sexual liberation, a more pronounced 
individualism and of course social welfare commitments, there remains a deep-seated cultural 
contradiction. O’Mahony and Delanty observe a return to the explicit themes of the nation in 
Ireland, particularly around the turn of the twenty-first century, coinciding with the development 
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of the ‘Celtic Tiger’, which, they argue, was both backward-looking in the sense of nostalgia for 
the certainties of traditional, Catholic Ireland, yet also forward-looking, attempting to 
accommodate “itself somewhat uneasily to social change while seeking to create a new cultural 
nation-code extending beyond existing institutional frameworks” (2001: 6). The power of 
conservative Catholic nationalism in shaping the institutional political order of Ireland, through 
the imposition of prescriptive ethical codes governing such spheres as the family, the public 
sphere, the economy, education and art, is indeed significant, particularly when viewed from the 
critical perspective of a democratic social order. The deep contradictions which were exposed by 
the response to the financial crisis, from this perspective, reveal a society at odds with itself, 
unable to reflect upon or thematise democratic principles at a crucial point in time.  
Drawing on Delanty and O’Mahony’s (2002) interpretation of Norbert Elias’ empirical-theoretical 
work on the construction of national cultures, the preceding observations on Irish society may 
be set in another context. By delineating national cultural norms associated with the 
institutionalization of certain principles over time, Elias developed typology of the national 
habitus within a European civilizational framework. There were three major traditions delineated 
in this framework; in the case of England, he identified a dynamic between the ideas of freedom 
and authority, tolerance and inequality, self-discipline and pragmatism; in France, ideological 
intolerance and instrumentalism, authoritarianism and formalism; and Germany, 
authoritarianism, bureaucratism, discipline and conformism (Delanty and O’Mahony, 2002: 67). 
National political cultures thus formed along the lines of the different experiences of state-
formation, an outcome which Elias understood as the culmination of centuries-long struggles 
within and between territories, constituting conflicts and alliance-building processes between 
monarchical, aristocratic and bourgeois elements. It is ultimately, as Delanty and O’Mahony point 
out, through his understanding of the formation of conscience – ‘conscientization’ – in the 
civilization of western modernity that distinctive national paths, and the associated collective 
identities, may be charted.    
The construction of national cultures situates the functional importance of nationalism as an 
integrative ideology within states, also constituting boundary conditions regarding other nation-
states. The former relates to the development of a particular national ethos and sensibility, which 
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is constructed out of the dynamics of social forces within the nation itself (2002: 69). Elias defined 
this process as the formation of a ‘canon’, which Delanty and O’Mahony conceptualize as being 
deeply related to the learning processes that are generated within a distinctive culture and 
therein diffused out of the defined milieux of social classes (2002: 69). From this distinction, a 
general normative orientation of a national culture may be identified, and ultimately subjected 
to critique. Considering the Irish case from the viewpoint of learning processes which are 
determined by the historical development of a distinctive ethos and sensibility of the nation, 
which in turn is shaped by the institutionalization of certain principles in the political public 
sphere, a discernible pattern begins to emerge. Irish national culture reproduces the conditions 
of a deeply conservative society, the outcome of a learning process which is fundamentally at 
odds with the democratic alignment of the enlightenment principles of modernity. As it will be 
argued, through the prioritization of certain principles over any consideration of the democratic 
will of the Irish public, the 2008 crisis presents an intellectual opportunity to make explicit this 
problematic learning process, and in doing so disclose a denied potentiality for a democratic 
mode of public discourse, in relation to which the legacy of the crisis is most profound. 
The second distinction, which will be used in delineating the specific form of cultural model 
relevant to the Irish national context and its distinctive mode of public discourse, is the socio-
economic category of class. In many ways closely related to the idea of nationalism in this 
context, the classical understanding of this broad concept refers to relational categories within 
an overall structure of the cultural model of the time.  Explicating the relationship between the 
dynamics of labour and capital, between the capitalist class and the working class, it may be 
understood through what Marx termed the means of production, which in a capitalist social 
formation, is ultimately characterised by exploitation. Levine (1998) provides an appropriate 
outline of the concept as follows;  
It is this ‘hidden’ contradiction that results in the antagonistic relationship between labour 
and capital and forms the basis for conflict in capitalist society. Hence, the opposing 
interests of the two different classes (the interest of the capitalists being the increase in 
profits and the interest of the working class being the increase in wages) lead the two 
classes to objective conflict (Levine, 1998: 4) 
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In the Irish context, the lop-sided development reflected in the emphasis on the middle class, as 
a distinctive political group, through the twentieth century characterizes a process of social 
change that “worked insidiously and unbeknown to those it was affecting” (Farmer, 2010: vii). In 
fleshing out the cultural codes and aspirations of this burgeoning middle class, Farmer (2010) 
examines two books of etiquette published in the in the 1960s aimed at the future (male) 
breadwinner, which help to illuminate some interesting dynamics representative of this 
distinctive group; Martin Molloy’s ‘Book of Irish Courtesy’ and ‘Christian Politeness’, written by 
the Christian Brothers themselves (2010: 224). Although the latter, rather obviously, presents a 
dull set of guidelines for ‘fulfilling of the Divine precept’, the former offers a crucial insight into 
the extent of class-consciousness in Ireland at the time. Referring to the “aristocratic temper of 
the Irish mind”, Farmer explains in relation to Molloy, there was an unease about the genre of 
class, that Ireland perceived itself as a distinctly classless society (2010: 224), specifically in 
contrast to Britain; “Despite their long years of hardship, the Irish never became bourgeois: their 
minds were too fine, too sensitive”, according to Molloy (2010: 224). Also, Farmer explains, it 
was claimed that there was an inordinate “respect for good breeding” in Ireland, not, he clarifies, 
in any class-conscious sense but in their respect for the integrity and personal qualities associated 
with member of the “Old Stock” (2010: 225). “This aristocratic stamp”, Molloy explains, “is very 
clearly explained in the average Irish countryman, than whom there is no finer gentlemen to be 
found anywhere; and no shrewder judge of what constitutes a true gentlemen” (2010: 225).  
Diarmaid Ferriter (2010), in addressing how the cultural capital of the Irish middle class has been 
translated into extensive political power, analyses how the interests and values of a definite 
group have become entrenched in Irish politics, leading to the formation of political conditions 
which define the beginning of the twenty-first century in Ireland. Using internal government 
documents, which began to be released in the 1990s under the National Archives’ 30-year rule, 
Ferriter focuses on the decisive role of Fianna Fail – the most historically significant political party 
in Ireland – in this process, highlighting, in particular, its transition from being ‘the real Irish 
Labour Party’ to an embrace of unbridled capitalism as the basis of its governing strategy 
(Ferriter, 2010: 272). He makes the point, however, that this transition was a salient problem in 
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the 1960s, with some members of the party expressing concern in relation to the increasing 
emphasis on the interests of the middle and upper-middle classes;  
In January 1965, for example, [Kevin] Boland wrote to the Minister for Finance that there 
was a ‘general feeling that we have not paid sufficient attention to the weaker sections of 
the community and that there has not been an equitable distribution of the increased 
prosperity to which we point as an achievement’ (Ferriter, 2010: 273) 
Ferriter posits that in the post-war period, when the welfare state was very much at the forefront 
of European politics, hopes of a commitment to social-democratic forms of government in Ireland 
were severely impeded; in this period “the response of the middle-class establishment to 
Ireland’s social and economic malaise was entirely ineffectual” (Ibid, 2010: 374-5). Partly, he 
explains, a product of scare-mongering about socialism, the ‘Red Scare’, sponsored by the 
Catholic church, the consensus among the large political parties and the middle class in general 
was that Ireland was actually not a very poor country, and those insistent on ‘class-politics’ were 
portrayed as “foreign-influenced and dangerous radical” (2010: 275). However, it may be argued, 
the constant denial of social deprivation and suffering, particularly in the face of statistical 
evidence regarding the degree of inequality and acute economic vulnerability at the time, reflects 
a political culture with a tendency to entirely circumvent responsibility. Ferriter draws attention 
to the obvious alternative to engaging with the middle class politically, emigration; a trend which 
would continue, and constitute an essential feature in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. “Between 
1951 and 1961, 500,000 emigrated. In 1957 alone, the figure was 60,000” (2010: 277).  
Through the 1960s and 70s, Ferriter observes, middle class interests and values continued to 
dominate, advanced by the persistent control Fianna Fail maintained over political discourse and 
action in Ireland. Considered the period during which it properly entered the global economic 
system, becoming a member of the European Economic Community (EEC), ultimately beginning 
to take what would become its recognizably modern form, Irish society saw a substantial increase 
in general wealth, but the class-dynamics remained in place, strictly controlling the distribution 
of resources and power. Ferriter discerns consistent themes in public discourse during this time, 
related to the preoccupation with the security of the state over social equality, and, most 
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significantly, the controversy regarding progressive strides made in relation to social welfare 
(2010: 280). An important factor in understanding this development is the lack of distinction 
between the two major political parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. The lack of any relevant 
ideological distinction is strikingly clear in relation to the approach to social welfare;  
In 1974, the Minister for Finance, Richie Ryan, returned to the issue [of wealth tax] in the 
context of the publication of a White Paper on capital taxation. There was considerable 
unease on the part of Fine Gael supporters about this question – in February 1974, Dr. 
Edward More, Bishop of Kilmore, Elphin and Ardagh, wrote to Cosgrave and warned him 
to tread carefully and not adopt the ‘doctrinaire’ approach of the Labor Party on such 
issues (Ferriter, 2010: 281)              
Although the 1980s began with a decisive victory for Fianna Fail in the 1977 general election, 
Ferriter notes, the era would be dominated by a resurgent opposition Fine Gael party, which now 
also “appealed to the liberal middle class” (2010: 283). Despite being overshadowed by reports 
of deep corruption associated with the Taoiseach, Charles Haughey, government policy at the 
time emphasized fiscal austerity, and the reduction of the national debt in the late 80s and early 
90s laid the groundwork for the economic boom of 2000s. However, it is emphasized once more, 
“the creation of a more solvent and ultimately wealthy society was not matched by any 
determination to redistribute these riches or tackle the fundamental inequalities of Irish society” 
(2010: 283). Ferriter argues, by way of summation, there is very little to distinguish between the 
main political parties in Ireland in terms of economic and social policy from the 1980s onwards, 
and, most importantly for the purposes at hand, as the twenty-first century dawned and 
economic growth accelerated exponentially, the extent to which successive governments 
focused on addressing poverty and class inequality continued to be dismally reflected in the ever-
widening gap between rich and poor, as Ireland’s health system, housing, education, and 
transport problems remained completely unresolved (2010: 287).  
The reproduction of a public culture which coincides with a deeply restrictive and somewhat 
insular form of ‘national identity’, on the one hand, and a structure of class relations which 
negates the recognition of general principles and problems of the political order, on the other, 
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results in a mode of public discourse, reflected in the response to the crisis. A principle task of 
the Critical Theory approach, taking into account these particular circumstances, is the 
reconstructive exposition of social relations which constitute relations of domination, through 
uncovering instances of ideological distortion. There is an important distinction to be drawn here 
in relation to the role of ideology, between the function of supporting, fostering or stabilizing 
hegemony and the function of justifying and legitimizing hegemony. It is the latter that applies 
to the case of Ireland, as Raymond Geuss (1981) clarifies “any set ideas which legitimizes or 
justifies a social practice will thereby tend to support it, but the converse is not the case” (Geuss, 
1982: 15). Habermas employs the term ‘Herrschaft’ to describe this condition, which refers to 
“the power to repress, i.e. enforce the frustration of some given human preferences” (1981: 15). 
The following section, which focuses on an analysis of the implications of a conservative ideology 
for conditions of learning, takes the idea of ‘normative repression’ as the key point of critique. 
The objective here is not simply to identify an example of ideological distortion, which is to 
reproduce conditions of normative repression, with the intention of showing how it ought to be 
eliminated, but to recognize a context in which the frustration of some preferences is deemed 
legitimate and unexceptional. In this sense, Herrschaft refers to the exercise of power in a 
political order, and how this is linked to its basic claim to legitimacy. This leads to an important 
distinction which informs the proceeding analysis, whereas ‘normative repression’ refers to the 
frustration of agents’ preferences “which makes a claim to legitimacy that is accepted by those 
agents because of certain normative beliefs they hold”, ‘Herrschaft’ refers to the power to 
exercise this repression (Geuss, 1981: 16). As this form of power is normally unequally distributed 
in society, it results in the domination of one group over another, as in the Irish case, along the 
lines of socio-economic class. 
Terence Brown (1985) charts the development of Irish society at the beginning of the twentieth 
century by means of an assessment of the emergence of a conservative society. It is in this period, 
Brown explains, which led up to the formation of the Irish Free State in the early 1920s, that a 
cultural model which was to establish a hegemonic form of domination for the proceeding 
century took shape. What preoccupies Brown’s treatment of the society and culture begins with 
an explanation of how a revolution, fought on behalf of ambitious republican ideals, “ideals which 
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had been crystallized in the heroic crucible of the Easter Rising”, could have led to the 
establishment of an Irish state “notable for a stultifying lack of social, cultural and economic 
ambition…” (Brown, 1985: 14). Brown argues that for the twenty-six counties that made up the 
Free State from 1922, a “prudent acquiescence” was displayed in relation to the “inherited 
realities of the Irish social order and a conservative determination to shore up aspects of that 
order by repressive legislation where is seemed necessary” (1985: 14). The conditions of 
economic stagnation, which were an unavoidable feature of Ireland at the turn of the twentieth 
century, are presented as an initial explanation;  
The beautification of the cities and the education of the workers could not proceed without 
an economic miracle that faith might generate but works in the form of major investment 
and bold enterprise would have to sustain. Neither faith nor works could easily flourish in 
the insecure economic environment of the Irish Free State in the 1920s, in the aftermath 
of a civil war (Brown, 1985: 14) 
Brown, however, emphasizes that the lack of cultural and social innovation which was evident in 
the first decades of Irish independence must not be attributed to the depressed economic 
conditions alone. Indeed, the pre-revolutionary experience had shown that artistic and cultural 
vitality did not necessarily require vast economic resources; “…it was to those years of cultural 
and social activity and to the political and military exploits that accompanied them that the new 
state owed its existence” (1985: 17). It is, Brown reasons, in the social composition of Irish society 
itself that an explanation of the deep-rooted social and cultural conservatism of the new state is 
to be found. Using the 1926 Census as his empirical reference point, the homogeneity of this 
composition is highlighted. The partition of the island into two separate states in 1920 
precipitated a sectarian division where the northern six counties, which contained the only large 
industrial centre, constituted a Presbyterian majority that expressed its own distinctive sense of 
Irish identity. The southern twenty-six counties, on the other hand, as Brown explains, lay open 
for a “Catholic nationalist majority to express its social and cultural will unimpeded by significant 
opposition from powerful minorities” (1985: 18). The years preceding Irish independence, 
according to Brown, saw a ‘cultural flowering’ as a product of the ‘invigorating clash’ between 
the representatives of Anglo-Ireland and the emergent nationalists, leading to sensitive and 
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imaginative projections, ‘adventurous social and cultural experiments’, of the ways in which that 
diversity could possibly be accommodated in the future (1985: 18). However, as Brown observes, 
following revolution, civil war and, ultimately, a brokered independence, “the social 
homogeneity of the twenty-six counties no longer demanded such imaginatively comprehensive 
visions” (1985: 18).   
There are two more important elements, which Brown highlights in his analysis of the 1926 
Census, that further illuminate the social order of Ireland in the early part of the twentieth 
century; firstly, this was a rural state, with 61% of the population living outside towns or villages; 
and, secondly, it was prodigiously Catholic, 92.6% of the population according to the same record 
(1985: 19 & 30). Associated factors, such as, in relation to the former, the extreme levels of 
emigration, which had since the Famine remained the highest of any European country, and, in 
relation to the latter, the prevalence of pre-marital chastity and the disproportionate levels of 
unmarried men and women, the highest of any country in which records are kept, reveal these 
features of social composition as contributing to the overwhelming cultural and social 
conservatism (1985: 19). Brown describes Irish rural life at the turn of the twentieth century as 
being “like a raft afloat in the calm of a great storm” (1985: 19). But, however damaging the 
peculiar social organisation of rural life in Ireland to the possibility of future cultural and political 
innovations in the subsequent decades, the role of the Catholic church in the formation of the 
state and throughout the twentieth century is pivotal to understanding the country’s disturbed 
relation to modernity;    
The role of the Catholic Church in directing Irish life into the narrow channels of Jansenistic 
puritanism has…been proffered by commentators as one explanation for the fact that so 
many people for so long in Ireland were able to behave as if those troublesome but 
exhilarating manifestations of human nature, passion, sexual aspiration, and the erotic 
principle itself had been quite excised from the Irish experience (Brown, 1985: 26) 
The domination of the Catholic Church over Irish social life is due in large part to its institutional 
and popular achievements in the period following the Famine, and, throughout the past century, 
the role played by Catholicism in confirming Irish national identity is pivotal. Setting apart what 
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it meant to be Irish from the identities of the other inhabitants of the British Isles, Brown argues, 
was vital for Irish nationalism, particularly at a time when the Irish language and the Gaelic 
culture of the past was in decline (1985: 28). The devotion to the Catholic faith, he claims, was 
peculiarly well suited to the narrative of nationalist awakening; it was also “richly endowed with 
attributes appropriate to its modern role in the nation’s life” (1985: 29). Brown, furthermore, 
illustrates that Irish Catholicism increasingly became a core symbolic feature of Irish national 
identity at a time when the Church promulgated doctrines that enshrined the rights of private 
property; this took advantage of a central nationalist aspiration, often rooted in the farmer’s 
attachment to the land, he explains, as exemplified in the Land War, and ensured the Church’s 
continued role at the heart of Irish social life (1985: 29).   
This attempt to situate Irish society, with its distinctive conditions, into the general context of 
modernity drew from historical works, which offer perspectives on the way in which the society 
was constituted at the beginning of the last century. The development of Irish society in the wake 
of independence, consolidating throughout the twentieth century, represented a mode of social 
organisation deeply committed to conservatism, as observed above, and this would become 
explicitly reflected in its politics and political culture. It would cultivate what Ferree et al. (2002) 
would refer to as a representative elitist form of democracy. In this sense, comparable to Peters 
(2008), normative culture becomes actualized in a given political system and public sphere, thus 
providing characteristic orientations in relation to what, who, where, and how public discourse 
shapes the conditions, mechanisms and outcomes of politics. The idea of representative elitism, 
used here to describe the form of democracy which has become established in the Irish context, 
refers, in Ferree et al.’s work, to one of four normative models which are used to account for the 
development of contrasting forms of democracy in different national public spheres. In this case, 
the model of democracy reflects a form of publicity which runs from top to bottom. It is therefore 
understood as an elitist scheme in which citizens are viewed as merely observers of political 




3.2 A Conservative Cultural Model: Implications for Learning and Normative Innovation 
The literary writer, Sean O’Faolain’s work The Irish (1969) helps to locate Irish political culture in 
the context of modernity. Through what he referred to as ‘a creative history of the growth of a 
racial mind’, or a ‘psychological history’, O’Faolain sought, as a challenge to the conventional 
nationalist account of historically significant political events, to describe the unfolding narrative 
of Irish history as “the story of the development of a national civilization” (O’Faolain, 1969: 9). 
He argued that what had happened to the Irish mind in this development was not an ‘undisturbed 
local expansion’, but part of a complex process of assimilation, “at the end of which Ireland 
enters, with her own distinctive qualifications, into the great stream of European culture” (1969: 
9). O’Faolain was critical of the dominant nationalist conception of Irish history, a perspective 
from which Ireland was consistently represented as on the defensive, protecting herself against 
foreign enemies. To take the perspective of ‘nationality solely from the viewpoint of civilization’, 
Ireland is understood, he argues, not in the sense of defending itself on the political or military 
battlegrounds, but, on the battleground of this racial mind, “forced on each occasion to struggle 
afresh with itself” (1969: 9). He observed, however, that any of the historical explanations of the 
achievements and failures which had come to create this ‘Irish mind’, as he described it at the 
time of writing this book, must remain circumspect. Indeed, how can one speak of an historical 
event or sequence of events and boldly claim they point directly to the modern destination one 
is viewing them from?  
Ireland presents somewhat of a conundrum from the perspective of modernization. Having a 
long colonial attachment to a British state, that, following Cleary, is thought to be the exemplary 
incarnation of the fundamental principles of modernity, has resulted in continuous disputation 
regarding the historically subordinated country’s relationship to ‘the modern’. As O’Faolain’s 
critique also reveals, academics and cultural commentators have laboured persistently on the 
question of whether Ireland was ever, in itself, a modern society, whether, as Cleary puts it, “the 
modern was to be equated with progress or its obverse, whether the agencies that had 
apparently generated or stymied the modern were largely external or internal to Irish society, 




…the issue as to how to articulate the relationship between Ireland and the modern has 
constituted an abiding stimulus or tonic to Irish cultural activity in literature, in cinema, in 
music and in the visual and other arts. In short, a complex, contested history of claim and 
counter-claim means that in an Irish context the term ‘modernity’ is stripped of its 
semblance of obviousness: its meanings have been consistently interrogated (Cleary, 
2005: 3)     
Employing the concept of modernity presupposes an epochal rupture with the ‘pre-modern’ or, 
more generally, a set of conditions which can define the separation of the past from the present, 
thus providing a definite context for analysis. Cleary, therefore, considers the question, when 
does modern Ireland actually begin and end? Two representations of modernity are outlined in 
the Irish case, constituting a transition from an ‘early’ to a ‘mature’ or ‘advanced’ phase of 
modernity. In regards to the former, Cleary highlights epochal events which correspond to the 
standard metanarratives of Western or European modernity; “the Protestant Reformation and 
the development of novel modes of consciousness, discipline and enterprise; the emergence of 
capitalism and the gradual dissolution of the feudal mode of production with its characteristic 
forms of authority, land tenure and labour; the conquest of the Americas and the expansion of  
the European terrestrial and maritime empires across the globe; the conception of a sovereign 
and self-reflexive human subjectivity as one of the cardinal features of modernity” (2005: 3). 
From the standpoint of these epochal events, the emergence of the initial manifestation of a 
‘modern Ireland’, Cleary claims, is conventionally ascribed to the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. The inception of this modernity, he states, is attributed to the Tudor and Stuart 
colonisations of the island, events which are viewed either as part of the larger struggle between 
European Reformation and Counter-Reformation, or as an element of the westward drive of 
imperial expansion; “its corollary was the inception of a centuries-long attempt to render Ireland 
amenable to the imperatives of English and later transnational capital” (2005: 3).  
In relation to the ‘advanced’ phase of modernity, Cleary points out identifying inaugurating 
historical moments that characterize it, typically beginning with the French Revolution and the 
European Enlightenment that prepared the way for and accompanied it (2005: 4). He also points 
to the development of industrial capitalism, and corresponding technological revolutions, as 
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constituting another important sequence of events; the emergence of the bureaucratic state, 
another; the elaboration of anti-colonial and official state nationalisms; “the dissemination of 
Darwinian evolutionism and the secular natural and social sciences and the consequent crisis of 
religious conceptions of human history”; and finally, he points to the formation of modern 
bourgeois subjectivity and sexuality (2005: 4). The significance of each of these events indicates 
the complexity of the context in which one may claim ‘modern’ Ireland emerged, specifically with 
regard to the latter phase of modernity of principal concern here;   
The Irish transition from an ‘early’ to a more ‘mature’ or ‘advanced’ modernity is again 
conventionally situated in terms of a wider Euro-American context: contributing forces 
include the influence of the American and French Revolutions on the development of Irish 
republicanism; the impact of the British industrial revolution on Irish economic 
subordination and underdevelopment; the emergence of the ‘second’, eastward-looking 
British Empire, and the technological dominance of the Anglo-American industrial world 
with its gravitational effects on Irish migration and diaspora from the nineteenth century 
onwards; the ideological ‘wars’ between clerical and secular forces that raged across the 
European continent throughout the nineteenth century even as in Ireland the Catholic 
church, after two centuries of suppression, established a moral monopoly over Irish society 
designed to shelter the island from the icy blasts of continental secularism (Cleary, 2005: 
4) 
This sketch of Cleary’s perspective helps to contextualize the conservative setting in which a 
modern Ireland has emerged, also establishing the basis for understanding how a corresponding 
social order was to develop thereafter. Moving to the end of the twentieth century, however, 
focus turns to what were to become the dominant ideas, symbols and cultural projects which 
would provide the Irish with their sense of national identity. The process of modernization in the 
Irish case, following Cleary’s distinction in relation to the ‘advanced’ or ‘mature’ phase, brought 
with it the foundations of a conservative social and cultural order; how would conceptions and 
aspirations of a new setting address these pressures and what form would the process of 
democratization take in such a context? This must be a fundamental consideration when putting 
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into perspective the aftermath of the 2008 crisis and, more generally, the problems Ireland faces 
in the twenty first century.   
Before adopting a sociological perspective in relation to the problem of conservatism, it will firstly 
be contextualized and understood in relation to a conceptualization of political ideology. Michael 
Freeden (1996) understands ideologies as “forms of political thought that provide important 
access to comprehending the formation and nature of political theory, its richness, varieties, and 
subtlety” (Freeden, 1996: 1). He argues that the predominant academic mode of construing the 
social world through an emphasis on the study of political philosophies, at the expense of the 
consideration of concrete ideologies results in severe constraints on the methodological tools at 
the disposal of theorists for understanding political thought in an actual situation. Furthermore, 
by neglecting a serious reflection on the problem of ideology, the political theorist is “channelled 
towards some features of political thought at the expense of others” (1996:2). Therefore, initially 
by way of redress, the exploration of political thought, in this case, coming to terms with and 
explaining the domination of a specified mode of ideological thinking within a defined spatio-
temporal context, will be advanced, following Freeden, from the perspective of the ‘conceptual 
morphology’ they display (1996: 2). 
According to Freeden’s approach, which lends itself suitably to a sociological position, ideologies 
may be subject to three distinct perspectives. The first concerns a genetic perspective, and 
introduces history and evolution to address the question, “how did a particular set of political 
views come about?” (1996: 3). The second perspective relates to functional concerns and seeks 
to answer the question, “what is the purpose, or the role (if unintended), of a particular set of 
political views?” (1996: 3). The third, which informs Freeden’s own approach to the analysis of 
ideology, is semantic and is developed in response to the following questions; “what are the 
implications and the insights of a particular set of political views, in terms of the conceptual 
connections it forms? Which universe of meaning – deliberate as well as unintentional – is 
constructed by its conceptual configurations?” (1996: 3). The latter perspective is advanced as it 
is not a causal or functional explanation of ideology that is sought, but an interpretative 
framework through which one may comprehend their concrete manifestations. This approach to 
the analysis of political concepts, therefore, does not seek to project “logical permutations and 
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ethical possibilities in the abstract”, often, he argues, attached to some universalizable models, 
but locates them within patterns which actually appear. It is these ‘patterns’, therefore, that 
constitute an ideology; 
Such patterns are most conveniently known as ideologies, those systems of political thinking, 
loose or rigid, deliberate or unintended, through which individuals and groups construct an 
understanding of the political world they, or those who preoccupy their thoughts, inhabit, and 
then act on that understanding (Freeden, 1996: 3) 
There are three core elements which allow for the identification of conservatism as an ideology. 
The first element, which is based on an interpretation of the writings of Michael Oakeshott, 
relates to the ‘self-definition’ of conservatism, and refers to the methodological disagreement 
within the perspective itself regarding its essential definition and substance (1996: 320). It’s anti-
ideological, pre-conceptual stance and the general lack of evaluation and comparison with other 
political ideologies make it difficult to delineate its central principles and viewpoints. Freeden 
points to two self-imposed obstacles within conservatism that maintain this analytical obscurity; 
the very denial of the validity of theorizing about human beings and societies, which he explains, 
relates to “an attitude found among some of the less perceptive exponents of conservative 
thought, who insist that no schemes or categories can be applied to the spontaneity, 
diffusiveness, and pragmatism of human conduct”; and, secondly, here following Oakeshott, “a 
denial of the relevance of abstract techniques in directing human conduct, thus rejecting the 
rationality of any ideological manifestations of political thought as well as the recommendatory 
or deontological aspirations of political philosophy” (1996: 320). Although they constitute 
obstacles, they uncover some characteristics which offer an insight into the self-understanding 
of the ideology of conservatism. Freeden explicates the inferences to be drawn here; 
conservatism, he states, is about doing, “and about understanding what one is doing, not about 
thinking in the sense of planning what to do” (1996: 321). Also, it is revealed to be unreflective 
to the extent that it does not engage in systems of ideas about human beings and society, but, 
he argues, “is a method of recognizing reality through experiencing it, intellectually unintelligible 
for non-participants” (1996: 321). Ultimately, from the conservative viewpoint, it is futile to 
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conceptualize about human conduct, political or otherwise, and, therefore, Freeden holds that 
its horizons look only upon the past and cannot be projected on an expected future (1996: 321). 
The second core element of conservatism, Freeden delineates, challenges the notion that its aim 
is to maintain the current political order, and puts forward a chameleon analogy to better capture 
its seemingly unclear modus operandi. It is, he explains, commonly understood by conservatives 
and their critics, that the central defining feature of conservatism is a concern with upholding the 
status quo. However, given the lack of a specific core and adjacent beliefs and values concerning 
fundamental political principles, its capacity to adapt to different conditional settings is 
highlighted as a core element (1996: 329). Following Huntington, therefore, it may be described 
as a positional ideology, “lacking both an intellectual tradition and substantive ideals” (1996: 
329). Moreover, Freeden argues, conservatism may be understood as a response to an attack 
mounted against established institutions, a system of ideas employed to justify any established 
order, “no matter where or when it exists” (1996: 329). It is an ideology that is “not transmitted 
over time, not does it have an evolving and growing body of works attached to it…its life pattern 
is more like a series of sudden births and sudden deaths, activated when provoked, dormant or 
absent when not” (1996: 329).   
The third core element, Freeden identifies, concerns resolving the “morphological puzzle” 
presented by the preceding two elements, therefore, submitting conservatism to distinct 
evaluation as an ideological project, constituting a coherent mode of thinking. Considering the 
conservative perspective on change, Freeden notes that, as it is not an ideology of the status quo, 
seeking to “forestall change and arrest the historical process”, it must however be understood as 
an ideology predominantly concerned with the problem of change, “not necessarily proposing to 
eliminate it, but to render it safe” (1996: 332). It, therefore, advocates a notion of change which 
corresponds to a conception that is “sure-footed and respectful of the past” (1996: 333). 
Analysing conservatism from the perspective of the principles and ideas located within rival 
ideologies, such as liberty, reason, sociability, or welfare, Freeden argues, is to look in the wrong 
place, as those concepts are merely adjacent to the core problem of controlling change (1996: 
333). This leads to accepting a conception of “organic change”; “the decontestation of history as 
organic growth renders change acceptable because it is conducted within proven 
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frameworks…because it is not destructive of the past or of existing institutions and practices, and 
because it does not appear to be instituted by human design” (1996: 333). Ultimately, Freeden 
explains, the conservative understanding of organic change as a core concept “postulates a 
specific diachronic reading – a construction of tradition – as part of its ideological synchrony” 
(1996: 333). By this, it is meant that any conservative position adopts a view of change which 
appears to shore up the current synchronic arrangements. Moreover, through the diachronic 
interpretation of the present, a specific version of historical continuity secures the preservation 
of the prevailing social order (1996: 333).  
From Freeden’s perspective, to understand and evaluate conservatism as an ideology, one must 
analyse the conditions from which that ideology had emerged. Although it opens a path to 
examining, in further detail, aspects of specific ideological projects, the problem of cross-cultural 
variance among conservatisms and, indeed, variance within a given cultural sphere, remain 
problematic. However, by following the core elements introduced above, problems related to 
the dominant contemporary manifestation, which somehow reconciles the seemingly 
irreconcilable principles of conservatism and classical liberalism, specifically pertaining to the free 
market, may become clear; 
How can one term encompass within its domain both a belief in history and a rejection of 
history, both reverence for the state and contempt for it, both a conception of community and 
an atomistic libertarianism, both a faith in high politics and a diminution of the political 
sphere, both a notion of citizenship based on responsibility and duty and one based on 
contractual markets and an economic clientele? (Freeden, 1996: 346)       
From this reading of Freeden, a somewhat difficult relationship between the ideology of 
conservatism and democracy emerges. The restriction of thematization, which comprises the 
blocking of self-reflection and the denial of deeper theoretical analysis and critique relate to 
conditions which may be characterised as antithetical to the discursively open ideal of a 
democratic social order. Where is the space for cultural innovation, upon which the process of 
democratization itself fundamentally depends? The correlation between this deep-rooted 
conservatism and a rigid class structure, which reflects the hegemonic position of a native 
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bourgeoisie, who have come to embody and reproduce the values conducive to the reproduction 
of the cultural model. This, furthermore, in relation to the concept of the public sphere, concerns 
the problem of access to public discourse. The fundamental conservative perspective on 
democracy seeks to preserve the existing state of affairs, therefore, structurally precluding the 
entry of vital peripheral voices into the discourse.  
Freeden’s formulation of conservatism as an ideology remains strictly in the theoretical domain, 
however, to make it relevant for illuminating a dimension of the Irish cultural model, it requires 
empirical illustration. Garvin, in ‘Preventing the Future’ (2004), makes the argument that 
Ireland’s economic development was severely stunted as a result of a series of ‘non-decisions’ 
when faced with the difficult conditions of the post-WWII period. He argues that Ireland suffered 
from a form of stasis throughout much of the twentieth century, much of it down to the 
entrenchment of powerful groups in areas of political, economic, cultural and religious life, 
reinforcing a ‘cultural mindset’ that “thought in static and rural ways and in ethical rather than 
scientific terms” (Garvin, 2004: 3). The development of conservatism in the Irish case, which 
Garvin is drawing attention to, is represented in the arrangement of socio-economic 
organisations, such as trade unions, the business sector, parts of state bureaucracy, that have 
“defended their turf in ways that effectively persevered a status quo” (2004: 3). This has 
ultimately led to a dysfunctional propensity of power-holders to fear other power-holders, 
thereby creating an environment which exhibits a general lack of self-assuredness and moral 
courage. Garvin observes that an “intimidating ecclesiastical apparatus intensified this climate”, 
which would serve as a basis for similar forms of behaviour on the part of secular elites in the 
future.   
Although Garvin’s observations help to demonstrate the way in which conservatism is historically 
rooted in the Irish context, it is important to explicate features of this ideology as it manifests in 
the domain of policy. The correspondence between a public’s preferences and government policy 
plays a crucial role in the normative justifications for democracy. The typical political cleavage, 
reflected in specific attitudes that may be measured through extensive surveys and/or 
interviews, over the distribution of economic resources has always played a significant role in 
structuring ideological conflict and the process of party formation. To understand Ireland’s 
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positioning in relation to these factors, which reflect the expression of the underlying policy 
ideology, it is once again considered in a comparative context. To do this, I will draw from a 
longitudinal analysis of policy ideology in European publics between 1981 and 2016, recently 
published in the journal, ‘American Political Science Review’, by Caughey, O’Grady and Warshaw 
(2019). The study is truly extensive in its scope, comprising a dataset covering 27 countries over 
36 years, which contains nearly 2.7 million survey response to 109 issues questions, it is also 
invaluable in identifying concrete correlations between public opinion, political ideology and 
government policy in a European context. The objective, which makes it particularly relevant for 
present purposes, is to “obtain biennial estimates of the absolute economic conservatism, 
relative economic conservatism, social conservatism, and immigration conservatism of men and 
women in three age categories in each country”, thereby “aggregating the group-level estimates 
yields of the average conservatism in national publics in each biennium between 1981–82 and 
2015–16” (Caughey, O’Grady and Warshaw, 2019: 1).  
The four dimensions of conservatism are measured and represented in each European country, 
encompassing the degree of conservatism reflected in government policy and also the public 
mood within each country over time. A particularly interesting trend, identified in the study, 
relates to a distinction between economic conservatism (absolute and relative) and social 
conservatism. The former, which had seen a substantial increase in the 1980s, plateaued and 
changed little between the 1990s and the early twenty first century. The study found that during 
and immediately after the Global Financial Crisis, all groups shifted leftward on economics, 
however, this only proved temporary and the trend reverted to pre-crisis levels by 2016. 
Although, what they define as ‘economic mood’ has trended in a liberal direction since the mid-
1990s, there has emerged a divergent trend evident with the increase of absolute conservatism, 
which they attribute to the retrenchment of the welfare state in Europe. In contrast, social 
conservatism in general has been found in the research to have declined steadily over the whole 
thirty-six years of data gathered, with the most rapid changes occurring between the 1980s and 
90s. This seems to support an impression of conservativism, outlined at the beginning of the 
current chapter in relation to Ireland, which reflects a contradictory tendency between certain 
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forms of cultural liberalization, on the one hand, coinciding with a sustained economic 
conservatism on the other.  
When Caughey, O’Grady and Warshaw’s research is broken down, country by country, Ireland 
may be contextualized in a comparative ideological context. All four measures of conservatism 
show a clear north-south distinction, “Southern European countries, most notably Greece, tend 
toward the left-wing end of the economic scales, but are closer to the conservative end of the 
social and immigration scales. In contrast, Northern countries, such as Denmark and the 
Netherlands, are the least conservative on social issues and immigration but are more 
conservative on economics, particularly mood” (2019: 10). Ireland, from this perspective, reflects 
trends similar to other Northern countries on social issues, including attitudes towards to 
immigration, conservativism has shown to have significantly declined, whereas, economic 
conservatism, in both absolute and relative terms has shown an increase. Although such a study 
is far from conclusive, merely reflecting trends over a specified period of time, it does correlate 
with the order of discourse identified in the Irish crisis narrative.  
Conservatism represents the ideological base that underlies the dimensions of nationalism and 
class, as introduced in the previous section, in the Irish cultural model, which then determines 
the way in which such principles as legitimacy and responsibility are brought down from the level 
of the cognitive order and discursively realized in society. The next chapter will re-introduce the 
critical-cognitive theoretical framework, developed in Chapter 5, to explicate this process. The 
purpose of this approach is to show the way in which the thematization of the crisis reflects a 
mode of learning that restrains the exploration of democratic alternatives, specifically related to 
the principles of legitimacy and responsibility, which, in turn, exposes a pathology in the 
formation of the Irish cultural model. However, what is of vital importance to the cognitive 
approach adopted here is also the disclosure of potentiality. This perspective always holds open 
the possibility of an unrealized potential at work in the contexts of social interaction. Although it 
may currently seem implausible that an emancipatory alternative to the conservative model, 
which sustains this deeply unequal socio-economic system, will emerge, it is impossible to 
accurately predict future forms of learning, which could potentially emerge in response to 
another crisis that will lead to significant transformation.  
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3.3. Learning in the Aftermath of a Crisis: An Inquiry into the Case of Ireland     
Crises generate social conditions of deep uncertainly and intense conflict, in which the nature of 
what is taking place and proposed solutions to it are contested in discursive struggles, ideally 
played out in a public sphere. A narrative ultimately emerges which seeks to give meaning to the 
crisis situation, identify how it came about, who is to be held responsible for it and then justify 
the proposed solutions to it. This, to repeat the key point made in the first chapter, is the 
communicative/discursive understanding of crisis being adopted here. From a comparative 
perspective, narratives that put forward alternative, democratic responses to the financial crisis 
were relatively absent in the Irish case. Certainly, social movements emerged to oppose and 
resist specific austerity measures in this context, but a political movement offering a progressive 
alternative that could resonate with the Irish public, as with the cases of Greece and Iceland in 
which there were serious transformations in the mainstream political landscape, was not evident. 
In essence, it is argued here that the crisis narrative succeeded in guiding Irish public discourse 
in a certain direction, establishing a spectrum of relevance within which are set out the 
parameters for how the crisis was to be understood and, following the key moments in the 
previous chapter, the justification for an appropriate response to it.  
The key question, which this thesis will seek to address, is, what has been learned from the Irish 
experience of 2008 Global Financial Crisis? Furthermore, given the nature of the crisis response, 
in particular the key events outlined in the last chapter and the imposition of austerity measures 
within the European context, how has Ireland changed in the aftermath of the crisis? An 
understanding of the processes of social and cultural change, whether realized in the context of 
actually existing social movements or remaining merely as public narratives that point towards 
some unrealized potentiality, are at the heart of how these questions will be addressed. A 
fundamental distinction, therefore, guiding the analysis to come is that between learning and the 
processes of change. It may initially be presupposed that the former is a precondition of the 
latter, in that for a state of affairs to change in any way, it requires some form of learning to take 
place on behalf of those involved. The sociological approach to learning adopted here, however, 
which will become clear in the proceeding chapters, not only incorporates the idea of learning as 
an aspect or even precondition of change, but conversely as a key mechanism in the prevention 
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of change. From this critical perspective on social or collective learning, there is a pre-existing 
socio-cultural condition, which shapes the way in which a society learns, which then becomes 
realized in relation to a particular event or situation thus either allowing for or preventing the 
relevant processes of change to initiate.  
The crisis, and its aftermath as outlined in the European context here, presents an ideal case in 
which to examine this dynamic between learning and change in the case of Ireland. Essentially 
constituted by a series of mediated discursive events, the crisis reflects the emergence of an 
‘opportunity structure’, which opens up the possibility of reflexively examining the state of 
society, specifically, as will be seen in the analysis of this case, in relation to the role of democracy 
and the strength of a democratic culture in that society. This represents the fundamental 
normative underpinning of the work. The proceeding analysis, therefore, employing Touraine’s 
‘cultural model’ as a key analytical concept and the basis for a critique of Ireland’s response to 
the 2008 financial crisis, seeks to access the generative dimension of the Irish normative order. 
This moves towards offering a critical explanation for the distinctive ‘pathological’ form of 
learning that is reflected in the crisis-response itself, central to which is the dominance of a 
particular form of conservatism in public discourse. A critical aspect of this reflection will, 
therefore, be viewed from the normative perspective of democracy, and the evidently 
diminished role played by democratic communication in this context.  
The next chapter will set out an approach suitable for accessing the normative dimension at work 
in the Irish crisis narrative. This will encompass two different methodological perspectives on the 
analysis of public discourse, with the intention of distilling the appropriate normative content 
that is recognised to be at stake in this particular context. The principles of legitimacy, specifically 
the discursive process of legitimation, and responsibility will be brought to the fore as the 
relevant normative elements in the case of the Irish crisis response. The key purpose of the 
proceeding chapter is to establish those elements required for the later reconstructive critique. 
It is in relation to this distinctive form of communication that processes of critical and societal 
reconstruction, which develop reflexively upon the established potentiality of democratization, 
may lead to new modes of learning, beyond the current conservative reality. This may be 
represented as discursively transforming, what will later be conceptualized as, a ‘dissensus 
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learning pathology’ into a limited or finite conflict by communicating to the Irish public in such a 
way that actually includes them in the democratic political process, in turn generating an 





























Modes of Legitimation and the Principle of Responsibility:                                        
The Discursive Construction of the Irish Crisis Narrative 
 
The narrative processes of ‘meaning-making' are an intrinsic part of all social relations. In crisis 
situations, as reflected in the Irish case, when previously held structural assumptions are 
destabilised and social forces compete to interpret and represent complex unfolding events, the 
discursive processes involved in narrative construction are fundamental. The critical-normative 
importance of the concept of narrative is associated with the inherent role of justification. In this 
sense, as mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 1., narratives of justification reflect the relations 
of power in society and may therefore be understood as a reflection of orders of power. Such 
orders of power shape and reproduce, what Rainer Forst calls, the ‘space of reasons’ in which 
the narratives themselves resonate. Therefore, a narrative represents a social order that, in turn, 
comes to be accepted as an order of justification (Forst, 2013: 9). Forst’s perspective on 
justification narratives helps illuminate the normative grounding for a counterfactual approach 
to the Irish crisis narrative. Levels of justification progress and are made accessible, or are 
achieved, by means of societal struggles that challenge the justificatory authorities in the first 
place. According to Forst, this progress encompasses more than just the existence of better 
justified social relations, it also involves improved conditions of justification in the society and, 
as such, suggests that a basic structure of justification either exists or is being aimed at (2017: 8). 
As a narrative reflects an order of justification, therefore, a normative dimension is introduced 
to the equation. The discursive thematization of the response to the financial crisis constitutes 
the development of a narrative that, in turn, represents the conditions of the underlying cultural 
model. In the Irish case, as argued in the previous chapter, the ideology of conservatism plays 
the decisive role in shaping the cultural model, which manifests itself, on the one hand, in the 
domain of Irish political culture and, on the other, in shaping the conditions of learning and the 
possibility of normative innovation. The process of thematization reproduces a distinctive mode 
or ‘way’ of learning in the Irish context, thus allowing for the reproduction of the same conditions. 
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In this sense, the conservative cultural model presents a difficult predicament. As Freeden 
explained, a hallmark of the ideology relates to this unreflective and non-conceptual quality, 
compounded by the overriding objective of maintaining the existing political/social order, 
therefore, the process of thematization is in many ways a form of ‘non-thematization’. To 
overcome this, the analysis will reach beyond the procedural focus on the discursive processes 
involved in thematization and explore the substantive, normative content feeding into Irish 
public discourse at the deeper, cognitive level of society.    
For the purposes of critique, gaining access to this substantive dimension, which will be shown 
to encompass the communicative structuring lying behind the mechanism of public discourse, 
requires the specification of the normative elements involved in this specific case. In critically 
analysing the Irish government’s response to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it would lead to 
inaccurate judgement to criticise this response from the perspective of it being either right or 
wrong, particularly when looking at it from a moral-political point of view, as opposed to, for 
example, a classical economic perspective. It is, therefore, necessary to first identify what is 
normatively at stake in the situation before coming to a more general critical or prescriptive 
judgement. There are a number of normative democratic principles at stake in this context, from 
justice and equality to solidarity and the fundamental notion of morality itself, all of which here 
presuppose an incursive shaping within the Irish cultural model. However, it is the principles of 
legitimacy and responsibility that are identified as the normative elements at stake. The former 
relates to the process of legitimation, which is fundamental to the thematization of the crisis and 
the justification narrative that developed around the response to it. It is not just the legitimation 
of the narrative itself, however, in this sense, but the legitimation of the socio-economic order 
that it is trying to justify and maintain itself in the aftermath of the crisis. Responsibility, as a 
second normative principle, emerges as being specific to the context of the crisis itself. Closely 
related to the principle of justice, the question of who is to be held responsible for the financial 
crisis and how this is to be discursively understood, which would then inform the institutional 
response to it, is fundamental. As it will become clear in the theoretical framework, these 
principles are related to one another in the transcendent dimension of society, unrealised in 
regard to the potentials contained in both, yet still having a critical bearing on the situation. 
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This chapter should be read as part of a broader methodological approach. What follows here 
will provide the tools to identify and root out the normative principles, mentioned above, from 
the narrative. This will then generate the elements for a reconstructive critique, which 
constitutes the other major part of the methodological approach. The principles of legitimation 
and responsibility will be accessed by means of their negative manifestation in the process of 
thematizing the financial crisis in Ireland, reflected in the mechanisms of public discourse. To 
expose the negative realisation of the principles is to suggest that there is an unfulfilled 
potentiality, this is where the reconstruction will come into play. By overcoming learning 
pathologies, which are the product of an ideologically distorted system of communication within 
a repressive cultural model, an alternative, perhaps more reflexive form of public discourse may 
be realised.  
The methodological approach to discursive modes of legitimation will be developed, following 
the work of Theo Van Leeuwen. These modes of legitimation critically reflect the form of public 
discourse outlined in the preceding chapters. Legitimacy is therefore understood as a mechanism 
that forms the components which leads to the construction of the narrative. In this sense, 
legitimation is deployed as a communicative mechanism that reinforces the underlying 
normative order, reproduced by the Irish cultural model. It is, as I have mentioned, 
conceptualized negatively in relation to its empirical manifestation in public discourse, yet, 
reconstructively, it also harbours a normative-democratic potential. This anticipates a 
normatively advanced understanding of legitimacy, which develops counterfactually in 
conjunction with a critique of the principle of responsibility in the context of the crisis response.  
The principle of responsibility represents a key dimension in the analysis of the 2008 financial 
crisis. This principle allows for a distinction to be drawn between the discursive mechanisms of 
blame, characteristic of Irish public discourse, and the counterfactual demands of a normative-
democratic view of responsibility, a standard from which Ireland is seen to fall far short. In that 
critical sense, although an interestingly ambiguous and multi-layered term, responsibility 
emerges in this context by virtue of a negative critique of blame, which, it will be argued, obviates 
an appropriate application of the principle. What brings into play the notion of responsibility in 
the first place is that a decision has been taken that has discernible consequences. The 
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institutional response to the crisis in Ireland, therefore, presupposes the presence of some form 
of responsibility, however imperfectly realised in the context of the discourse of blame and, in 
particular, blame avoidance. Moreover, as this is a response that refers specifically to a financial 
crisis, which as Beck argues, pertains to a system based on ‘organised irresponsibility’, 
reconstructive access to the normative principle of responsibility is made much more difficult, on 
both the societal level and that of the analyst.   
The following section will examine specific dimensions of public discourse in the context of the 
Irish crisis in relation to the concept of legitimation. This will constitute a background normative 
reconstructive animus for the work as a whole and will be taken up again in a later chapter along 
with the methodological application of Critical Theory. The broader intention of the present 
chapter is to elucidate these contested principles of legitimacy and responsibility at stake beyond 
the conservative formulation, which thus reveal the possibility of a democratic potential. The 
forms/modes of legitimation, which will be empirically detailed in what follows, present aspects 
of the narrative that reflect a conservative public culture, which will be analysed in more detail 
in as a crucial causal element in Chapter 6. From the emphasis on authority, to the moral norms 
and rationality at work in the discourse of the crisis response, this approach seeks to expose 
specific discursive features of the conservative actuality and by doing so, anticipate the disclosure 
of an untapped reconstructive potential, unrealized in the given situation.  
 
4.1 Discursive Modes of Legitimation in the Irish Crisis-Narrative   
Taking cue from the theoretical developments on the concept of legitimation, following the work 
of Habermas, the approach adopted in the proceeding section will be guided by the wider 
reconstructive intentions of critical social analysis to follow. In ‘putting to use’ of a critical theory 
of society, which may be defined by attempting to overcome the conventional 
empirical/normative split, this perspective highlights the structure of the communication itself 
as the focus of critique (Habermas, 1976: x-xii). Proceeding in an empirical-theoretical space, 
therefore, this approach offers explanatory scope to represent public discourse in relation to the 
development of a distinctive narrative, guided by the critical concept of legitimation.  
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Habermas’ theorization of ‘legitimation crisis’ was by means of an emphasis on ‘tendencies’ 
towards such a condition. By characterizing the economic, the administrative and legitimation 
systems at the most general level, he delineates the ‘crisis-tendencies’ in each case in the context 
of advanced-capitalist societies. While the economic system refers to the coordination of 
productive activity in relation to a distinction between the private and public sectors, the 
administrative system, correspondingly, refers to the mechanisms of the state apparatus which 
carry out numerous imperatives of the economic system (Habermas, 1976: 34). It is, however, 
the legitimation system, presupposing a re-coupling of the economic to the political – the 
repoliticization of the relations of production – that holds together capitalism through the 
“universalistic value-systems of bourgeois ideology, civil rights – including the right to participate 
in political elections” (1976: 36). The legitimation system is resolved, Habermas explains, through 
the development of a system of formal democracy, however, careful to avoid forms of 
substantive democracy, which would incorporate the full participation of citizens in the process 
of political will-formation. In capitalism, therefore, it is an imperative to keep this fundamental 
contradiction from being fully thematised; the administrative system must be sufficiently 
independent of legitimating will-formation. It is, ultimately, the distinctive class structure, 
Habermas posits, of advanced capitalism which prevents the easy identification of ruling groups 
and manifested forms of domination (1976: 37).     
So, taking into account Habermas’ distinction regarding crisis-tendencies, one can see in the Irish 
case, a response to the 2008 crisis, attempts to resolve such tendencies towards economic 
collapse by administrative means. However, it must be recognised that these have not in practice 
resulted in major de-legitimizing effects. The management of the crisis-response, by means of 
political communication, as reflected in the above, had been staged for the public in a very 
effective manner, targeted in such a way as to resonate in the Irish public sphere. There has, 
indeed, been an incipient estrangement from the political system at a general level, and the 
gradual emergence of new, more radical, political parties, but one certainly cannot speak of a 
real legitimation crisis. People continue to vote and, as has been shown in the Irish General 
Elections of 2011 and 2016, in their clear majority for the traditional parties. As Habermas himself 
explains, “a real legitimation crisis would signify a collapse of the traditional party system and the 
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formation of a new party whose aims would at least transcend the existent economic system” 
(1979: 80). The critical focus must ultimately be, from a reconstructive perspective, on a greater 
democratization of our society, and the normative structures required to achieve this. 
There is an essential link to be highlighted here, between discourse, the normative demands of 
legitimation and the processes of learning. Habermas’ understanding of legitimation follows an 
evolutionary logic, which takes place in the form of “directional learning processes” that, in turn, 
work through “discursively redeemable validity claims” (1976: 14). It follows that the rationally 
reconstructible elements that learning processes generate can explain only the “logically 
necessary sequence of possible developments” (1976: 14). In the case of ‘actual’ developments, 
such as innovations or stagnations, the productive or unproductive working out of crises, these 
can only be explained with the aid of empirical mechanisms. Foundational to Habermas’ 
perspective on collective learning, ‘not-learning’ reflects a situation in which validity claims are 
accepted or rejected without discursive consideration, thus requiring an explanation at the socio-
cultural stage of development. ‘Reflexive’ learning, on the other hand, which allows for 
normative innovation and the productive working out of crisis situations, takes place through 
discourses in which actors “thematize practical validity claims that have become problematic or 
have been rendered problematic through institutionalized doubt, and redeem or dismiss them 
on the basis of arguments”. Whichever form of learning is identified as the outcome, it firstly 
requires empirical mechanisms to gain access to the actual developments leading up to that 
point. Theo Van Leeuwen (2007) provides a methodological framework for identifying these 
empirical mechanisms involved in the discursive construction of legitimation.  
There are four main forms (or modes) of legitimation developed in Van Leeuwen’s framework 
that may operate separately or simultaneously, in combination with one another in the course 
of communication processes (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 92). Firstly, ‘authorization’ refers to a mode of 
legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom and law; ‘moral evaluation’, 
secondly, refers to legitimation by reference to value systems; ‘rationalization’, to legitimation 
by reference to the goals and uses of institutionalised social action; and, finally, ‘mythopoesis’ 
refers to a form of legitimation related to specific narratives, where outcomes reward legitimate 
actions and punish non-legitimate actions (2007, 92) These categories of legitimation refer to 
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explanations and justifications, that is specific instances of talk and text, which inform descriptive 
or prescriptive accounts of social practices and institutions (2007, 92). A critical aspect in 
analysing the construction of legitimation in discourse is understanding that legitimation is 
always in reference to, and thus contextualised within, specific institutional orders. The focus 
here is, therefore, on identifying a narrative specific to the Irish institutional setting.  
 
- Authorization 
Emphasis on the principle of authority is an important characteristic of conservative cultures. 
Following Van Leeuwen’s formulation, authorization, in the sense of a discursive form of 
legitimation, may be understood as an answer to a specified ‘why’ question – ‘Why should we do 
this?’ (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 94). There are six different contents or forms of legitimation which 
are identified as possible answers here. Firstly, personal authority concerns the legitimate 
authority vested in a person, specifically because of their status or role in a given institution. Van 
Leeuwen explains that this form of authority does not require justification and it may be 
exemplified in the context of the ‘positional family’ in which “judgements are a function of the 
status of the member and disputes are settled by the relative power inherited in the respective 
statuses” (2007: 94). Secondly, role model authority refers to the legitimacy through the 
imitation of role models or ‘opinion leaders’ and plays a particularly important role in advertising 
and lifestyle media. Impersonal authority represents a third form of authority legitimation. In this 
case, which refers to laws, rules and regulations, the answer to the ‘why’ question does not refer 
to any particular actor, but to the fact that the law (rules, policies, guidelines) say so (2007: 96). 
The fourth form of authority legitimation Van Leeuwen identifies relates to the authority of 
conformity. In this case, the answer to the ‘why’ question is ‘because it is what everybody else is 
doing’, implying that it is also what you ought to do. Expert authority represents a fifth form and 
refers to a form of legitimacy in which expertise is held above status. Van Leeuwen explains that 
expert legitimation often takes the form of ‘verbal process clauses’ or ‘mental process clauses’ 
with the given expert as subject; e.g. ‘Professor Y believes…’ (2005: 95). Lastly, the authority of 
tradition relates to a situation in which legitimacy is determined through the ideas of tradition, 
practice, custom or habit. In this case, Van Leeuwen elucidates, “the implicit or explicit answer 
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to the ‘why’ question is, not ‘because it is compulsory’, but ‘because this is what we always do’ 
or ‘because this is what we have always done’” (2007: 96) 
 
- Moral Evaluation   
Before outlining Van Leeuwen’s approach to the moral evaluation mode of legitimation, it is 
necessary to delineate an important distinction here with Habermas, specifically in relation to 
the conceptualization of moral norms. Moral norms may be understood to emerge from the 
processes of argumentation on moral ideas, over time acquiring a form of institutional force. 
From Habermas’ perspective, the most fundamental moral norm is that of universal inclusion in 
fair procedures of deliberation (2013: 301). This norm is realized institutionally through the 
development of comprehensive and legitimate structures of public autonomy along with an 
equally fundamental framework of individual rights. In the conditions of modern pluralist society, 
consisting of multiple contexts of experience, moral norms are increasingly dependent upon 
procedural justification (2013: 301). 
Habermas’ approach to the theory of society grounds moral principles in the normative content 
of argumentation, thus establishing universally accepted norms through the deliberation and 
procedural commitments of co-present actors. Moral principles are ultimately derived from the 
content of the presuppositions of argumentation, but, critically, the concern here is with the 
viewpoint from which moral ideas and questions can be evaluated, and thereby, legitimized. The 
critical insight to be explored on that basis is whether the argumentation carried out in idealized 
discourse presupposes that all concerned in principle participate, freely and equally, in the 
cooperative search for truth, with the outcome determined only by the force of the better 
argument (Habermas, 1988).  
In Van Leeuwen’s use of the concept of legitimation, and its application to analysing specific 
instances of discursive communication, there are two important qualifications regarding the 
application of moral evaluation as a mode of legitimation. Firstly, relating to the limits of what 
discourse analysts can infer from their own distinctive approach, Van Leeuwen holds that “it is 
not possible to find an explicit, linguistically motivated method for identifying moral evaluations 
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of this kind” (2007: 98). By this, discourse analysis can only recognise moral evaluations from the 
perspective of common-sense cultural knowledge, and therefore, the usefulness of linguistic 
discourse analysis, with regard to identifying processes of legitimation, stops at that point. 
Secondly, developing on this argument, he claims, a historical discourse research must take over; 
“only the social and cultural historian can explain the moral status of these expressions, by tracing 
them back to the moral discourses that underlie them, and by undoing the ‘genesis amnesia’ 
(Bourdieu) that allows us to treat such moral evaluations as common-sense values” (2007: 98).  
The conceptualization of legitimation at issue here, following Van Leeuwen’s adaptation of 
Habermas, explicates a descriptive model “in order to derive from them the possible classes of 
crisis tendencies that can arise in such a social formation” (Habermas, 1976: 33).  
The arrangement of formal democratic institutions and procedures permits administrative 
decisions to be made largely independently of specifics motives of the citizens. This takes 
place through a legitimation process that elicits generalized motives – that is, diffuse mass 
loyalty – but avoids participation. This structural alteration of the bourgeois public realm 
[Offentlichkeit] provides for application of institutions and procedures that are democratic 
in form, while the citizenry, in the midst of an objectively [an sich] political society, enjoy 
the status of passive citizens with only the right to withhold acclamation (Habermas, 1976: 
37) 
To distinguish it from the previous mode of authorization, Van Leeuwen asserts that moral 
evaluation legitimation is based on the discursive expression of underlying moral values, rather 
than imposed by some kind of authority without further justification (2007: 97). Discourses 
pertaining to this mode of legitimation are rarely made explicit or debateable, and therefore, 
remain latent, predominantly referred to through revealing adjectives such as ‘healthy’, ‘normal’, 
‘natural’, ‘useful’, etc. (2007: 97). Making use of an illustrative analogy, he explains that these 
adjectives may in turn be understood as “the tip of a submerged iceberg of moral values” (2007: 
98). In the course of communication, when such references are made to a latent, ‘legitimated’ 
order, which indeed constitutes a significant portion of all social interaction, a moral concept is 
triggered. Crucially, whatever component of a given speech act triggers, or calls forth, such a 
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concept, it becomes detached from the system of interpretation from which it is derived, at least 
on a conscious level; “they transmute”, he argues, “moral discourses into the kind of ‘generalised 
motives’ which, as Habermas has said, are now ‘widely used to ensure mass loyalty’” (2007: 97).  
 
- Rationalization  
An important aspect of discursively constructed legitimation may be understood from the 
perspective of a distinction regarding the concept of rationalization, between instrumental and 
theoretical forms of rationality (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 101). In relation to the former, Van Leeuwen 
explains, purposes are constructed in discourse in order to explain a social practice or, as the case 
may be, a particular course of action, and moreover, may serve as legitimations where they 
contain an element of moralization. Closely following Habermas here, it is in relation to this 
process that purposes or ‘purposiveness’ turns into what has been termed a ‘strategic-utilitarian 
morality’; “...Habermas characterizes the institutions that regulate different kinds of social action 
in terms of the validity claims, or ‘kinds of truth’ which underlie or legitimate them” (2007: 101).  
Van Leeuwen’s adoption of Habermas’ concept of rationalisation in relation to the form of 
legitimation generated in the course of communication is theoretical rationalisation. In this case, 
legitimation is grounded, “not in whether the action is morally justified or not, nor in whether it 
is purposeful or effective, but in whether it is founded on some kind of truth, on ‘the way things 
are’” (2007: 103). Based, therefore, on this notion of ‘the way things are’, an appropriate 
perspective specifically in relation to understanding a restrictive style of political communication 
as in the Irish case, representations of practices and/or actions are rationalised by means of 
‘naturalised’ legitimations. Van Leeuwen develops three main typological forms of theoretical 
legitimation. Firstly, definition refers to the representation of an activity in terms of another, 
moralised activity; that is, he explains, “for a definition to be a definition, both activities must be 
objectivated and generalised, and the link between them must either be attributive (‘is’, 
‘constitutes’, etc.) or significative (‘means’, signals, symbolises, etc.)” (2007: 104).  
Legitimations related to this mode function as types of axioms, referring to a possible future 
activity or backwards to activity in relation to which they may are generalised. A second form of 
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theoretical legitimation within the mode of rationalisation is that of explanation. In this instance, 
Van Leeuwen explains, it is not the activity or practice in question, but the actors involved in a 
given action, an answer, he claims, to the ‘why’ question; ‘because doing things this way is 
appropriate to the nature of these actors’ (2007: 104). Thirdly, theoretical rationalisation as a 
mode of legitimation may take the form of predictions. Although this may already have been 
referred to in relation to the role of expert authority, Van Leeuwen makes a distinction here 
between expertise and authority, highlighting that predictions ought to be based more on the 
former, and may be denied on the basis of contrary past experiences.    
It is necessary at this point to clarify an important distinction in relation to Habermas’ general 
perspective on rationalization and Van Leeuwen’s appropriation of it here. Although the latter is 
understandably simplified for purposes of empirical-methodological application, Habermas’ 
theorization of the concept is critical in the broader context of the present work. To counter the 
almost pejorative use of the term, which seems to have become a common feature in certain 
areas of contemporary sociology, and which Van Leeuwen also seems guilty of here, 
rationalization must be understood from the perspective of communicative action. In this sense, 
contrary to the notion of simply generating strategic rationality for a given action (instrumental) 
or justifying the existing status quo (theoretical), communicative rationality allows for the 
possible coordination of action and the collective pursuit of goals on the basis of a shared 
understanding that the goals are inherently reasonable. Whereas Van Leeuwen’s focus on 
criticizing strategic action in the context of public discourse is understandable in relation to 
identifying unjust or bad reasoning, the perspective of communicative action, which mobilizes 
the ‘potential for rationality’, encompasses a much more complex form of interaction, disclosing, 
for instance, the reconstructive standpoint at the core of the present critique.        
 
- Mythopoesis   
The last form of legitimation articulated by Van Leeuwen is related to the formation of the 
narrative itself. As distinct from the preceding forms, mythopoesis concerns a mode of 
legitimation which is achieved through forms of story-telling, more specifically, through what he 
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refers to in the first instance as ‘moral tales’; “In moral tales, protagonists are rewarded for 
engaging in legitimate social practices, or restoring the legitimate order” (2007: 105). The least 
developed within the typology, there are, however, a number of distinctions to be explained and 
made relevant to the case at hand. The first distinction to be drawn in relation to this form of 
legitimation is between moral tales, which are, as outlined above, represented by narratives that 
characterise legitimate action as being worthy of reward, and ‘cautionary tales’, which are 
represented by narratives in which social practices that deviate from conventional social norms 
are reproached; as Van Leeuwen explains, they constitute warnings in which “protagonists 
engage in deviant activities that lead to unhappy endings” (2007: 106). In essence, legitimation 
is conveyed here by developing a symbolic structure which reflects the moral order, thus 
reinforcing the dominant societal positions on right and wrong.       
A second vital distinction drawn here in relation to this form of legitimation, also contributing to 
a further understanding of the first, is between inversion and symbolization. The former, which 
delineates things in relation to good/bad and right/wrong, constitutes narratives in which actors 
and/or actions are inverted in terms of their semantic features, thus rendering such distinctions 
more ambiguous and complex (2007: 106). This conception of inversion will be explored in much 
more detail in the next chapter through a clarification of the principle of responsibility, which has 
been, to an extent, anticipated here in relation to the comparison developed between political 
interventions and public resistance in the Irish response to the crisis.  
The concept of ‘symbolization’, as a dimension of this mode of legitimation, constitutes the use 
of symbolic actions in stories; specific actions, Van Leeuwen argues, that can represent more than 
one domain of institutionalised social practice, and so provide, what he refers to as ‘a mythical 
type of social action’ (2007: 106). He further illustrates this point, referring to an example 
developed from a children’s story, the ‘Unknown Soldier’; “Just as fairy tales distance their 
readers from the actuality of their subject matter in faraway places and long ago times, so this 
story distances its readers from the naturalistic specifics of institutions such as the army, the 
factory, the office and the school, to allow the de-legitimation of all these domains and of the 
principles of social organisation that underlie them” (2007: 106-107). This is a crucial point, every 
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society has a repository of organisational principles, an underlying generative structure, which 
holds within it a system of symbolic power that is called upon in the context of a crisis.  
To conclude, the discursive modes of legitimation will be deployed as part of reconstructive 
critique in order to identify the development of a narrative that reinforce the underlying cultural 
model. That is, a culture in which the thematization of alternatives is suppressed within a mode 
of public discourse that reproduces distinctive conditions of learning. The combination, 
therefore, of learning-resistant discourses, in this case identified through the normative concept 
of legitimation, and the more general feature of deficient thematization constitute a societal 
barrier to the exploration of a reconstructive potential. However, normative legitimation 
processes are not confined to the empirical, immanent domain of social life. Developing a 
reconstructive form of critique, the unlimited, counterfactual dimension is accessed, which 
allows for the development of a democratically more advanced form of legitimation.  
In pursuit of this more advanced form of legitimation, however, further methodological 
observations of the crisis discourse will be brought forward in order to identify and expose 
another key principle, i.e. responsibility. Reflecting a core feature of the narrative of the crisis 
response, in a number of different respects, responsibility will be critically developed through a 
theoretically guided exposition of the discourse of blame, which, as in the case of legitimation, 
leads towards a normative appeal to the reconstructive-transcendent horizon. Legitimation and 
responsibility are intrinsically linked in the crisis-narrative, constituting core aspects of the 
justificatory basis of the institutional response. However, their empirical significance in relation 
to reinforcing the narrative, and by extension the conditions of domination in Irish society, allows 
for the critical-reconstructive approach to combine both principles in order to put forward the 
idea of a co-responsible form of legitimation, a normative-reconstructive standard against which 




4.2 A Distinction Between the Discourse of Blame and the Normative Principle of 
Responsibility  
The modes of legitimation, outlined in the last section, relate to specific discursive mechanisms 
that constitute the development of a narrative that sought to justify Ireland’s response to the 
2008 financial crisis. Responsibility will be disclosed as a normative principle through an analysis 
of the prevailing discourse of ‘blame’. Revealed, therefore, through a negative critique of the 
immanent situation, this principle further elaborates the distinction between the conservative 
actuality of Irish political and public culture and the unrealized, reconstructive potential that is 
being denied. Blame, therefore, is also a blocking mechanism, understood to reflect the 
conditions of learning which constitute the ad-hominem hegemonic culture of conservatism. It 
will be empirically analysed in the following through empirical observations of selected aspects 
of the public discourse. Finally, this will lead to the reconstructive theorization of a co-responsible 
mode of legitimation, holding open the possibility of an alternative future, guided by a form of 
democratic social change.  
I will begin here with a question: who was seen to be held responsible for the 2008 crisis? From 
the analysis of the institutional response to the crisis thus far, developed specifically in relation 
to the narrative constructed in Irish public discourse, things were construed in such a way as to 
attempt to make everyone responsible for the crisis8. The implication here being that the Irish 
public had benefited from and enjoyed the fruits of the economic boom, and they must now pay 
the price and suffer the consequences for their excesses9. Although a government commissioned, 
expert report by Peter Nyberg (2011) determined that the causes of the Irish crisis were a 
combination of “very specific and serious breaches of basic governance principles” and a problem 
of ‘groupthink’, associated with an inter-elite network of relationships between politicians and 
actors in the financial system, responsibility for the crisis would ultimately rest with the Irish 
public. In what follows, this perspective will be fundamentally challenged, and the very nature of 
                                                          
8 At the World Economic Forum in Davos in February 2011, the new Taoiseach, Enda Kenny claimed “What 
happened in our country was that people simply went mad borrowing”   
9 In an interview with RTE in 2010, Finance Minister Brian Lenihan stated in relation to the housing bubble and the 
resultant banking crisis; “Let’s be fair about it, we all partied”. 
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the way in which the principle of responsibility itself is conceptualized and generally operates in 
the Irish context critiqued. 
Drawing once more from the empirical observations of the opening chapters, I will develop a 
distinction in relation to another specific normative feature of the actual discourse itself and, in 
a second move, propose to open that problem to a more advanced, reconstructive form of 
critique. Having established some general features of public discourse in Ireland in the context of 
the development of a justification narrative which sought to legitimize the response to the 2008 
financial crisis, the previous chapter presented a normative perspective, drawing on elements 
related to the forms of legitimation employed in the course of a specific mode of public discourse. 
The purpose of the opening chapter was to delineate the actual discursive environment in which 
the crisis unfolded, presenting, by pointing towards distinct interventions in the disorienting and 
disruptive context, the emergence of political explanations reflecting divergent social forces 
aimed at construing events and, thereby, publicly opposing or promoting certain responses to 
what was taking place. A dominant narrative was then identified and, through four modes of 
legitimation, drawing from Van Leeuwen’s appropriation of Habermas, inferentially linked back 
to understand the justifications for the measures taken by the Irish government in response to 
the Global Financial Crisis. 
Responsibility and legitimacy are empirically and theoretically related to one another here in the 
sense that both are conceived in relation to normative principles, appealed to in the mediation 
processes of public discourse and elaborated upon, in a distinctive justificatory manner, in the 
context of the crisis-narrative in Ireland. Following the empirical-theoretical logic of the previous 
chapter, the principle of responsibility will also be disclosed and developed in relation to 
distinctions observed in the analysis of the discourse itself. The concept of responsibility will later 
be reconstructed, along with that of legitimacy, in relation to what is being denied in terms of 
the realization of the principle, in this sense, following Apel (1993), a democratic 
conceptualization of co-responsibility is put forward. Key to this perspective, and to the 
reconstructive critique that follows, is the concept of learning. I will argue that the principle of 
responsibility has been culturally learned in a specific direction in the Irish context, which 
reflexively blocks exploration into the democratic frame of co-responsibility. 
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The first section to follow will introduce a concept of blame, discuss it in relation to certain 
discursive strategies in the Irish case and then move to develop a methodological distinction 
regarding the concept of responsibility. Although blaming is indeed a ubiquitous feature of 
contemporary politics, particularly in the conditions of the ‘neo-liberal age’, in which democratic 
politics is seen to play a diminished role, it is a dimension of public communication which has 
received little focused attention from discourse analysts (Hansson, 2015). Taking lead from some 
recent developments in amending this gap in the literature, communicative aspects of blaming 
strategies regarding certain forms of argumentation, framing techniques, action representations 
and legitimation will be presented. In drawing attention to a specific conceptualisation of blaming 
in public discourse and highlighting how it was employed in the course of the Irish crisis narrative, 
the intention is to move toward a distinction with regard to the principle of responsibility.  
Blame, it seems, is often conflated with responsibility. By blaming someone or something, it 
follows, social actors are engaging in the attribution of responsibility. Take, for example, the 
recent empirical work of Hobolt and Tilley (2014), ‘Blaming Europe?’, which pertinently focuses 
on the aftermath of the global financial crisis in the context of political structures of 
accountability within the EU. Through their analysis of multiple quantitative data sources, 
including an immense survey of voter perception across European populations, the authors seek 
to explain how the media and politicians’ attempts to transfer blame allows for citizens to assign 
responsibility, and from this, consider what the implications may be in relation to electoral 
democracy in a transnational institutional context (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). Although it is 
certainly a valuable study, particularly from the perspective of understanding how actors and 
groups form judgements in complex multi-level systems, problems arise in relation to the 
absence of a clear conceptual distinction between processes of blaming and the consequences 
for the principle of responsibility. Granted, the main concern in their work is the idea of 
responsibility without accountability, the objection is, however, sustained as there are normative 
presuppositions built into the theoretical framework on responsibility evaluations, which are not 
clarified. For instance, empirical cases are highlighted in the work, when European citizens ‘get it 
right’ or ‘get it wrong’ in relation to where their blame is assigned, but the societal mechanisms 
involved in maintaining that indistinct, yet crucial, conception of responsibility are obviated, and 
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this will be a key point to be addressed in the proceeding argument, which will contend that 
discourses of blame actually obscure, and sometimes eclipse, the related principle of 
responsibility, especially in a situation where complex systematic problems ought to be the 
critical focus of attention.    
A more specific conceptualization of blame is therefore required. One, however, that does not 
dwell on a priori definitions, but that is sociologically appropriate by way of application. Although, 
indeed, the concept of blame invariably contains a strong moral component – by virtue of 
constituting a dimension of the concept of responsibility itself – which warrants deeper 
philosophical inquiry, the intention here is not to pursue this aspect, but to focus on the 
mechanisms involved in specific processes of blaming and, ultimately, to disclose underlying 
generative conditions at work in a given institutional context, actually causing responsibility 
problems. Shaver’s (1985) social psychological insight offers a usefully basic distinction at this 
point; 
An assignment of blame is a social explanation. It is the outcome of a process that begins 
with an event having negative consequences, involves judgements about causality, 
responsibility, and possible mitigation (1985: vii) 
Considering that the focus here, from the outset, is within the realm of public discourse, Sten 
Hansson’s (2015) research on ‘discursive strategies of blame avoidance in government’ offers an 
ideal point of departure for re-conceptualizing blame in the appropriate register. Situated within 
the critical realist philosophy of social science and also based upon the notion that discourse 
analysts are without a sophisticated understanding of blaming, Hansson, guided by a ‘discourse-
historical’ methodological approach, seeks to refine the concept from a communicative 
perspective, focusing specifically on the theme of executive government communication which, 
he argues, contributes to the dissection and de-mystification of power relations in political life 
(Hansson, 2015: 2).  
Hansson’s approach to analyzing blame avoidance in political communication proceeds according 
to three distinct steps; first, linguistic tools are developed by way of describing aspects of an 
instance of blaming in a given institutional setting, specifically, a way of arguing, framing, 
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denying, representing social actors and actions, and legitimizing and/or manipulating (social) 
cognition; second, in order to account for possible moves within government-related ‘blame 
games’, a public administration approach is adopted following a framework developed by Hood 
(2011); and finally, the previous steps are integrated into a comprehensive heuristic model, 
appropriate for discourse analysis, as he states in this regard, “[a model] that discourse analysts 
will be able to use to detect and interpret typical macro-conversational practices adopted by 
officeholders in the circumstances of blame risk to achieve the goal of positive self-presentation” 
(Hansson, 2015: 2). A key point in proceeding through the above steps, according to Hansson, is 
that in the context of political debates and persuasive public discourses, moments of blaming 
and denying are strategically planned and carefully orchestrated, and therefore, following 
argumentative moves in ‘conflict talk’ is crucial (2015: 3). The main advantage of this 
conceptualization of blame, particularly in relation to adapting it to the case at hand, is that it is 
embedded in a communicative framework from the beginning.  
It’s important to highlight that evaluating aspects of Irish public discourse from the perspective 
of how blame is used in political communication is not a unique approach.  Brendan Flynn’s ‘The 
Blame Game’ (2007) deals precisely with this problem, focusing on discursive blockages in 
relation to Ireland’s approach to environmental policy and sustainable development. Through a 
critical analysis of several key instances of conflict, between environmentalists, economic actors, 
state agencies and the government, Flynn describes the emergence of a ‘blame game’ which has 
come to characterize the conditions of public debate around environmental issues in Ireland. A 
key dimension of Flynn’s research, similar to the strategies of blame-avoidance in Hansson, 
although lacking a comparable theoretical framework, is a description of how the blame game 
logic actually presents itself in the discourse. Outright denial and manipulation, especially 
through the public (mis)representation of scientific evidence, are specified in this regard, which, 
he argues, leads to a general political complacency towards environmental problems and a 
reactionary view of policy-implementation (Flynn, 2007: 19). Although the focus is much more 
on institutional structures than the actual substance of the discourse itself, Flynn identifies a 
culture of blame as being at the very root of the problems regarding the environmental debate 
in Ireland; he states, “it is abundantly clear… that Ireland faces very serious environmental 
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problems. Yet a culture of blame and complacency stands in the way of dealing with these 
challenges” (2007: 24). Blame is undoubtedly foregrounded here as a significant obstacle to 
improving political engagement with environmental issues in Ireland.  
Another example of research which illustrates the approach of analyzing Irish public discourse 
from the perspective of processes of blaming is O’Flynn et al’s (2014) ‘Scapegoating During a 
Time of Crisis: A Critique of Post-Celtic Tiger Ireland’. Again, based within a critical realist 
conception of social science, this study seeks to describe how blame was placed on a myriad of 
targets in the muddled aftermath of the Irish crisis, ranging from a generalized collective ‘we’, 
which is a different angle on what is observed in the present work, to more specific groups such 
as public sector workers (also pointed out in the present), the unemployed, single mothers and 
immigrants, with the objective of deflecting blame from the government. There are some 
valuable empirical insights presented here, particularly with regard to a distinction drawn 
between a ‘conflict frame’, which refers to a strategy of diverting public attention away from 
problems associated with the political economy towards some other aspect of social life, and a 
‘responsibility frame’, which is used, they argue, to ‘reveal’ those who are really responsible for 
social ills (2014: 925).  
The discourse of blame is represented in the above as a communicative mechanism, not just in 
the narrative that emerged in the aftermath of the financial crisis, but as a characteristic element, 
an inherent mechanism, of Irish public discourse itself. In contrast to this perspective, which sees 
blaming as an inevitable feature of public discourse, it will be reconstructed in the following as a 
manifestation of a learning process which has been cultivated over time, under specific 
conditions, and as a feature that must be perceived as susceptible to transformation. A 
distinction, in relation to presenting a counter-point to the conventional concept of responsibility 
that has become entangled with the discourses of blame, will therefore be required in order to 
illustrate how the reconstruction of an alternative, or counterfactual understanding of public 
discourse based on a more advanced perspective on the principle of responsibility may emerge.  
The prevalence of blame-avoidance in Irish public discourse reflects a learned and structurally 
institutionalized feature of a distinctive public culture. The principle of responsibility is therefore 
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animated by the particular way in which it has been socially learned, and furthermore sustained 
within the broader social and cultural order. This distinctive mode of learning is represented, not 
just in the empirical examples developed in the present chapter, where it has been exposed by a 
means of a critique of the discourse of blame-avoidance but may also be identified in relation to 
other aspects of the crisis-response. The responsibility, for instance, to repay all bank debt to 
international creditors, backed by a government guarantee, may be highlighted as a further 
illustration of the way in which the principle operates in the Irish case. By focusing on the negative 
critique of blame-avoidance, a disclosed potentiality for a different mode of learning is 
anticipated, thus, critically opening the way to a reconstructive perspective on responsibility.  
As in the case of Hobolt and Tiley (2014), referred to at the beginning of this section, Hansson 
(2015), Flynn (2007) and also O’Flynn et al. (2014) are guilty of dissolving responsibility into their 
conceptualization of blame or discursive blaming strategies, and by doing so obviate the 
normative significance of what is being denied, or blocked through such a mode of discourse. In 
Hansson, for instance, despite the advanced theoretical framework behind understanding 
strategies of blame-avoidance in public administration, there is no distinction made in relation 
to what may be the consequences of this for a broader democratic form of communication. From 
the perspective of critical realism, the problem is presented as an intrinsic reality of political 
discourse, a ‘realpolitik’ that can be comprehended by delineating the mechanisms involved. 
Although, indeed, blame is a dimension within the broader context of responsibility itself, the 
overshadowing of the latter by actual mechanisms related to the former in this case requires a 
sharper distinction be drawn in the diagnosis, thus disclosing reconstructive possibilities; the 
conflation of responsibility and blame neglects the background normative-democratic context 
and the associated forms of discourse required for the evolution of a legitimate democratic 
culture. The critical realist tradition, to reiterate an earlier point, is essentially found to be 
fundamentally restricted by its ontological commitments and is consequently unable to satisfy 
the requirements of the critique proposed here. 
The principle of responsibility, and the disclosure of a responsibility discourse through the 
critique of blame, raises the prospects of a responsible society. This, in turn highlights the 
emergence of a reflexive, counterfactual idea of responsibility, which will later be shown to 
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constitute an element of the modern cognitive order of society, along with the principle of 
legitimacy. There are competing models, or cultural interpretations of responsibility, which may 
be illustrated in the present context with reference to the conservative emphasis on individual 
moral responsibility and the emergence of broader conceptualization of co-responsibility, which 
seeks to encompass a more democratically advanced application of the principle. The former 
model, which may be understood as operating in the Irish case, constitutes an element of the 
general ‘conservative turn’ that accompanied the thriving of the globalizing neo-liberal socio-
economic order from the 1980s onwards. In essence, developments which supported the 
progressive privatization of state assets and the dismantling of the welfare state – all promoted 
on the general appeal of individual responsibility.  
The category of individual responsibility, which is congruent with the development of a 
conservative culture, applies to pre-institutional contexts. According to Strydom (1999), the 
traditional interpretation of this category pertains to the duty of loyalty incurred specifically 
within the settings of friendship, family, kinship and the group or nation (Strydom, 1999: 68). On 
the formal, institutional level, this form of responsibility extends to marriage and family, and to 
occupational roles characterized by the existent division of labour. It presupposes social 
institutions, therefore, remaining within the normative confines of the social institutional 
framework. The post-traditional variant of individual responsibility is post-conventional in the 
sense that it breaks the limits of the pre-institutional and institutional conventions (1999: 68). 
Strydom argues that “duties of responsibility accrue to individuals on this level due to their 
possession of special knowledge, abilities, judgement, power or influence in particular domains 
of social life” (1999: 68). In this sense the boundaries are shifted by assuming individual 
responsibility for the redesign and reorganization of social institutions.  
In the proceeding analysis the principle of responsibility will be re-framed in sociological terms. 
In the same way that learning is conceptualized as a collective achievement in the present work, 
occurring at the systemic level, following Miller, so responsibility is to be understood as a social 
phenomenon, framed by the conditions within which a given interpretation of responsibility may 
be reconstructed. Framing responsibility in such terms requires consideration of situational 
structures, thus constituting the elements which will provide the content for a reconstructive 
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procedure later. Strydom describes the relevant situational structures in this sense as context 
within which “a range of – objective, moral and conative – classifications of reality, variable yet 
nevertheless relatively small cross-section of knowledge concerning values and norms becomes 
accepted or rather presupposed by the participants” (1999: 72). These presuppositions are the 
features that therefore coordinate the situation in relation to the principle of responsibility, as 
such they are rules of coordination. As this coordination effect rests on the mechanisms of 
communication, the rules of coordination are themselves actually structure of discourse. The 
proceeding reconstructive approach, which moves towards a critical-cognitive perspective, 
makes explicit these rules of the discourse, and therefore, a normative reconstruction of the 
underlying coordinating conditions.  
By conceptualizing the principles of legitimation and responsibility as key features of the analysis 
of the crisis-response, I have elaborated a distinction between the conservative reality of Irish 
normative culture and the potentiality of reconstructive horizons which, in being disclosed in the 
conditions of crisis, contain the possibility of an alternative future. The next chapter will further 
explicate this distinction in relation to an account of the foundational concept of Critical Theory, 
namely immanent-transcendence, and also develop a specific reconstructive procedure for 
advancing a co-responsible mode of legitimation. Responsibility, in this sense, will be re-framed 
within the principle of legitimation. Therefore, no longer constituting separate regulative 
principles, they will be combined transcendently as a novel cultural model in relation to which 
the mechanisms of communication and processes of collective learning may be critically 
reexamined through a critique of the conditions of Irish conservative culture.  
The normative principles introduced in this chapter will now be contextualized within a broader 
critical theoretical architecture. The next chapter will outline the theory of society within which 
the various elements introduced up to now are placed and, importantly, held together in relation 
to one another in the context of a crisis aftermath. At the surface, manifest level of social reality, 
processes of public discourse were identified in the thematization of the crisis, leading to a 
narrative which sought to justify the crisis response. Beneath the surface, shaping the conditions 
of resonance to which the discourse above has to make sense, lies the cultural model, this is a 
crucial component in the proceeding analysis. A mediating structure that sets out the parameters 
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of the social conflict, this is restricted in the Irish case by the culture of conservatism, which 
constrains the thematization of alternative responses to the crisis and blocks out voices opposed 
to the status quo. This ultimately reflects a distinctive mode of learning, reproduced by the Irish 
cultural model, at work in the aftermath of the crisis. The theoretical framework that follows here 
takes advantage of recent social theoretical developments in cognitive sociology to put forward 
a critical framework in which each of these components are placed in a causal relationship to one 
another. Vital to this framework is the way in which the normative principles, introduced in the 
present chapter, are accommodated in a dialectical fashion, recognizing their diminished 
immanent realization in the context of the Irish cultural model, while simultaneously containing 

















Developing a Critical Theoretical Framework:                                                                                
From the Public Sphere to a Cognitive Theory of Social Learning 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 sought to outline distinctive features of the response to the 2008 financial crisis 
in Ireland. Public discourse, constituting the key mediating mechanism in the development of the 
narrative of this response, is ultimately identified in this approach as the object of analysis. An 
important element in establishing an analytical link between the crisis and the mediating 
processes of discourse will be introduced using the concept of the public sphere. Focusing, 
therefore, on the meso-level dimension of public communication, this concept will be employed 
in detecting the structural selectivity of discourses in building such a narrative to justify the Irish 
government’s response to the crisis. The critical normative perspective of the work was outlined 
in the previous chapter with the introduction of legitimacy and responsibility as the relevant 
normative principles in the case. The approach adopted here towards these principles is 
anchored in the democratic project of modernity, specifically, a communicative understanding 
of a democratic society, at the centre of which is a properly functioning public sphere.   
Up to now, the relationship between the concepts of crisis and narrative have been understood 
predominantly in relation to discursive mechanisms, mainly following a critical realist account. 
However, this approach becomes inadequate in detecting the normative power implied in the 
specified concept of public discourse. The construction of what may be perceived as a legitimate 
response reflects the selective, normative operations of the public sphere. Moreover, this must 
also be recognized as constituting a key determining factor in identifying what is understood in 
relation to that perception of legitimacy – such operations include the organization and role of 
the mass media, the part played by intellectuals in public life, and the structural biases and 
strategically selective processes of various public and private modes of economic, political, and 
ideological domination. Discursive mechanisms, according to the realist account, down-play this 
critical-normative dimension, focusing instead on the selection of discourses according to a static 
macro-structural orientation, guided in this context by the imperatives of global capitalism, and 
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by a seemingly inert micro dimension, where agency and forms of socio-cultural innovation 
appear inconsequential.  
In assuming the normative structure of public discourse, distinguished only latently in the 
account of the public resistance in the Irish case above, there is, contained within, a 
reconstructive potential beyond this realist conceptualization of discourse as a structural 
supposition comes into focus. Normative selectivity, therefore, is dependent on a distinctive 
mode of public discourse, which is in turn conditional upon a specific formation of public sphere. 
This exemplifies the normative power of public discourse. The crisis narrative did not just develop 
through some arbitrary selection of discourses that sought to legitimize the Irish government’s 
institutional response. The discourse is culturally embedded, which moulds a narrative that 
resonates under specific conditions.    
Although resistance movements in Ireland appeared at the time of the crisis somewhat inchoate 
and unable to alter the dominant narrative of the crisis response, they nonetheless demand 
attention as significant moments of learning, suggesting the possibility for the development of a 
counter-legitimation narrative; i.e. the possibility of democratization as a response to crisis. 
Social movements, which in this case emerged in opposition to the perceived injustice of the 
political management of the crisis, often signal the beginning of the gestation process of social 
and political change. However, in the context of the crisis aftermath in Ireland, an opportunity 
for this normative democratic learning, which may carry and develop the reconstructive potential 
given expression in the course of such movements, did not strongly resonate in public discourse 
in any sustained way.  
In advancing an argument which seeks to explain the conditions for the domination of certain 
interests or of a specified form of political hegemony reflected in public discourse, one must 
articulate exactly what these interests are and the form this hegemony actually takes, and, from 
a critical perspective, what is being denied or blocked in such a situation. Following the 
descriptive analysis of the initial chapters, which establish the relevant features of the actual 
situation, the remaining steps in the present work will go beyond the concrete setting, seeking 
to uncover the causal structures at work in the problematic situation. In pursuit of this form of 
111 
 
critique, guided by the methodological structure of Critical Theory, reconstruction will take a 
multi-dimensional form; at the immanent level, it will focus on the problem of legitimation in 
relation to the crisis narrative and on the more general issue of responsibility in Irish public 
discourse, and, on the transcendent level, it seeks to expose those unjustifiable features of socio-
practical ideas of reason or cultural models, thus positively disclosing a surplus potential, which 
has remained critically unrealized in the actual situation. The objective is to arrive at an 
explanatory critique which offers an account of the problem and specifies the relevant learning 
pathology which, if transformed, could allow for a more adequate and justifiable realization of 
democratic possibilities. 
 
5.1 The Concept of the Public Sphere: Towards a Theory of Triple Contingency Learning 
In ‘The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere’, Jürgen Habermas argued that, as a 
distinct realm set between the state and civil society, the idea of a public sphere emerged initially 
in Europe in the late eighteenth century with the development of rational-critical discussion of 
public affairs. A sphere, therefore, in which critical public discussion on matters of collective 
interest became institutionally guaranteed, would replace the absolutist notion of the ruler’s 
power as being represented before the people with a sphere in which state authority was publicly 
monitored through informed and critical discourse by the people (Habermas, 1989: xi). Above all, 
the public sphere refers to the “people’s public use of their reason” (1989: 27).  
Through the formation of political associations over time, the objective of citizens became the 
assertion and maintenance of the autonomy of civil society as a forum for rational-critical 
discourse, free from political domination, thus allowing for the elaboration of such fundamental 
principles as freedom, equality and publicity as the basis of a democratically transformed politics 
(O’Mahony, 2013: 8). The most vital aspect in the tradition of Habermas’ formulation of the 
public sphere is not so much concerned with the historical development and eventual 
disintegration of this distinctly normative category, but with the recognition of the centrality of 
discourse in transforming the relationship between political and social spheres. Following 
O’Mahony (2013) on this point, modern political society does not simply depend upon the 
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aggregation of votes as the mechanism for the establishment of legitimate political authority, 
but, more fundamentally, it depends on the communicative process of the formation of 
reasonable public will by means of rational critical discourse; “the latter is more fundamental as 
it embraces the indispensable ethos of democracy, an ethos that must be constantly 
communicatively replenished and without which it would not endure” (2013: 9). 
Nancy Fraser (1990), among others, has highlighted significant limits in Habermas’ original 
formulation, specifically in relation to understanding actually existing democracy, that is, with a 
view to bridging the gap between critical social theory and actual democratic political practice. 
Firstly, Fraser contends, Habermas idealizes the liberal, bourgeois public sphere and thus fails to 
recognize other, non-liberal, non-bourgeois, competing public spheres, which are understood to 
have been co-emergent. Counter-publics, she argues, following a revisionist historiography of the 
subject, contested the exclusionary norms of the bourgeois public, developing alternative styles 
of political behaviour and forms of public engagement (Fraser 1990: 61). Secondly, focusing on 
the process of discursive interaction within formally inclusive public arenas, Fraser claims that 
the precondition of participatory parity and equality for engaging in Habermas’ bourgeois public 
sphere does not go far enough by merely ‘bracketing’ social inequalities. Discursive interaction, 
therefore, within this construct “was governed by protocols of styles and decorum that were 
themselves corelates and markers of status inequality…these functioned informally to 
marginalize women and members of the plebeian classes and to prevent them participating as 
peers” (1990: 63). In order to correct these significant shortcomings, Fraser argues, Critical 
Theory most expose the ways in which societal inequality infects formally inclusive existing public 
spheres, which thus requires a reconstruction of the concept that would allow, on the one hand, 
for the recognition of multiple publics and, on the other, the inclusion of interests and issues that 
“bourgeois masculinist ideology labels ‘private’ and treats as inadmissible” (1990: 77). 
Fraser’s critique indicates the sociological significance of the public sphere, particularly in relation 
to the analysis of modern democratic social relations. Although Habermas’ formulation is indeed 
an invaluable conceptual resource, and has initiated an extensive tradition of sociological inquiry, 
work remains in order to make its counterfactual claims relevant to the muddled empirical 
conditions of modern, political reality.  Habermas (1992) himself conceded that his early 
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conceptualization of the public sphere risked over-idealizing a set of norms and value-
orientations that proved historically ambivalent about democratic commitments, and therefore 
later proposed that these intersubjective commitments, which ground democratic practices, 
must be understood to emerge out of everyday communication and informal discourse 
(O’Mahony, 2013: 10). It is, ultimately, in the light of his broader, more complex, social 
theoretical developments, specifically the elaboration of a two-track, integration theory of 
society according to the system/lifeworld distinction, that Habermas’ concept of the public 
sphere and its normative functioning through the processes of public discourse and collective 
learning may be properly understood. In this sense, public discourse is embedded in the general 
context of social integration, constituting the communicative power of the democratic public 
sphere itself. The objective, therefore, must be, moving towards empirical considerations, to not 
simply continue advancing normative arguments for comprehensive communicative power, but 
to understand the actual conditions that enable or block its realization.   
Bernhard Peters’ work brings us much closer to the possibility of empirically implementing the 
distinctly normative category of the public sphere. By distinguishing between the ideal of the 
discursive public sphere, or the procedure of public deliberation, and the idea of a ‘public 
culture’, Peters presents a more complex framework according to which the analysis of actual 
public communicative mechanisms may be guided. A further distinction in developing this 
framework, highlights the need to combine two bodies of research and theory; on the one hand, 
this involves the body of literature on culture, specifically political and national cultures, including 
belief systems, value change and the production and distribution of public knowledge; and, on 
the other hand, the body of literature on public communication, which pertains to two 
overlapping forms, namely mass media communication and political communication (Peters, 
2008: 69). This distinction draws attention to the differing concepts of legitimacy in relation to 
both the normative and empirical accounts of public discourse. From the perspective of the 
former, a political order or decision is deemed legitimate when specific reasonable and 
transparent justifications are present. The empirical account, in contrast, understands legitimacy 
as extending beyond the general compliance with a political order to its standing as a kind of 
asset or loyalty (O’Mahony, 2013: 27). In the latter sense, therefore, legitimacy is composed of 
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phenomena such as custom or affective identity within a given tradition – for instance, in the 
case of nationalism – which can only be weakly normatively justified. The empirical concept of 
legitimacy, following O’Mahony’s interpretation of Peters, is more comprehensive than the 
normative one as it includes the normative understanding itself as an element within the overall 
process of legitimating a political order (2013: 27).  
Peters’ understands Habermas’ concept of the public sphere as corresponding to the structure 
of public discourse or deliberation within a given national context, or public culture. This basic 
assumption, which leads to regard the national setting as a public culture in itself also, therefore, 
leads to the assumption that public discourse is a ‘national affair’, taking place, as Peters’ writes 
“in communicative structures and processes that are centred in a given country, despite many 
links to communication processes in other countries” (Peters, 2008: 80). The sphere of public 
deliberation, even within national confines, however, is far from homogenous. The relations 
between a public culture and structures of public deliberation are internally differentiated in 
many ways. As it will be reflected in the empirical account of Ireland, which follows here, the 
ideas and interpretations that constitute parts of the cultural repertoire function as a background 
and a resource in public deliberation, “as unstated assumptions and as a reservoir for the 
articulation of specific ideas” (2008: 110). In the course of public debate, therefore, elements of 
the cultural repertoire become articulated, while other parts remain as an implicit horizon of 
assumptions and presuppositions.  
The focus of public debates might be narrow (oriented towards questions of immediate 
practical relevance and towards specific disputed aspects of such issues), or more general 
or fundamental. It is in these wide-ranging ‘grand debates’ that public interpretations and 
collective self-understandings are most clearly articulated and disputed (Peters, 2008: 
110) 
To differentiate the various possible manifestations of public sphere within diverse national 
settings, thus allowing for an assessment of the varying normative democratic capacities of 
different societies, Ferree et al. (2002) offers a framework to guide such a distinction. They 
observe a close link between theories of the public sphere and democratic theory more generally, 
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with the latter focusing on accountability and responsiveness in the decision-making process, and 
the former, on the role of public communication in facilitating or hindering this process (Ferree 
et al., 2002: 289). Seeking to develop a categorization tool for attempting to identify normative 
criteria in relation to the role of the public sphere in ‘actually existing democracies’, they review 
four distinct traditions of democratic theory; Representative Liberal, Participatory Liberal, 
Discursive, and Constructionist. Each tradition is mined for its key normative criteria, for what 
they refer to as ‘good democratic public discourse’ and summarized in terms of who should be 
included, what is the ideal content of the discursive process, how participants should express 
themselves and the relationship between discourse and decision-making (outcomes) that is 
sought (Ferree et al., 2002: 290).  
The four democratic traditions identified by Ferree et al. reflect a varying emphasis on each of 
the above key questions, therefore generating contrasting normative modes of public discourse. 
For the representative liberal tradition, the emphasis is placed on the problem of who should be 
included in the discursive process; for the participatory liberal tradition, the ‘what’ question, 
regarding the processes of engaging in public debate is core; placing the discursive and 
constructionist traditions together as newer theoretical approaches, they emphasize, 
respectively, the ‘style’ in which debate occurs and the relationship between public debate and 
decision-making as central. From this framework, the most appropriate form of public sphere for 
describing Irish democracy would align with the representative liberal model. In contrast to the 
other traditions, this model of public sphere stands alone in valuing “elite inclusion over stronger 
and more active versions of popular inclusion” (2002: 317). Placing a strong role on the value of 
expertise in public discourse, it also suggests a criterion that such discursive space should be 
allocated according to proportionality. In contrast, discursive theory, which holds the idea of 
‘deliberativeness’ as its highest value, suggests that public discourse space should be divided 
among actors in the centre and periphery, at least for non-routine decisions. The representative 
liberal tradition also places the strongest value on the idea of discursive closure; Ferree et al. 
explain, public discourse from this perspective “is only useful in relationship to decision-making, 
and once decisions are made, continuing debate is at best a waste of resources and at worst a 
threat to legitimacy” (2002: 318).    
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In deriving specific normative criteria from contrasting democratic theories of the public sphere, 
this framework may certainly be appropriated to empirically analyse distinctions in how public 
spheres operate across different countries. However, in light of developing the present critique, 
the question I seek to focus on, specifically in relation to the Irish case, is why. That is, although 
Ferree et al. distinguish a typological framework for identifying general variations in democratic 
public spheres, one must examine more closely the underlying normative cultural conditions 
within different national settings in order to develop sharper distinctions in relation to why these 
variations take the shape they do. Irish public discourse, as reflected in the context of the crisis 
response, represents a public sphere which is plagued with distortions, which is shown to repress 
the reflexive component in discursive learning and ultimately constrains the possibility of cultural 
and democratic innovation. In what follows, I will argue that this is a direct result of the historical 
development of a distinctive Irish political and public culture. That is, a culture dominated and 
moulded by a deeply conservative national ethos, hegemonically manifested in the political 
domain with an emphasis on the authority of traditional institutions. This, I will furthermore 
argue, results in a general suspicion of the normative functioning of public discourse and may be 
observed in the processes of discursive mediation of the financial crisis dealt with above.  
Differing traditions of public sphere may also be reflected in the normative development of 
varying modes of communication and conditions of collective learning in relation to specific 
political forces. Compare, for instance, the development of the tradition of European social 
democracy through the post-war decades, with the emergence of a transnational political 
movement and parties defending the interests of labour, and its stunted adaptation in the case 
of Ireland. This example marks a fundamental cultural incompatibility with the leaning conditions 
constitutive of rational dissensus, upon which the tradition of social democracy is generally 
based. These conditions are conducive to the communicative setting for a productive form of 
social conflict, in which there is an attempted balance struck in realizing the core principles of 
freedom, equality and justice. In the Irish case, however, the normative operations of public 
discourse fail to achieve these communicative standards, and instead result in the reproduction 
of learning pathologies and conditions of social injustice. This indicates, therefore, distortions in 
the normative functioning of the Irish public sphere itself. 
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Habermas’ early conceptualization of the public sphere may be understood as maintaining the 
basic theoretical position of double contingency. Following Piet Strydom (2009) here in 
explicating an important conceptual blind spot with regard to the role of the public in a modern 
communication society, Habermas somehow accommodates a higher, more complex level of 
contingency than he seems to accept by maintaining double contingency. Strydom explains, 
“through such matters as the public sphere, the public, the structure of communication, the 
system of perspectives and personal pronoun, and the third point of view, [Habermas] often 
touches and even elaborates upon this form of contingency, yet he never acknowledges it as 
such, not to mention giving it a name” (Strydom, 2009: 121). An insight which has therefore 
remained dormant within Habermas’ work, Strydom distinguishes the contingency that the 
public, as a bearer of the ‘third point of view’, brings into communicative relations, and thus into 
the social process itself, as ‘triple contingency’ (2009: 121).  
The normative significance of the public in contemporary communication societies is therefore 
captured in the theory of ‘triple contingency learning’. The formulation of double contingency, 
sustained in Habermas, views communication as two subjects, ego and alter, facing the problem 
of taking up communicative roles of speaker and hearer. Engaging at this level of contingency, 
the interchangeable perspectives of the speaker and the hearer become interlinked in such a way 
that two coordinated ego-alter circles or perspectives of participation result (Strydom, 2009: 
133). Strydom’s argument is that the participants’ awareness is not exhausted by focusing solely 
on one another, that both must also in some way relate to the “world of perceptible and 
manipulable objects around them”, otherwise “they would not have been able to participate fully 
in communication” (2009: 133). This implies that, in addition to the perspectives of ego and alter, 
another perspective comes into play, beyond the double contingency relation. This Strydom 
refers to as ‘the observer’; “the observer belongs to the situation as a constitutive part of its 
sociality. Over and above the ‘I’ and ‘thou’, the third point of view represents society” (2009: 
111). This third perspective, located within the society itself, constitutes the role of the public. 
Strydom explicates the formulation of triple contingency as follows;  
…the concept of double contingency needs to make way for a more adequate replacement 
– namely triple contingency. In the first scenario, two social actors, communicatively 
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acting subjects or black boxes, A and B, face or encounter one another and enter into some 
relation with each other as ‘I and ‘thou’. In the basic situation of triple contingency, by 
contrast, there is a third perspective, borne by C, who observes what A and B are saying 
and doing. By doing so, C has a constitutive impact on the situation. Indeed, this threefold 
configuration represents the elementary social situation rather that the former twofold 
one. But it also brings a higher degree of contingency with it (Strydom, 2009: 111)       
In relation to the present work, which conceives of the 2008 crisis and its aftermath in 
communicative terms, this formulation of triple contingency learning presents a key theoretical 
perspective. It is, of course, not just simply a matter of communication, but one critically 
concerned with processes of collective learning. Following Strydom’s constructivist lead further 
here, which is juxtaposed to Habermas’ ‘legitimationist’ approach, a triple contingency learning 
perspective seeks to grasp what is collectively accepted in a particular situation, and not, as in 
the case of the latter, attempt to measure existing reality against a necessary and unavoidable 
presupposition, stylized as a normative standard (2009: 120). In this sense, the focus is on 
detecting starting points for new “constructive learning processes that could possibly move in 
the direction of an unlimited or indefinite public” (2009: 120).  
Identifying this counterfactual, unlimited or indefinite public by following learning processes 
requires that the normative codes of all societal participants, not just the preferred one, be 
examined as possible presuppositions for further learning. This focus on all participants, 
including, Strydom argues, social movements, must be subject to social critique, which should 
assess the projection each animates in its strategic communication in relation to the other 
participants. Therefore, rather than simply holding up the picture of a transcendent normative 
standard against the actuality of the society, so that one can begin to appreciate how far short it 
falls from these ideals, this constructivist sociological approach discloses the illusory side of the 
ideals in order to expose the errors that need to be corrected. As Strydom points out, “sociology 
is not exhausted by describing existing reality – ‘facticity’, in comparison with a normative 
standard, ‘validity’, as Habermas proposes – since it specifically undertakes the uncovering and 
exposure of illusory ideals about reality and their effects on what becomes collectively accepted 
in the course of public communication within a particular situation” (2009: 120).  
119 
 
Democratization depends upon listening more attentively to publics. The financial crisis has 
indeed exacerbated existing tensions and activated new, perhaps more destructive ones. In this 
sense, the clash between nation-based social protection regimes and the European Monetary 
Union-induced austerity and imposed spending cuts has entered the electoral arena across 
Europe; of course, Brexit being the most dramatic example of this. The crisis has also led to the 
reactivation of latent distributive cleavages at the European level, between the ‘richer’ Member 
States and the ‘poorer’ receiving Member States, leading to a further straining of the tension 
between solidarity and economic integration. Eder (2014), similarly to the present thesis, 
recognizes this ‘crisis of Europe’ as an opportunity for the birth of a new society through the 
development of a post-national narrative, which could potentially herald the first truly modern 
society. Although I agree with Eder’s sentiment here, and there is indeed much evidence of new 
emergent cultural models which could potentially challenge the dominant cleavage, there is still 
much to overcome at the cognitive order level for these to constitute new transnational cognitive 
cultural models. The focus must, therefore, remain on the cognitive processes of collective 
learning, and the identification, exposition and critique of those instances in which learning 
processes are pathologically blocked.  
In that sense, Celikates’ (2015) approach of ‘learning from the streets’ offers a more promising 
orientation, if combined with the critical-cognitive framework developed here, for detecting the 
sources of potential social transformation in the future. By addressing systematic theoretical 
shortcomings in the analysis of modern social movements and the related forms of civil 
disobedience, Celikates evaluates how the activist practice of confronting “low-intensity 
representative democratic institutions” with “participatory or high-intensity democratic forms of 
democracy and self-determination” actually guides this transformation (Celikates, 2015: 65). By 
paying closer attention to forms of cultural innovation, learning processes could potentially 
generate novel forms of contestatory power, combining “new forms of civility that will challenge 
established assumptions about civil and civic norms, the symbolic and the confrontational, 
alternative forms of collectivity, and a prefigurative transformation of public space in ways that 
trigger the dynamics of collective action” (2015; 72). This perspective also indicates the future 
orientation for the development of the empirical focus of the critical-cognitive framework 
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advanced in the present work, pointing towards new combinations between applications of a 
Critical Theory research and the theoretical advancement of cognitive sociology.  
 
5.2 The Theory of Social Learning and the Pathologies of Blocked Learning  
A fundamental theoretical distinction in proceeding with this approach relates to a sociological 
concept of learning. Following in the social evolutionary tradition, learning is understood here to 
proceed at the level of the society, prior to that of the individual. It is a fundamental constitutive 
element of social evolution. Klaus Eder (1999) argues that modern societies have created a new 
type of ‘reflexive knowledge’ in relation to the way in which they look at themselves; he writes, 
“society has learned that it learned” (Eder, 1999: 197). This exceptional form of reflexivity is 
therefore an inherent characteristic modern society, which, he argues, is a learning society. 
Ultimately, however, this advanced sociological understanding of the reflexive capacity of the 
modern learning society presents us with a paradox, which is reflected in the title of Eder’s paper 
and illuminates a core concern of the present work; why, despite this learning capacity, is it so 
hard to change the world? This paradox may be resolved in some ways by further clarifying 
aspects of collective learning, specifically, why under certain circumstances societies do not make 
use of what they have learned, why, at critical times, they block learning processes.  
Eder suggests that the learning of societies is a phenomenon that would be impossible to explain 
by following the logic of individual learning. Breaking therefore with the long-held individualist 
(psychological) assumptions regarding the micro-level basis of macro-level learning, he advocates 
following a shift that has resulted from real changes in relation to the way in which social learning 
has been observed by those involved in collective learning processes. The key sociological point 
here is “that modern culture is perceived by its participants as the outcome of a collective 
enterprise, as the outcome of collective discussion, of collective argumentation in groups, 
organizations, institutions” (1999: 199). In essence, the creation of modern culture is understood 
by the actors themselves as a collective learning process. Eder argues that this perception of 
modern society “forces us to take the step from an individualist to a relational theory of action” 
(1999: 199). This relational approach is then filled in and developed according to certain 
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substantive assumptions of Habermas’ communication theory, that human beings base their 
capacity to act rationally upon specific cognitive and moral competences (1999: 201). Pursuing 
this communicative approach to social learning, Eder turns to the work of Max Miller in outlining 
a model of collective learning processes, which allows for a key set of distinctions to be made in 
applying the theory. 
Miller (2002), in integrating a perspective on communication theory with insights developed from 
a theory of systemic learning, represents a critical step in the light of the present work, specifically 
as it opens up the cognitive sociology approach to follow. Systemic learning relates to a form of 
‘structural knowledge’, which presupposes the ‘exploration of differences’ as the central 
mechanism of learning through a given ‘social discourse’ or ‘system of communication’ (Miller, 
2002: 3). In line therefore with Eder’s approach, it is not the intentions or purposes of individual 
agents that is of concern, but the ‘logic of discourse’ that systemic learning essentially depends 
on. Following this, Miller’s key critical position is that “if the continuation of discourse is 
externally determined by individual intentions and interests to such an extent that consensus 
and dissensus pathologies arise, learning will be blocked, and forms of an authoritarian, 
defensive, ideological, or regressive learning will result” (2002: 3). It is necessary to reflect further 
upon the concepts Miller raises here, as they will bear a fundamental importance for the analysis 
at hand. 
A basic assumption is that conflict and discourse – as, for instance, in the case of responding to 
the financial crisis – do not always enable learning processes. They may in fact represent 
conditions that block all kinds of learning and, as I will argue in relation to the Irish case, may be 
performed with the goal of preventing any progress of knowledge. It is therefore imperative, 
according to Miller, that a clear distinction be made for a theory of discourse learning between 
“forms and structures of discourse which can enable processes of structural learning (including 
self-referential discourse learning) and those forms and structures of discourse which lead those 
efforts to fail, because otherwise (without the possibility of any such distinction) the mere illusion 
of a theory has been created” (2002: 27). This distinction highlights specific forms of discourse 
that systematically impede collective learning processes. In identifying these forms of discourse, 
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Miller poses the question, “how can the potential of differences or, more broadly, of conflicts be 
converted into a blockage of all progress?” (2002: 27). 
Miller, in articulating a perspective on systematically blocked processes of learning, classifies 
three forms of social conflict, constituting the basic parameters for potential collective learning 
outcomes. The first two forms of conflict he identifies relate to the idea of a limited or finite 
conflict, a situation in which participants in discourse reach some understanding about the nature 
of the conflict itself. In one sense, the actors involved succeed in jointly identifying points of 
controversy and are therefore capable of proceeding communicatively with the exploration of 
differences, which is crucial for processes of collective learning; Miller refers to this as a rational 
dissensus (2002: 27). A second form of finite conflict refers to the transformation of a dissensual 
situation into a final consensus, an outcome which very rarely occurs in actual social 
communication. In direct contrast to these forms of social conflict, a third and critical distinction 
is presented, in which participants are unable to identify common points of controversy and 
where communication is ultimately powerless, one may describe an endless or infinite conflict 
(2002: 27). It is in relation to this latter form that we can speak of blocked processes of collective 
learning precisely. 
Miller differentiates infinite conflicts into four forms of ‘systematically distorted discourse’, 
which in turn corresponds to four ideal types of blocked processes of learning; “authoritarian 
learning, defensive learning, ideological learning and regressive learning” (2002: 28). He 
furthermore distinguishes here between two basically different ways in which discourse becomes 
distorted, externally overruling the autonomous logic of discourse through the enforcement of 
either a consensus or dissensus. He argues that when discourse proceeds under such conditions 
of communication, learning pathologies arise; consensus pathologies in the case of authoritarian 
and defensive learning, and dissensus pathologies in cases of ideological and regressive learning 
(2002: 28). The four ideal-typical forms of systematically distorted discourse/learning blockages 
may be elaborated in relation to this distinction regarding specific learning pathologies. 
Authoritarian learning, firstly, relates to some external factor determining what belongs to the 
realm of collectively accepted beliefs. A system of learning based on imposition, coercion and 
‘toughness’, it is enforced by simply excluding certain kinds of conflict or dissensus from public 
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discourse (2002: 29). Secondly, in the case of defensive learning, Miller explains “power is exerted 
to enforce a predefined consensus in a much more subtle and abstract way, as it can no longer 
be traced back to specific sources” (2002: 29). This system of blocked learning is therefore based 
on a ‘collective pattern of defensive avoidance of dissensus’, and any attempt to generate a 
possible dissensus will be censured before it crystallizes (2002: 29). Ideological learning, Miller 
explains, mirrors defensive learning in some ways, as it refers to the basic assumption that 
whatever can be learned must not place certain antagonisms in question (2002: 29). There are, 
of course, varying levels to this system of learning; he points outs “ideological learning is not 
always an expression of that dark side of human nature, it can also occur in less dramatic and less 
threatening ways when, for example, in sociology departments there is…a dogmatic controversy 
between advocates of different theoretical paradigms” (2002: 30). Lastly, regressive learning, 
which presents an oxymoron “that states and simultaneously revokes the essential property of 
learning” (2002: 29). Miller equates this form of learning with the idea of argumentum ad 
hominem; a given argument or point of view is rejected because the person stating or holding it 
is rejected (2002: 31).  
As a dissensus pathology, regressive learning bears particular significance in the context of the 
proceeding critique. Systemic learning, Miller explains, does not depend on individual agents and 
their willingness to learn, it is rather the processes of discourse and argumentation that augment 
the possibility of such learning. The relation between discourse and individual agents is therefore 
turned upside down in this blocked process of learning, because in the regressive case, it is the 
individual intentions and purposes of agents that fully determine the continuation or rather “the 
stagnation of discourse” (2002: 31). Discourse, in this sense, becomes the vehicle for regression, 
the impositions of one’s interests. Learning systems become causally determined and ultimately 
destroyed in the case of regressive learning by means of subjective interventions and intrusions 
upon the autonomous logic of discourse; Miller states that “here relevance and acceptance of 
communication regarding coherent and proper continuation of discourse may even become 
totally dependent on the individual and particular person who communicates” (2002: 31). As a 
final word on Miller’s crucial insight into collective learning processes and their associated 
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pathologies, I will quote a distinction he draws between the relations of power and 
communication;  
…blocked processes of learning depend on certain relations between power and 
communication that may lead to specific forms of systematically distorted discourse. Of 
course, as most sociological approaches in understanding power (cf. e.g. Lukes, 1986) 
emphasize, power is neither inherently good nor evil but rather a basic structure for action 
in all human societies. Power will only block learning processes if it systematically prevents 
the exploration of differences and thus also prevents a potentially infinite conflict from 
being transformed into a limited conflict that is mutually acknowledged and so could 
possibly be resolved. In its capacity to reflect on rules and structures of discourse self-
referential discourse learning represents the only method for possibly breaking learning 
blockages However, if there is a struggle between, as Habermas (1992) would say, 
communicative power and social power the effectiveness of systemic learning will possibly 
be very low – at least if looked at in the short term; and in the long term, even if learning 
succeeded it could be too late (Miller, 2002: 32)  
By identifying elements of distorted communication, therefore, at the manifest level of public 
discourse, a pathology is indicated at the underlying structure of collective learning processes, 
following Miller’s formulation, which in turn, I will argue, may be causally linked to the given 
normative culture. In bringing this approach to bear on the empirical problem of Ireland’s 
response to the 2008 crisis, I will now put forward a critical-cognitive sociological approach, 
which will integrate the normative perspective of collective learning processes – along with the 
specified learning pathologies – with a cognitive theory of society, encapsulated in the concept 
of the cognitive order. It is crucial, in attempting to develop such a framework, which does not 
lend itself conveniently to traditional methodological approaches, to clarify the empirical 






5.3 Cultural Models and a Cognitive Sociological Approach to Learning Pathologies 
According to the critical sociologist, Alain Touraine, society does not just involve reproduction 
and adaptation, but crucially, it is also involves creation, i.e. self-production. Through knowledge, 
accumulated over time, it has the capacity to define itself and, therefore, to transform its 
relations with its environment, essentially, “to constitute its milieu” (Touraine, 1977: 3-4). Human 
society, he explains, is the only natural system that possesses the capacity to form and transform 
itself on the basis of its capacity to act upon itself; “Society is not what it is but what it makes 
itself be” (1977: 4). It is through, what is termed, historicity, consisting of three distinct 
synchronic components, that society is able to place distance between itself and its activity, thus 
gaining perspective and determining the categories of its practice; firstly, through knowledge, 
“which creates a state of relations between society and its environment”; secondly, through 
accumulation, “which subtracts a portion of available product from the cycle leading to 
consumption”; and, thirdly, through the cultural model, “which captures creativity in forms 
dependent upon the society’s political dominion over its own functioning” (1977: 4).  
The development of orientations which allow for the capacity of society to act according to its 
own historical action, by means of historicity, specifically in relation to its cultural model, entails 
the division of society into opposing classes; “it is not society but part of society, the ruling class, 
that takes over the responsibility for historicity and emerges from the society’s functioning in 
order to go beyond mere self-production – through use of accumulation – to knowledge“ (1977: 
5). This dimension of the cultural model, which relates to the institutional establishment of 
relations of domination is particularly relevant in the Irish case, where a distinctive category of 
lower middle class assumes responsibility for the historicity of the society. In this context of 
cultural domination, as reflected also in the system of political power, the remaining 
constituents, predominantly the elements within the proletarian class, merely react to the 
process of historicity.    
The sociological perspective on cultural models allows for society to be recognized, not as a 
totality or an order sustained by the unity of some social consensus, but as a complex system 
whose principle characteristic is the generation of its own orientations and thus, the conditions 
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governing its functioning (1977: 6). It is through struggles constitutive of social conflicts and 
movements, revealing the existence of domination, violence and ideological distortion in social 
relations, that such general orientations and conditions are understood; as Touraine notes, “it is 
in this respect above all that Marx’s critical analysis retains all its value as an antidote to the 
optical illusion that leads each and all of us to perceive social relations as subject to some unifying 
intention or law” (1977: 6). The distinction within a society’s field of historicity, therefore, 
captured in the concept of the cultural model, establishes social relations not on the basis of 
reciprocity or competition but on the basis of conflict. This is understood not simply as a conflict 
of interests or values, but a “battle for the control of historicity”, partly open and partly concealed 
between the dominators and dominated, which determines the social and cultural orientations 
of the system of historical action. Society is therefore perceived as divided against itself, “each 
of its orientations is the object of opposing attempts at appropriation” (1977: 10); 
The sociologist must not identify himself with the ideology of any actor, but in order to 
achieve this independence, without which his work is impossible, he must throw all his 
weight into the task of re-establishing the nature of the social relations thus concealed, in 
order to let those speak that have no voice, in order to illumine that which is hidden, 
forbidden, or lock away, in order to break the power of ideological discourse and the false 
evidence in the categories of social practices (Touraine, 1977: 10-11) 
In ‘The Post-Industrial Society’, Touraine (1971) sketches out an impression of the dominant 
cultural models, the basic parameters mediating conflict at the most general social level, through 
which the different stages of modern society have developed. With the transformation of 
production techniques and economic organisation in the development of capitalism, particularly 
through the nineteenth century, the capital/labour distinction is highlighted in this context as the 
dominant cultural model, according to which one may characterise the adversarial structure of 
conflict in industrial society. This structural distinction, Touraine suggests, remained stable, as 
the basis of society’s historicity – the capacity to act on itself – until the post-WWII period, when 
new modes of crisis and conflict precipitated the advent of what he terms the post-industrial 
society, therefore shifting parameters and creating the conditions for the emergence of a new, 
overarching cultural model.   
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These novel conditions, which Touraine observes as emerging in the late 1960s, were born out 
of an “anti-technocratic social movement” (Touraine, 1971: 96). Technocracy, in this sense, does 
not refer simply to the replacement of political choices by some form of wholly technical choice, 
but to a form of power exercised in the name of the interests of the politico-economic production 
and decision-making system, which “aim at growth and power and consider society to be only 
the collection of the social means to be used to achieve growth and to reinforce the ruling 
structures that control it” (1971: 98). The development of this technocratic form of governance, 
which of course coincides with the adoption of neo-liberalism as a guiding ideological agenda, 
particularly in the US and Britain, is in turn resisted by new forms of social movement, 
representing specifically the alternative interests of students and the new constellations of urban 
working class. Such movements derive their strength from social forces that are defined by their 
place within the new relations of production and power, rather than “because they belong to 
social groups that are either in decline or are relatively far from the centres of decision-making” 
(1971: 98). Without delving further into the complexity involved in the development of these, 
then emergent, cultural models, Touraine diagnosed this period of social change as resulting in a 
new distinction between ‘technocrats’ (techno-conservatism) and ‘new social movements’ 
(radical pluralism). The present crisis may, therefore, be perceived as a culmination point of the 
tensions within this new cultural model.    
The different modes of theorizing and explaining the 2008 crisis, reflected in Irish public discourse 
at the beginning of the present work, may be represented as highlighting the distinctions in this 
cultural model. The assumptions that underlie both perspectives characterise fundamental 
differences in relation to the coordination of social life; in the case of the techno-conservative 
perspective, it is, very generally, that social and cultural differences between groups should not 
be exaggerated and brought to the core of theoretical presuppositions about social coordination 
and political life; in contrast, the radical pluralist perspective, deriving from the counter-cultural 
milieus of new social movements, claims that such differences must be recognised and made 
salient. The form of diagnosis associated with the latter perspective, although very far from 
uniform, is based upon a critique of the socio-cultural orientation of western societies, making 
claims for further democratization, specifically including innovations in public participation.  
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Both perspectives are ultimately based upon a dissatisfaction with contemporary forms of 
democratic governance, and this is particularly evident in the EU, where the detachment of 
transnational institutions tends to exacerbate the general perception (O’Mahony, 2014: 242). 
Due to an increased level of institutional influence over the last twenty years, the techno-
conservative critique has become muted, however, the crisis has presented a situation where the 
position must either take responsibility for its excessive approach, specifically in relation to the 
dependence on financial systems, perhaps leading to a desire for compromise, or further 
radicalize its programme. Since 2008, indications, particularly from the experiences of Ireland, 
Greece and Italy, suggest the adoption of the latter; as O’Mahony explains in relation to the crisis-
response, “Governments generally, with the European Union at the forefront, combine further 
reductions in the residual welfare state with attempts to align national and international 
economic forces within a minimal regulatory regime and through emphasis on technical norms 
rather than a concern for general welfare” (2014: 242). The deep-lying problem with this 
perspective, specifically as it has become manifest in the European crisis, is that it seems to 
present a fateful choice between the continued market-efficiency of techno-conservatism and 
the future of democracy understood as a meaningful expression of public will. 
From the above observations, the public discourse of the crisis is animated and given a discernible 
structure by a dominant conflict-mediating cultural model. However, it must be pointed out that 
modern forms of social organization generate multiple cultural models that interact with one 
another in the course of social practice, therefore, the substantive effects of cultural models 
depend on the relative power of the various communicative structures that underpin their 
formation in the first place. The construction of normative cultures, which generate the mode of 
communication that determines the thematization of principles such as legitimacy and 
responsibility, now becomes of ultimate importance. The concept of conservatism, which will be 
presented as the characteristic mode of political culture in Ireland, will be submitted here as a 
reason for the structural reflexivity deficit, reflecting a problematic modality of public discourse 
in which there is an inability to reflect upon the crisis in an appropriately democratic way and 
thematize possible alternatives to it. This, in turn, through the perspective of cultural models is 
shown to be represented at a higher level in the present state of the EU, in which the dominant 
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structure of communication is constitutive of a power imbalance that favours the asymmetrical 
political style of repressive hegemony, based on the dominant techno-conservative perspective, 
rather than, critically, the democratically oriented communicative structures of compromise, 
rational dissent and consensus. 
Ireland, reflecting more generally on the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, and indeed Europe, 
currently lack the communicative culture and infrastructure, and the normative, deliberative 
institutions to foster an appropriate culture model to address the monumental challenges of the 
post-crisis situation. Klaus Eder (2014), in his analysis of the ‘crisis of Europe’, appeals to the 
‘normative power of Europe’ and a new conception of solidarity in overcoming the consequences 
of the crisis; these, he claims, refer not just to abstract moral principles, but to a sense of 
responsibility accompanying the application of cherished and collectively shared moral principles 
on the transnational plane. A cognitive sociological approach, which will be presented in the next 
section, offers the advantage of relating public and institutionalised democratic culture to one 
another, also incorporating the concept of cultural models as a key component, in such a way 
that normative culture does not appear as over-idealised. The socio-cognitive context of such a 
normative culture is shown in relation to how it is socially constructed and made manifest. 
Understanding normative culture to have cognitive foundations means that socio-cognitively 
organised universes of meaning and associated rule capabilities become the key to 
understanding the processes of social change, and in turn the diagnoses of blockages to 
democratic innovation and transformation (O’Mahony, 2013). 
The concept of cultural models, having drawn predominantly from the sociological insight of 
Touraine, yet continuing to pursue the distinctly normative-reconstructive approach of Critical 
Theory, oriented also towards the cognitive advancement of this critique, develops a sharper 
description of the conditions from which public discourse is generated in Irish society. Focus now 
shifts to the mechanisms constitutive of, and reproducing, the discursive conditions in the Irish 
public culture. Although cultural models determine the selectivity settings of a given society, this, 
it will be submitted here, presupposes the correlating mode of learning, operating at the meso-
level, reflecting a dominant communicative structuring of that society. Constituting, also, another 
key component of the critical-cognitive sociology paradigm, which will be elaborated upon in the 
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proceeding section, the intention here is to develop an explanation of the mechanisms by which 
the principles of legitimacy and responsibility are refracted in a distinctive pathological direction, 
as presented in the Irish case. Ultimately, therefore, a cognitive-cultural model of an alternative 
mode of responsibility and legitimation is blocked. 
Given the critical theoretical focus on language communication as one of the basic elements in 
exploring social relations, the emphasis of the explanatory critique moves to examine those 
elements or structures of communication that deny the possibility of learning, which occludes 
the conditions of the ideal speech situation. The counterfactual standards set out in the 
conditions of discourse ethics may, from this perspective, be characterized as “undistorted 
communication”. Habermas (1970) develops the theory of systematically distorted 
communication in order to capture those patterns of communication in which there are 
disturbances that result in misunderstanding, or, more precisely, pathological forms of 
recognition. Of particular importance are those instances in which speech is not conspicuously 
pathological, where the participants themselves do not recognise any communication 
disturbance, therefore reproducing the system of reciprocal misunderstanding (Habermas, 1970: 
369). Crucially, he explains, in such a situation, it is only a neutral observer that may notice the 
participants do not understand one another. The distinction here between manipulation and 
systematically distorted communication is an important one; in relation to the former, following 
Gross’ (2010) assessment of Habermas, at least one of the participants is deceiving the other 
regarding the non-fulfilment of the conditions of communicative action which he or she would 
have apparently accepted, in contrast to the latter, which refers to a situation in which at least 
one of the participants is deceiving him-or herself, “regarding the fact that he or she is actually 
behaving strategically” (Gross, 2010: 337). Gross elaborates this distinction;  
“In manipulation, a border is crossed. Communicative becomes strategic action: its goal is 
no longer mutual understanding, but an end deliberately hidden from one of interlocutors. 
In systematically distorted communication, a border has also been crossed. Interlocutors 
deceive themselves; they think they are in control of exchanges whose purpose is mutual 
understanding; in fact, they have ceded control” (Gross, 2010: 338) 
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The narrative of the 2008 crisis in Ireland, presented as the empirical focus of the present work, 
was constructed through processes of public discourse and, therefore, it is recognized as 
constitutive of elements already existent as cognitive resources in the structure of Irish society, 
mobilised as the crisis demanded a political response. Anticipating the key methodological 
concept of immanent transcendence, much of the preceding analysis here will focus on the 
immanent dimension, the level of actuality, distilling the relevant principles for reconstruction 
out of the content of the discourse itself. The ideal, or counterfactual level is, however, now 
coming into focus and critique shifting to the transcendent dimension of modern society. The 
distinction, which will be explicated in the following pages, between, what may be referred to as, 
the democratic normative potential of modernity and the reality of democracy, specifically 
regarding the realization of the principles of legitimacy and responsibility, will be developed in 
relation to the way in which communication itself is structured, and, ultimately, how this is then 
shown to have become pathological in the case of Irish public discourse. Critically, such an 
analysis extends beyond communication, and examines what the learning taking place in relation 
to that communication and, moreover, how this determines the possibility of social and political 
change.  
To explicate the concept of collective learning at issue here, following Eder initially, there are 
three fundamental points to outline; firstly, in response to the question of ‘who is learning?’, 
there is a transition from a single actor to a collective, interaction-based perspective (here using 
Habermas as the theoretical basis for such a shift); secondly, learning collectively presupposes a 
narratively-based shared universe of meaning; and, thirdly, in response to the question ‘what do 
they learn?, learning refers to the acquisition of knowledge and “to learn how to learn”. 
Importantly, Eder maintains, learning does not guarantee evolutionary social change, he explains, 
“learning, it is argued, does not guarantee evolution but provides the mutations for evolutionary 
processes to take place” (Eder, 1999: 195). The more traditional, individualistic perspectives on 
learning begin at the micro-level of social action, and through cognitive capacities and 
assumptions about rational motivations, accumulate to eventually constitute macro-social 
structures, in contrast, the perspective being adopted here takes collective learning processes as 
the starting point. The basis of collective learning is not individuals, but the social relationship. 
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The key point here is that modern culture is perceived as the outcome of a collective enterprise, 
of collective discussion and argumentation, and of organizations and institutions (Eder, 1999: 
199).  
Miller’s (1986) communication-theoretical model for understanding collective learning processes 
may be directly appropriated here to explicate the critical approach to cultural models. He 
defines the concept of ‘ideal’ collective learning processes as attempts to solve cognitive 
inconsistencies through rational argumentation which requires that principles of ‘generalization, 
of objectivity, and of truth are followed in such argumentative situations’. Following Eder’s 
explanation of Miller, this ideal situation then serves the identification of situations in which 
learning is either prevented, interrupted or systematically restricted (or, as explained in the case 
of Habermas, distorted), which in turn leads to the development of a typology of blocked learning 
processes; authoritarian, ideological and regressive learning. Similar to the way in which Van 
Leeuwen connects instances of discursive communication to distinctive forms of legitimation, 
Miller’s typology links collective learning processes to the communicative structures within which 
social interactions are taking place. Authoritarian learning, firstly, relates to situations where 
knowledge is accepted by its mere authority, the principle that a statement should be subject to 
a test of its generalizability no longer applies in this instance; secondly, ideological learning 
constitutes a more subtle form, where moral and normative questions are in some way 
presupposed, implying that the principle of objectivity can be suppressed which, as Eder explains, 
“entails that the arguments of the other (enemy) are not seen as part of the definition of the 
situation among those taking part in the argumentative process”; regressive learning, finally, 
refers to the most radical and clear-cut case of blocked learning processes, as here, the idea of 
argumentative rationality, the principle of truth, is given up.    
The communicative structures in which these blocked learning processes are understood to be 
embedded are reflective of the broader normative order of society, that is, by the established 
practices generated and sustained by a given pattern of dispositions, reflected empirically in the 
Irish crisis-narrative. This normative order, guiding processes of communicative social 
integration, is mediated along horizontal and vertical axes. This may be considered in line with 
Touraine’s distinction between the synchronic and diachronic structure of societal forms, 
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between the historicity of a given society, constitutive of its cultural model, in relation to the 
former, and the passage from one societal form to another, the latter. Whereas horizontal 
mediation refers to the different institutional configurations, evolving over time, and capturing 
social change in relation to normative complexes, vertical mediation operates through 
mechanisms in micro and macro scale, crucially, by means of the meso-level of communicative 
structures. O’Mahony, in developing a framework for the communicative structure of the public 
sphere, develops a distinction here between norm-reproducing communication, which includes 
a significant degree of normative elaboration, and norm-transforming communication, which 
then enters the “discursively carried cognitive-learning circuit” (O’Mahony, 2013: 311). Although 
the latter is fundamental to understanding processes of public discourse, equally so are the 
embedded normative structures related to the former, resisting normative elaboration by means 
of communicative-learning pathologies.  
Miller (2002), as outlined in previous section, elaborates upon the approach to the conditioning 
of learning processes by the development of systemic learning, in which a conflict-based 
perspective on communication and argumentation is theoretically outlined. Following this, and 
the typology of blocked learning processes, O’Mahony (2013) delineates key structures of the 
communicative organisation of social integration which, he argues, facilitate integration by 
linking the institutional system of cooperation with the cognitive learning circuit of public 
communication. Essential components in the organisation of cultural models, these structures, 
which offer a suite of coordination mechanisms for normative practices, operate on two planes, 
corresponding to pathological and non-pathological forms of social integration.  
The first three communicative structures, outlined by O’Mahony, are consensus, compromise 
and rational dissensus, and relate to those forms which operate on the non-pathological plane. 
To begin with, the structure of consensus refers to a form of communicative organisation 
characterized by circumstances where moral justification processes determine norm formation; 
as O’Mahony explains, “where morally structured justification relates to consensus over norms 
with high moral content, deliberative processes, especially those that bear on constitutional legal 
issues, have a big, and sometimes decisive, role to play” (2013: 314). Consensus here refers not 
only to the moral dimension, but to a shared epistemic and wider symbolic assumption in relation 
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to what is valued in factual, social and emotional worlds; a shared background context that within 
the horizon of the lifeworld, which may inhibit or support the achievement of moral consensus 
(2013: 314). Compromise, a second non-pathological communicative structure, operates on the 
basis of bargaining or, more precisely, rational argumentative processes; O’Mahony elaborates, 
“this kind of communicative organization presumes a high degree of symmetry in the distribution 
of social power, including epistemic and communicative capacity to effectively understand and 
present social positions” (2013: 313). A compromise-based form of social integration is one 
conditioned by moral norms, played out in relation to a morally regulated constitutional 
framework. The third non-pathological communicative structure, which lies somewhere in 
between compromise and consensus, is rational dissensus. O’Mahony, following Miller, explains 
this term as referring to the identification of differences arising in argumentation that leads not 
to conflict, but, as distinct from compromise, to agreement on rules for managing disagreements; 
“a state of rational dissensus frequently entails the construction of coordinating schema of a 
partly moral, partly ethical and partly pragmatic kind” (2013: 314). Understood as constituting 
the preconditions for democracy itself, the structure of rational dissensus provides a means of 
rationality, coordinating disagreement that could eventually lead to consensus or compromise.  
The pathological communicative structures reflect problems in fundamental coordination 
mechanisms and a general failure of social integration. Firstly, permanent conflict describes a 
state of societal disintegration that is sustained by non-normative means, that is, by domination, 
potentially backed up by violence. O’Mahony uses the example of extreme ethnic conflict, where 
groups are separated by irreconcilable identity claims, to illustrate this. Although communication 
may continue in situations of permanent conflict, it is extremely polarized and proposed solutions 
often result in offending one of the contending parties (2013: 312). The second pathological 
structure, which will serve to best describe the empirical case at hand, is repressive hegemony; 
O’Mahony describes this communicative situation as involving “circumstances in which the ethos 
and interests of a particular group come to dominate over the – actual or potential – ethos and 
interests of other social groups” (2013: 312). This form of domination can occur across all of 
society at one time, as in the case of specific class interests, or it may be dispersed in various 
social spheres. Critically, O’Mahony makes the distinction that repressive hegemony may be 
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achieved, on the one hand, through the process of ideological distortion and subterfuge or, on 
the other hand, “by the unchallenged belief, even by the dominated, that the values of a 
particular group serve the good of all” (2013: 313). There is an emphasis on an ethical hierarchy 
in this structure, involving restrictions on compromise seeking and on moral norm formations.  
The principles of legitimacy and responsibility, which have been developed as the normative 
anchors of the present work, demand a high level of inclusive and reciprocal public discursive 
communication, constituting the structure of rational dissensus and the possibility of leading to 
an innovative combination with the structures of consensus and/or compromise. Sustaining, 
therefore, a cultural model appropriate to more advanced forms of responsibility and 
legitimation, requires demanding and innovative forms of discursive communication, underlain 
by a robust democracy. The response to the 2008 crisis in Ireland constitutes a situation in which 
the terms of democracy remain unthematized, thus unable to shift towards responding in a way 
that would reflect such fundamentally important principles as equality and solidarity. Repressive 
hegemony is revealed by the crisis as the dominant structure; the mechanisms required to 
realize, never mind sustain or reproduce, such counterfactual normative ideas of responsibility 
and legitimacy are therefore severely weakened, specifically in relation to the prospects of a 
rational dissensus, and to a significant extent, non-present in the Irish context. The democratic 
regulation of the society is therefore recognized as poorly developed, resulting in the 
reproduction of a political culture with limited communicative structures of responsibility and 
legitimation processes – a conservative political culture that restricts the thematization of a 
democratic form of legitimation. Ultimately, it is held here that without dramatic episodes of 
collective learning, presented in the context of an acute crisis, such deeply rooted structures will 
continue to shape values, norms and general collective perceptions of what is perceived as 
possible, just, responsible and desirable in Irish society. 
To summarize, there is a transcendental foundation to all societies, given shape by means of the 
construction of distinctive cultural models and expression through the associated communicative 
structures that constitutive generative mechanisms reflecting a combination of organisational 
principles. From this perspective, a spectrum of claims that can be asserted in public discourse 
and gain resonance as valid in a given society becomes discernible; on the immanent plane, it is 
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through this ‘spectrum of relevance’ that selections are made, by means of an appropriation of 
the cultural model putting varying emphasis and weight on validity claims. The cultural model 
determines what principles are to be valued positively, and those that are to be valued 
negatively, as a threat to the social order. There is always a distinction that must be maintained 
between the norms that are established and institutionalized in a society and this transcendent 
level, which contains an infinite potential. In the case of Ireland, however, the societal 
appropriation of what is transcendentally possible is extremely weakened. The empirical 
legitimation processes outlined earlier and the obstruction of the principle of responsibility by an 
emphasis on blaming in public discourse, shows that Irish political culture is not oriented toward 
the ideal level, unable therefore, to achieve a form of democratization which would allow for the 
thematization of such ideas as legitimacy, democracy, solidarity, co-responsibility, equality and 
justice, most critically in the context of a crisis.  
The following section will introduce the concept of the cognitive order as a final theoretical 
component, allowing for the many distinctions drawn in the present and preceding sections to 
be integrated into an advanced critical-cognitive sociological framework. This approach will re-
cast the relevant principles, communicative structures and associated pathologies, and the 
cultural model itself, by means of which claims are made immanently effective, in cognitive 
terms. It will delineate, in the clearest sense, the orientation of Irish society in relation to the 
coordinating mechanisms determining the societal emphasis on the three fundamental cultural 
spheres of modernity; the functional, moral and evaluative (mentioned earlier by reference to 
Peters). A social order dominated by functional and ethical-evaluative imperatives, the 
dimension of moral-legal, crucial for the survival of a democratic society, is observed to be 
severely diminished. The 2008 crisis has revealed, in Ireland, a society in which the efficiency and 
goal-oriented form of economic organization and functional coordination, along with evaluation 
standards associated with successful identity-building overshadow the moral component as the 




5.4 The Cognitive Order and the Irish Crisis Narrative 
The distinction, which runs throughout the present work, between the immanent and the 
transcendent, the actual and the counterfactual, will now be advanced in relation to a further 
distinction, that between the Irish crisis-narrative, representing the normative conditions of 
social reality, and the cognitive order. Through the public discursive construction of the crisis-
narrative, the principles of legitimacy and responsibility have been conservatively refracted to 
constitute the dominant political and public culture of Irish society. The conditions, therefore, for 
more advanced forms of responsibility and legitimation, are blocked by pathological 
communicative structures, resulting in blocked learning and, ultimately, non-normative modes 
of legitimation and the discursive mobilization of blame in the public sphere.  
Two key distinctions will be developed in the following to delineate this fundamental concept; 
firstly, the essential elements presented in the last section, that of the cultural model and 
communicative structures and related learning pathologies, will be integrated as components 
within an overarching ‘cognitive theory of society’; and, secondly, the concept of the cognitive 
order will be developed in light of the preceding empirical-theoretical work, to move towards a 
reconstructive analysis of the response to the 2008 crisis in Ireland, which will be developed upon 
in the following chapters. The cognitive approach that will be submitted here, predominantly 
following the work of Eder, Miller, Strydom and O’Mahony, has been developed essentially on 
the basis of a theory of collective learning, where collective learning may be understood as either 
as either a socio-cognitive accomplishment or, depending on its actual form, a pathology. This 
theoretical account arises from the interplay between public discourse and cognitive structures 
that constitute the validity conditions of normative orders.  
The approach, at a general level, operates through the device of the cognitively grounded 
anticipation of the possibility of an alternative normative order. It is, following O’Mahony (2013), 
an extension of the formal pragmatic understanding of the relationship between the limited and 
unlimited communication community. By means of collective counterfactual anticipation of 
alternative futures in collective learning processes, possible directions of social change may be 
apprehended and applied critically to concrete problems. This anticipation is generated out of 
collective learning processes and given societal expression in the form of emergent cultural 
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models, that is, possible options for altered cultural models developed in, for instance, 
experimentation of new social movements and ensuing radical democratic innovation, making 
use of opportunity structures, such as in the case of a global financial crisis. The five 
communicative structures of social integration outlined in the previous section, in relation to 
which Ireland will be depicted as an example of repressive hegemony, are both mechanisms and 
outcomes of collective learning processes and will therefore, in the following, be deployed in 
relation to how the cognitive order is arranged and operating in the case of this specific 
structuration of the Irish cultural model.  
The concept of the cognitive order represents a key development in the emergence of a cognitive 
sociological approach. In a critical way, the cognitive social theoretical perspective, which will be 
drawn from and advanced here, was conceived by means of a problematization, following the 
intellectual impact of the ‘cognitive revolution’ of the late 1950. It comprises such elementary 
sociological processes as information-processing, knowledge-production and utilization, 
communication and world creation, and their associated modes of structuration, including 
existing epistemological and methodological approaches (Strydom, 2007: 339). The outcome of 
this has been a significant re-contextualization of new problems, challenges and possibilities 
within, specifically critical, social theory, at the centre of which has emerged the cognitive order. 
Strydom (2007 and 2013) systematically maps the contemporary cognitive social theoretical field, 
emphasizing, principally, its critical capacity. Focusing on its latent, yet undeniably present, 
development within the tradition of Critical Theory, particularly through the latter half of the 
twentieth century, the approach may be delineated by means of a critique of Habermas’ 
ontological turn, which would eventuate in the development of universal or formal pragmatics. 
Nonetheless, Strydom makes the argument for a sociological radicalization in Habermas’ 
ontological perspective, embracing the latent cognitive potential in the approach, thus allowing 
for the adoption of the key concept of the cognitive order of society. By doing this, he claims that 
Critical Theory’s diagnosis of society may be sharpened and its analytical tools improved, thus 




Collective learning processes, as understood here, constitute the fluid, mediating mechanisms 
which allow for the outcomes of innovation and change to pass through each level of the 
cognitive order. Although collective learning permeates each scale, it does not necessarily follow 
a fixed logic, flowing from one end of the cognitive order to the other, as it were. O’Mahony 
(2013) illustrates the centrality of these learning processes in relation to the reflexive dynamics 
of the cognitive order; on the micro level, actors may initiate collective learning by adapting their 
cognitive models to process various forms of experience; such experiences, as ideal innovations, 
may then shape public discourse, which, in turn, reorients the perceived significance of the 
innovative experience; on the meso level, interactive and coordinative mechanisms penetrate 
down into the micro, thus further reshaping takes places which elaborates and extends cognitive 
competences in that dimension; the macro-level constitutes ‘presuppositional’ collective 
competences, which are absorbed through socialization and general social participation. 
Innovative collective learning processes are, therefore, partly achieved by ‘pulling down’ 
elements held in the latent potential of cognitive rule systems and cognitive cultural models, 
which reside in the upper levels of the cultural structure, rendering them immanently available 
to feed into discursive processes, that, in turn, may potentially lead to collective learning and 
transformation on a larger scale (O’Mahony, 2013: 352).  
The communicative structures, outlined above, coordinate the social outcomes of political 
processes, and also highlight the impact of collective learning within the cognitive order of 
society. Ranging fom unconditional universal agreement (consensus), agreement to differ while 
fully respecting opposing positions and finding ways to go on evaluatively and normatively 
(rational dissensus), willingness to bargain while holding opposing values and interests 
(compromise), a state of domination where some group or groups successfully repress the 
interests or values or other, whether recognised or not by the repressed group (hegemony), and 
liminal conditions of unmitigated conflict, e.g., social, ethnic, or racial (permanent conflict), each 
communicative structure is associated with specific dimensions in the macro-cultural levels of 
the cognitive order. The three top-most levels, the cognitive order itself and cognitive cultural 
models, are constituted from the two higher levels of consensus and rational dissensus; at the 
lower level cultural model, the remaining structures of hegemony and compromise are foremost 
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– and at the immanent societal level, all five process-outcome structures are operative. Although 
this will remain quite abstract until the full composition of the cognitive order is explicated and 
applied empirically later, it is important to bear in mind that political interaction in democracies 
gravitate continuously to one or a combination of these structures.  
The cognitive order in this sense may be characterised as the social mind/brain of society, 
reflexively structuring the individual mind/brain, offering an all-embracing suite of post-
conventional generative mechanisms that make conventional rule-governed action possible – or 
problematise this action to such a degree that it is no longer possible. In identifying categorically 
distinct social capacities and competences, which combine in the construction of cultural models, 
the cognitive order allows for a recognition of the full range of social positions that modern 
society throws up at different times. It is an order constituted by a complex range of cognitive 
structures, each giving form to a distinct principle, which are normatively selected in processes 
of social struggle. These structures reflect what may be termed ‘collectively shared meta-frames’ 
at the very core of the reasoning processes on the societal level; in turn, this articulates principles 
– for example, freedom, legitimacy, dignity, equality, legality – whose fundamental relevance to 
modern societal organisation are beyond question, thus specifying, on the basis of incorporating 
the range of legitimated societal perspectives on each principle, a range of validity claims for each 
principle. Given the deep complexity involved here, and the varying distinctions regarding 
different cognitive structures, three distinct macro-cultural levels, corresponding to the micro-
meso-macro scale, within the framework may be delineated for the present analysis; 
(1) The cognitive order; the overarching structure comprising a range of meta-cognitive 
structures (schemata) operating transcendentally but mirrored immanently on the 
societal plane 
(2) Cognitive cultural models; these operate as immanent relational models (schema 
combining) of legitimating reasoning that derived from the cognitive order  
(3) Cultural models; as in the case of those presented in the last chapter, these operate within 
particular societies, reflecting the specific cultural structures at work in those societies, 




Levels (1) and (3) have been developed to a sufficient extent at this stage, (2) however requires 
elucidation. Cognitive cultural models represent the upper-most immanent level; closest to the 
transcendent dimension. The three-core cognitive cultural models, corresponding to the modes 
of reasoning in the cultural spheres of modernity referred to earlier, providing a structure to 
social life, are the model of functional reason, that of democratic reason (moral-legal), and that 
of aesthetic ethical reason. Given the critical-normative focus of the present work, the model of 
democratic reason is of most concern here; this may be understood as an orienting cultural 
structure, guided by the communicative structures of consensus and rational dissensus, for 
democratic reasoning that specifies the cognitive principles agreed to be important in democratic 
discourse. This perspective on the cognitive cultural model is not understood as a sphere of 
domination; it represents the totality of forms and conceptions that arise – or could arise – from 
the principles held at the level of the cognitive order. In this sense, the cognitive cultural model 
constitutes the level at which principles ‘come down’ from the cognitive order and ‘come up’ 
from evaluative normative considerations, thus determining the selections which in turn give 
definite structure to public discourse. 
The importance of the cognitive perspective being proposed here, for advancing the present 
analysis, will be explicated in methodological terms in the following chapter, following specifically 
the concept of immanent transcendence. A key concept in Critical Theory, and central to its very 
self-understanding, this refers to the reflexive situation-transcending capacity of social actors to 
reach beyond concrete reality towards a counterfactual horizon of possibility to make possible 
the identification and resolution of collective problems, a process itself theoretically explicated 
through reconstructive critique. This reconstructive approach was used to access the relevant 
transcendent categories bearing on the problematic situation in question, thus leading to the 
identification of the principles of legitimacy and responsibility as essential to the critique. The 
intention here is to attempt to bridge the divide between different emphases within critical social 
theory and social science, pursuing a framework that ultimately tries to reach across this 
fundamental distinction and yet maintain the constructive tension of immanence and 
transcendence in the course of the analysis.  
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The constructivist-cognitive approach is understood here to include a combination of rules which 
present a means for categorizing, classifying and ordering the world. In that sense, following 
O’Mahony (2013) again, the critical theoretical idea of transcendence refers to the existence of 
specific forms of reflexive rule systems, such as efficiency, sovereignty, legality and legitimacy 
(O’Mahony, 2013: 328). These rule systems constitute “cognitive rationality standards” which, 
O’Mahony explains, include “rule-following and rule-elaborating competences that are diffused 
across key domains of modernity” (2013: 328). Transcendence, therefore, indicates ‘cognitive 
presuppositions’ that are specifically related to and defined within the distinctive spheres of 
modernity, “constantly being ‘thought into’ afresh as agents confront problems and seek 
orientation” (2013: 328). These cognitive presuppositions relate, on the one hand, to the latently 
available foundations of everyday interactive practices and, on the other hand, to an 
inexhaustible ‘surplus’ that has yet to be institutionalized in society. This reconceptualization of 
transcendence, O’Mahony argues, offers a sociological translation of the formal pragmatic 
presuppositions of communication; “transcendence has a social pragmatic core that goes beyond 
normatively framed proceduralism” (2013: 329). This ‘social pragmatic core’ is manifested in the 
framework in two senses; firstly, cognitive rule systems are not consensually-based rules, but are 
elements that emerge from the “synthesis of different discursively articulated perspectives”, 
which, although they represent generalised rules, are still subject to the surplus latent potential 
of such rules systems and may therefore be discursively re-activated in episodes of collective 
learning; secondly, the transcendental social pragmatic presuppositions “add a stronger 
teleological or ends-oriented dimension to cognitive analysis”, thus enabling the reconstructive 
disclosure of alternative, perhaps better ways, of dealing with problems or seizing opportunities 
that arise in social practice.  
On the immanent plane, in contrast, cognitive elements practically operative in social life come 
into focus. At the ‘highest’ ideal level in this immanent dimension, lying on the horizon between 
transcendence and immanence, are cognitive cultural models, the key component of the 
cognitive reconstructive approach, which allows for the immanent ideal translation of cognitive 
principles and facilitates their incursion into social practices. ‘Lower level’ cultural models, which 
are closer to Touraine’s understanding, by contrast, offer substantively operating, rather than 
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ideal models of social organisation. ‘Quasi-transcendent’ cognitive principles do not, O’Mahony 
points out, simply flow into cultural models; “discourses stimulated by collective action induce 
different kinds of collective learning that agitate these rule systems into further operations that 
are then sifted into cognitive cultural models, into socio-cultural models, and into social life 
generally as group and individual level cognitive models and meso-cognitive interactive 
capacities” (2013: 329). It is, therefore, at the interface between the micro- and meso-levels that 
innovation and radical social change may be discursively formulated; that is, by social actors in 
various contexts generating reconstructive ideas about how relevant cognitive rules or principles 
could be differently applied to social life.  
Eder (2007) provides further justification for embracing the concept of the cognitive order in 
critical social analysis. Following Erving Goffman’s theory of frames as modes of organizing social 
reality, by means of coordinating interaction situations, he claims that frames can be understood 
in various ways, and they exist as cognitive tools before they are put to use. Constitutive of social 
interaction, therefore, they provide a means for linking social reality to the cognitive competence 
of human beings; according to Eder, what was lacking here was a theory that went beyond the 
contingency of situations. Goffman put forward the concept of the ‘interaction order’ by way of 
offering a solution to this problem, viewing cognitive frames as in-built regularities, constituted 
via language, shaping social practices. The ‘interaction order’, Eder argues, is full of norms, yet 
these norms do not create social order; norms, he explains, are broken, avoided and at times 
obeyed (Eder, 2007: 395). How then, he posits, is a social order in ongoing interaction, an 
‘interaction order’, possible? The answer to this problem lies in the fact that it is not norms alone 
that create an order, but the rules structuring the practical use of norms, i.e. cognitive rules that 
allow people to make sense and use of norms. The concept of the interaction order works 
because actors take it for granted; Eder explains, “breaking the taken-for-granted world creates 
problems and it is in such situations that we can see the rules that allow the interaction 
sequences to be repaired” (2007: 395). The real order is therefore always in repair, most explicitly 
in the context of a crisis, and observing such repair processes reveals the cognitive ordering of 
the world; ultimately, “cognitive orders explain why people are capable of continuing to interact 
as soon as the normative order tends to get out of order” (2007: 395).    
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Strydom (2013), in explicating the components of the cognitive order of modernity, claims that 
it consists of the full range of “second-order, synthetic, reflexive or meta rules which emerged 
from the social orientations and activities of the different social groups and collective actors who 
had made an input into the processes of formation of the state, capitalism, intimate relations, 
science and technology, civil society, modern law and corresponding cultural forms” (Strydom, 
2013: 2-3). The cognitive order may therefore be understood as the structured meta-cultural 
outcome of historical learning processes on all scales, while simultaneously constituting the 
conditions for further learning. The idea of meta-rules sustaining and modifying societal forms in 
the context of changing circumstances by successive generations, results in societal reproduction 
and yet continuous innovation. Strydom, in delineating the consolidation of a modern society 
from this perspective, explains the way in which given orientations, forms of action and the social 
practices of individuals and groups, engaging in and implicating various innovative processes, 
were ultimately given expression in modern cultural structures, a process and outcome he 
captures by the gestation of the modern cognitive order over time;    
It is on this socio-structural and socio-cultural basis that over a period of approximately 
three centuries the cognitive order of modernity arose which would henceforth, in 
interaction with the prevailing social practices, constitute, generate, guide and regulate 
the formation of modernity and the actualisation, realisation and expansion of multilevel 
potentialities (Strydom, 2013: 2) 
In attempting to apply the framework of critical-cognitive sociology, the cognitive order plays a 
fundamental role. As a concept which seeks to encompass all possible societal positions at a given 
time, thus underpinning all possible communicative interaction in society, it takes immanent 
social form in cultural models. In this sense, cultural models organise societal differences and 
conflicts, so as to make a normative order possible, furthermore constituting the outcome of the 
cognitively organized interplay of transcendent rule-systems, which contain an infinite potential 
through the reinterpretation of foundational cognitive principles. Collective learning proceeds in 
a specific way, as indicated earlier, within a given cultural model and involves the ‘pulling down’ 
and making immanent, through cognitive-communicative modes of collective understanding and 
argumentation, the latent potential according to which a future different from the present can 
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be imagined and even anticipated (O’Mahony, 2013: 248). I will clarify these distinctions, which 
are operating at the different levels of the cognitive scheme, as they are made directly relevant 
to the empirical case at hand. To properly analyse the cognitive-communicative structures that 
characterise the response to the Irish financial crisis, encapsulated in a distinctive narrative of 
justification, it is therefore necessary not just to account for the structures themselves but 
critically, for how they are actively held in place in relation to the wider elements of the cognitive 
order.  
The cognitive structures that shape the cultural models, and the corresponding communitive 
structures, specified above, have indicated a learning pathology in the Irish case blocking the 
possibility of an alternative public narrative in the aftermath of the crisis. Historically, Ireland has 
struggled to achieve the advanced level of responsibility, in a cultural sense, necessary to address 
the crisis it faced in 2008 in a justifiably democratic way and, subsequently, to navigate a moral 
path through its aftermath. The degree to which the ideology of conservatism has blocked the 
possibility of democratic innovation in the aftermath of the crisis may therefore be explained as 
a collective learning pathology. In Ireland, as dealt with in Chapter 3, the culture of the social 
welfare state project, emphasising redistribution and compensation, has always been weak, as it 
conflicted with the dominant conservatism sponsored by a highly influential Catholic church. 
Democracy, therefore, has tended to be a strictly representative, clientelistic and elitist form and 
social projects aimed at deeper social justice have been constrained. Hence, the critique of the 
idea of the response to the crisis from a critical-cognitive point of view, focusing on the blocking 
of a democratic, co-responsible mode of legitimation, indicates an imbalance in the immanent 
realization of the possibilities contained in the cognitive order.  
In conclusion, the cognitive order presents a multi-level conceptual framework through which 
the deep-lying generative structures of social reality, manifested in the discursive mediation of 
the crisis response in Ireland as learning and communicative pathologies, may be located. The 
cultural components of the cognitive order constitute the essential structural elements of 
modern society, thus accounting for all possible social positions which may be taken up, at every 
level, in relation to a problem or issue. Normatively, this approach to the analysis of the 
distortions in Irish public discourse allows for the identification of specific blockages in relation 
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to the key cognitive generative capacities of modernity, thus resulting in the exposure of 
significant unrealized and unexplored areas in the cognitive cultural model of democracy itself. 
Irish normative culture, in emphasizing certain cognitive principles in public discourse, such as 
authority, control and efficiency, has been shown in the preceding analysis to constitute a 
blockage in itself to potential innovative cosmopolitan learning processes, in which such cognitive 
principles as equality, justice and democratic solidarity could potentially be emphasized as the 
basis of social order. From a critical-reconstructive standpoint, therefore, I developed the 
cognitive-cultural model of co-responsible legitimacy as a possible structural reconfiguration of 
the cognitive order through which a transformation of the conditions of communicative 
pathologies and learning blockages could be realized in the Irish case.    
Overcoming the crisis, which persistently frames so much of our public discourse, requires such 
transformation. Touraine describes the post-crisis situation as a kind of liminal state in which the 
old socio-economic order has collapsed and yet another form of society is prevented from 
developing as a result of what may described as the stagnant response. Pointing towards a 
response based on the reconstruction of society, normatively carried by the emergence of a new 
‘moral subject’ based on the adoption of universal human rights, Touraine’s challenge is 
addressed here by means of the cognitive-critical approach, which allows for this potential 
reconstructive process to be made explicate in the counterfactual-transcendent domain. The 
mechanisms preventing this reconstruction are located, following Miller, in blocked processes of 
collective learning. From the perspective of the cognitive order, discursively overcoming these 
blocking mechanisms, which would allow for a situation of a consensus or dissensus pathology 
to be transformed into a situation of rational dissensus or consensus, may be reflected in new 
selective combinations of cognitive principles mediated through a different cleavage structure in 
the formation of cultural models. These new selective combinations therefore reflect the 
possibility of the normative reconfiguration of the cognitive order, precipitating the development 






The Reconstructive Methodology of Critical Theory:                                                            
An Empirical-Theoretical Mode of Inquiry                                                                     
 
The critical-cognitive framework, presented in the last chapter, sets out a theoretical paradigm 
within which the empirical content of the thesis may be understood in relation to the relevant 
counterfactual dimension, therefore allowing for a reconstructive form of critique. Up to now, 
an outline of specific methods has been employed to identify the negative aspects of legitimation 
and blame avoidance in Irish public discourse. This is a crucial step in the diagnosis of pathologies 
in the communicative structuring of the crisis narrative, however, the reconstruction step, which 
will be outlined in the present chapter, seeks to develop the critique from the perspective of 
what is denied in the actual situation. In this sense, normative ideals or, more precisely, 
transcendent standards of legitimation and responsibility will be conceived on the transcendent 
plane, against which the actual level of their realization in the society at present may be 
methodologically assessed in a critical reconstructive manner.  
Essential to the diagnosis of problems related to processes of public discourse is the 
reconstruction of the normative-pragmatic import of everyday social practices relevant to public 
communication and democracy. It is, therefore, on the basis of this interest in the possibility of a 
democratic form of public communication, contained in a more innovative culture of democracy, 
that a reconstructive approach is brought forth as the specific mode of critique in the present 
analysis. The concepts of legitimacy and responsibility have been introduced from the outset with 
this perspective in mind. Although they are realized in the actual situation in a deeply problematic 
way in the context of the Irish crisis, through their reconstruction in accordance with the 
normative potentiality contained in discursive forms of communication and learning, the 
transcendent dimension is exposed, allowing for a deeper explanatory critique of the 
deformations and/or social pathologies at the root of the problem. In what follows, the 
methodology of reconstructive critique, as it has been adopted in the Critical Theory tradition 
will be outlined as an initial step. Habermas’ development of the approach, specifically in relation 
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to the concept of immanent transcendence, will then be delineated in order to provide a general 
impression of its methodological significance, and, in a final section, Axel Honneth’s account of 
normative reconstruction will be presented by way of explicating a specific application of the 
concept which is most appropriate for present purposes.  
Robin Celikates (2009) specifies the distinctive procedure of reconstructive critique as lying at 
the very core of the Critical Theory approach. Following a reassessment of Axel Honneth’s focus 
on the concept of recognition through the idea of pathologies of excess recognition and the 
introduction of a concept of misrecognition inspired by Bourdieu, Celikates argues that critical 
theory must proceed in a specific reconstructive manner. There are, he argues, two conceptions 
of reconstruction, put forward through a review of Habermas’s early formulation in ‘Knowledge 
and Human Interests’ (1968). The first refers to the understanding of critical social theory through 
an analogous description of the methodological structure of psycho-analysis characterised by the 
process of self-refection and, the second, to a distinction between reconstruction and critique, 
where the former is dealt with through the development of a formal pragmatics and the latter 
through providing a “robust normative basis for critical theory” (2009: 94). 
Celikates contends that the earlier Habermas analogy regarding the reconstructive methodology 
of psycho-analysis, which is at the root of the Critical Theory tradition, has been too quickly 
dismissed and in fact, provides a promising direction for application. This methodological analogy 
is elaborated by Celikates on two levels; the level of the aim and that of the process (2009: 95). 
In relation to the former, he argues that the critical theorist’s aim is to “trigger a process of self-
reflection and to enable the subject to perform this self-reflection by herself” (2009: 95). A 
distinction between the process of self-reflection and that of transformation is highlighted here; 
it is not the theorist’s place to prescribe substantive goals for society. In relation to the process, 
Celikates proposes that a critical theory as reconstructive critique ought to follow the 
methodological structure of psycho-analysis in the sense of enabling the analysis and, through 
internalizing the capacity for analysis, to carry on the process of self-reflection.  Theory in this 
context plays the role of providing the analyst with the means to generate hypotheses, however, 
these cannot simply be deduced from the theory itself but must be developed, tested and 
continually readjusted in dialogue with the addressee (2009: 97). 
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This view of reconstructive critique, to echo Celikates’ central point, “is not just about making 
explicit something that was already implicitly present”, but through reconstruction, to identify 
normative and potential transformative moments (2009: 97). The intention, therefore, is to 
disclose what may be referred to as ‘reflective unacceptability’ in relation to a specified social 
problem. In line with the analogy briefly outlined above, it is up to social agents themselves to 
appropriate the proposals of the theorist and recognise the criticized social practices, institutions 
and self-understandings as unacceptable. In this approach, which is based upon a complex 
dialogical interaction between the analyst and the addressee, reconstructive aims guide practices 
of self-reflection, critique and eventually transformation.  Self-reflection is animated by the 
epistemic and normative principles of the agents involved and the validation of the theory is 
ultimately subject to their judgement. For Celikates, reconstructive critique is therefore a form 
of metacritique, “a critique that aims at the transformation of those psychological and social 
conditions that block critique, and at the development and exercise of the relevant reflective 
capacities” (2009: 98).  
Piet Strydom (2011a) goes beyond Celikates in mapping the internal development of Critical 
Theory’s methodology over three successive generations, from its classical foundations in the 
left-Hegelian heritage, to the symbiotic relationship with the philosophy of pragmatism over the 
course of the twentieth century. He explicates the methodological core of Critical Theory, 
encapsulated in the concept of immanent transcendence. Constituting an exposition of an 
already present, but persistently down-played set of underlying meta-theoretical, ontological 
and epistemological assumptions in its development, this concept ultimately seeks to address an 
explanatory deficit within Critical Theory, more specifically, the application of a critical social 
science. Strydom states, “not only do the critical theorists need to go beyond a preponderant 
emphasis on normative critique, yet without surrendering it, but they are also required to come 
to grips with the advances and demands of the post-empiricist phase in the development of the 
social sciences” (2011a: 3). Indeed, a demanding position, embracing, on the one hand, in relation 
to the pragmatist standpoint, a reflexive, open-ended understanding of history, mediated by the 
process communication, and, on the other, in relation to the left-Hegelian/Marxian tradition, a 
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critical perspective, insisting that the constitution and organization of society requires more than 
just an understanding of problem-solving capacities (Strydom, 2011a: 62).     
Strydom develops the concept of immanent transcendence with particular reference to the 
philosophical legacy of Kant and Hegel. Transcendent ideas are present in all forms of human life 
and, under certain conditions, are available in actual situations as partly grasped but still 
unrealized ideas which, if realized, could change society itself (2011a: 87). The concept at the 
core refers to the idea of reaching beyond a concrete problematic context through appealing to 
an interpretation of a principle or principles, such as freedom, responsibility, legitimacy, etc., that 
are currently unrealized to transform the immanent reality. He outlines the ‘rights discourse’ of 
the eighteenth century, which paved the way for the French Revolution, as an example of the 
concept in operation in social life. Although it has certainly remained a rather opaque concept, 
seldom referred to explicitly by the tradition’s main figures, Strydom foregrounds three theorists 
who have provided a comprehensive elaboration; Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel and, more recently, 
Axel Honneth. Contesting the very nature and intentions of critique, each developed a distinctive 
perspective by means of a specific appropriation of Critical Theory’s methodological structure. 
Habermas’ articulation of the concept, influenced by his collaboration with Apel, indicates its 
centrality to Critical Theory.    
In the following, the concept of immanent transcendence, the counterfactual foundation of 
Critical Theory, will be developed as an entry-point to a reconstructive methodology. By 
explicating the methodological value of such an approach, that is rarely taken up in any sustained 
way in the social sciences, a horizon of potentiality will be constructed, against which the 
conservative actuality at work in the situation may be normatively evaluated and criticized. 
Presupposing that there is a democratic potential being denied, as is suggested by the cognitive 
potential of the cultural model, the following will detail the steps required to disclose this. It will 
identify and reconstruct the essential ‘transcending’ principles of legitimacy and responsibility, 
emergent in the discourse itself and required in order to challenge the conservative standard that 




6.1 The Reconstructive Core of the Critical Theory Approach     
Critical theory proceeds on a distinctive reconstructive path, but it addresses both the specific 
limitations and relative rights of competitor approaches within its own perspective on critique. 
Habermas, for example, recognizes both interpretative and nomological approaches, despite 
their limitations, as valuable to the development of social science, but insists on a critical social 
science that distinguishes the significance of its own explanation-based critique focussed on the 
normative foundations and requirements of society. The scientific character of Critical Theory, 
moreover, which recognizes an appeal to, and emphasis on, the possibility of the theoretical 
approach of reconstruction, resulting in the production of objective and explanatory knowledge, 
must also be understood in relation to this procedure of critique.  
Immanent transcendence, as a methodological concept, refers, on the one hand, to an 
accumulated historical potentiality in the form of socio-practical ideas of reason, and on the 
other, to a cultural model within which reflective critical disclosure makes apparent a potential 
that may be realized to some degree in the society. This potentiality of reason, expressed in the 
possibility of innovative social practices, is not therefore to be understood as a transcendent 
ought, metaphysically projected beyond society. It is always operative in structuring social life 
itself, directing and guiding, or regulating social practices in some immanent way. Drawing on 
Strydom again, in general methodological terms, “the concept of immanent transcendence thus 
directs Critical Theory to focus on the dialectical tension that serves as the dynamic impetus of 
the ongoing process of the constitution, reproduction, organization and transformation of 
society, including the self-transformation of the agents” (2011a: 135). It is in relation to this 
conceptualization of reconstruction that Critical Theory’s methodological structure, guided by 
the immanent transcendence concept, may be characterized best as reconstructive-explanatory 
critique.  
Before elaborating upon the specific theoretical background and methodological implications of 
this concept, Strydom delineates three distinct modes of inference in relation to which Critical 
Theory proceeds at a general level. In explicating this threefold distinction, representing a 
correspondent dynamic within and across the framework’s theoretical, normative, 
epistemological and ontological dimensions, the reconstructive aims of Critical Theory are made 
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clear. The vital association between Peircean pragmatism; on the one hand, specifically the logic 
of abductive, inductive and deductive modes of inference, and Critical Theory’s ‘counterfactual 
imagination’, on the other, captured in the theoretical concept of immanent transcendence, and 
pursued through diagnostic, reconstructive and explanatory forms of critique; illuminates the 
methodological path. Strydom (2011) explicates this three-part dynamic association in relation 
to the ‘semiotic process of sign-mediation’ and the critical modes of engagement with a subject-
matter; the abductive moment, ‘firstness’, he explains relates to a feeling or vague perception of 
something on the surface of social reality; the inductive moment, ‘secondness’, relates to a 
confrontation with the problem and a theoretically-elaborated diagnostic or reconstructive 
approach to the problematic situation; and lastly, the deductive moment, ‘thirdness’, refers to 
the testing and validation of the resultant theory and/or concept in the scientific/public domain. 
These inferential moments constitute the methodological development of Critical Theory, 
reflecting the steps which correspond to the three inferential moments in the present work.    
Chapter 1 objectively disclosed a problem situation, descriptively constituting the 2008 crisis as 
it became manifest through the processes of public discourse in Ireland, situated in turn in the 
broader context of the global financial crisis. The initial, abductive moment, on the part of the 
analyst, which is initiated by a feeling of unease that something is not right in the society, 
develops into the second chapter, specifying further the problematic situation, where the 
implications of a conservative political culture are developed and linked, through the concepts of 
power and social class, to the notion of a distinctive political and public culture in the case of 
Ireland, thereby, it is argued, cultivating a style of politics reflected in a mode of communication. 
The second, inductive, move is made in the latter sections of the preceding two chapters, and 
also in the present chapter, involving a specific diagnostic engagement with the object domain 
delineated above, and presenting an analytical and normative focus on the problem through the 
procedure of reconstruction. It is at this point, following Strydom, that Critical Theory goes far 
beyond empiricist and interpretive approaches, “allowing a penetration of the various layers of 
the actual concrete situation to the deep level of structural rules or generative mechanisms 
which, although neither empirically observable nor interpretively discernable, can be unearthed 
with the appropriate methodological means” (Strydom, 2011a: 156). Finally, the reconstructive 
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work allows for an explanatory critique (Chapters 7 and 8 below) which seeks to account for the 
distinct causes of the designated problem, or social pathology, characterizing the situation.  
Reconstruction thus fulfills a pivotal and multidimensional task. It pursues  an attempt to make 
explicit the structuring or generating force of a problematic situation, not only in relation to the 
possibilities of the concrete setting involved, but also the formal structures “refracted as socio-
practical ideas of reason…expressed in ethically relevant cultural model which are unavoidably 
at work” (Strydom, 2011a: 156). It sets out the immanent pragmatic presuppositions and 
possibilities of the concrete situation, constituting the actual context, while also establishing a 
sense of the latently operating transcendent structures responsible for its regulative generation. 
That which is reconstructed in respect of the transcendent features of the situation is latently 
present in the structuration of immanent social life, thus making the concept of immanent 
transcendence core to the reconstructive methodological approach of Critical Theory.   
What remains of the present chapter will focus on the distinctive reconstructive methodology of 
Axel Honneth. Although he adopts the same inferential methodological perspective as Habermas, 
he activates Critical Theory’s methodology in a different way, with a critical focus much more on 
the diagnosis, reconstruction and explanation of social pathologies. Whereas Habermas adopts 
the notion of autonomy in the sense of “collective democratic self-constitution and self-
organisation”, Honneth, contrastingly, “shifts from the moral-practical political sphere to the 
ethical-practical one in order to prioritize the normative idea of the good life” (Strydom, 2011: 
207). The objective in adopting this approach in the present work is to establish the principles of 
legitimation and responsibility within a reconstructive frame, therefore, representing them in 
terms of the critical features of the Irish crisis. These principles will be viewed on the immanent 
plane as partly blocked by the mechanisms of public discourse within the Irish cultural model, a 
blocking process that may be identified and potentially re-oriented on the transcendent 
democratic reconstructive plane. A second fundamental task of reconstruction in the 
methodology of Critical Theory, is to put the reconstructed immanent and transcendent features 
of the situation in relation to one another; “the critical reconstructive demonstration of such 
mediation provides a framework of the formal features of the unobservable yet methodologically 
accessible depth-level structural rules or generative mechanisms of the actual concrete 
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situation” (2011a: 157). Before critically re-engaging with the empirical case, however, Honneth’s 
distinctive approach to normative reconstruction will now be outlined in order to provide a 
framework for the methodological procedure.   
 
6.2 A Normative Reconstruction: Sketching Honneth’s Methodological Procedure of 
Critique  
The transition from an approach which has closely followed the Habermasian path, specifically in 
relation to setting out the ideal communicative conditions of a democratic public sphere, to 
Honneth’s deployment of Critical Theory in the analysis of contemporary capitalist society, 
permits a focus on a particular conceptualization and application of social pathology. Understood 
as a distinctive critical resource for the social scientific position of Critical Theory, this allows for 
a connection to be made, methodologically, between an empirical sociological perspective on an 
actual problem and a normative basis for critique in social philosophy. Zurn (2011) describes 
Honneth’s formulation of social pathologies as ‘second-order disorders’ which capture 
substantial disconnects between ‘first-order contents’ and the second-order reflexive 
understandings of those contents (Zurn, 2011: 345). This approach therefore demands a much 
more advanced sociological perspective to appropriately identify and explicate these disorders, 
which may facilitate a critical social theory with an emancipatory intent. The proceeding chapters 
will endeavor to meet this challenge, through engaging sociological explanations of the cultural 
causes of the specific pathologies in this case, by adopting and applying recent theoretical 
developments in cognitive-critical sociology. 
Firstly, however, Honneth’s work illustrates a specific form of reconstruction within Critical 
Theory and may be applied methodologically according to a distinctive threefold process. For 
Honneth, the concept of immanent transcendence distinguishes the approach from all other 
currents and directions of critique, highlighting, in particular, the form of normative critique 
which has come to characterize its distinctive methodological orientation. In relation to applying 
this theoretically-informed, normative perspective, making a diagnosis, explanation and critique 
of a social anomaly, disorder and/or pathology, Critical Theory must abide by a specific stringent 
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condition; “to identify a pre-theoretical foothold for that perspective in reality and thus to root 
out its theoretical and critical endeavour in a moment or movement of immanent transcendence 
transpiring in social life or the actual situation itself” (Strydom, 2011a: 95). Honneth establishes 
the grounds for critique on the immanent plane, by identifying the violation of identity claims or 
claims for social recognition, disrespect and injustice over and above the authoritarian, 
ideological, distorting or obfuscating restriction of linguistically established rules and 
competences. He therefore focuses an anthropologically based perspective on moral 
experiences, suitable for identifying structural forms of violence and/or disrespect, as the 
immanent reference point to guide Critical Theory’s normatively oriented and theoretically-
informed mode of diagnosis, explanation and critique. 
Honneth’s articulation of the Critical Theory’s methodology provides a relevant blueprint for 
considering how to proceed with a reconstructive form of critique. Introducing a genealogical 
dimension to the approach, concerned with the deformation of reason in the historical process 
through its realisation and actualisation, Honneth provides a concise formulation of his 
methodological project in a 2004 essay, ‘A social pathology of reason: on the intellectual legacy 
of Critical Theory’. In identifying a common thread running throughout the history of the 
approach, he asserts that “the historical past should be understood from a practical point of view, 
as a process of development whose pathological deformation by capitalism may be overcome 
only by initiating a process of enlightenment among those involved” (Honneth, 2004: 337). It is 
this intertwining of theory and history that fundamentally unifies the Critical Theory approach.  
The first methodological step, corresponding to abduction in Strydom’s account of Critical 
Theory’s methodological structuration, which relates to the ethical core contained in the idea of 
a socially deficient rationality, spells out the fundamental normative concern of the approach. 
Whether one takes Horkheimer’s ‘irrational organisation’ of society, Adorno’s ‘administered 
world’, Marcuse’s ‘one-dimensional society’ and ‘repressive tolerance’, or Habermas’ 
‘colonization of the social lifeworld’, they all relate to foundational, normative concerns; “such 
formulations always normatively presuppose an ‘intact’ state of social relations in which 
members are provided with an opportunity for successful self-actualization” (2004: 339). This 
initially negative moment – an abductive sense that all is not well in capitalist society – conceives 
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the state of social relations to be a consequence of a deficiency in social rationality; an internal 
connection exists between pathological relationships and the condition of social rationality, thus 
explaining Critical Theory’s continuous interest in the historical process of the actualization of 
reason (2004: 339).  
The theory of social pathology seeks to grasp the historically available potential of reason, and 
furthermore explain how, on the one hand, this can be used by social actors in a process of 
collective self-realisation for emancipatory movements or why, on the other hand, it is blocked; 
“the explanation of the circumstances that have blocked or skewed the process of actualization 
of reason should have in and of itself the rational force to convince subjects to create a praxis of 
cooperation” (2004: 345). This first move, identifying a social situation characterised by negative 
features indicating the existence of a social pathology, was taken in the opening part of the 
present work. The description of Irish public discourse in the context of the 2008 crisis identifies 
a specific empirical situation, characterised normatively in the principles of legitimation and 
responsibility, which calls forth the need for detailed diagnostic analysis, which precedes the 
reconstructive critique.   
The second methodological step, corresponding to an inductive inference Honneth develops in 
relation to the process of reconstruction, is to explain the pathological deformation of reason 
sociologically10. In the context of a tradition which is increasingly engaging in social criticism 
without any sociological component, as he observes; “The question why those affected do not 
themselves problematize or attack such moral evils is no longer seen as falling within the purview 
of social criticism as such” (2004: 345). It is clear for Honneth that Critical Theory must couple its 
critique of social injustice with an explanation of the processes that obscure the sources of that 
injustice, for, he argues, in line with the idea of ‘reflective unacceptability’, “only when one can 
convince the addressees by means of such an explanatory analysis that they can be deceived 
about the real character of their social conditions, can the wrongfulness of conditions be publicly 
                                                          
10 This second move in Honneth’s methodological procedure may be linked with the previous chapter (4), with the 
identification of problems associated with the discourse of blame in the Irish context. Resulting in an inability to 
properly thematize the issue of responsibility, the intention there will be to casually explain the pathological factors 




demonstrated with some prospect of acceptance” (2004: 346). In essence, normative criticism 
must be complemented by historical explanation; the process of the deformation of reason must 
casually explain the failure of a rational universal, a failure that, in turn, constitutes the social 
pathology of the present (2004: 346). Core to this feature, in both understanding the emergence 
of the social pathology itself, and in relation to what may be involved in overcoming such a 
seemingly inherent problem, is the idea of a historical learning process; “The future surmounting 
of the detrimental causal force of the capitalist form of social organisation depends on such 
learning” (Strydom, 2011: 115).  
The third, and last, methodological step, corresponding to the deductive inferential moment, 
Honneth singles out relates to the concept of reflexivity at the heart of the Critical Theory 
approach. The reflexive dynamic he specifies is that between theory and practice; “explanation 
of the causes that may be responsible for obscuring social injustice are thought to belong just as 
little to the business of criticism as do perspectival characterizations of the conversion of 
knowledge into praxis” (Honneth, 2004: 352). Highlighting again the tradition’s indebtedness to 
its Left-Hegelian roots, it must always consider as one of its essential tasks, the initiation of a 
critical praxis, which, by means of reflexively disclosing some transformative potential, can 
contribute to overcoming a social pathology. In outlining this feature, Honneth turns to the 
earlier (First Generation) origins of Critical Theory’s methodological development, rooted in 
adapting approaches from psychoanalysis and moral psychology.  
The resulting perspective presupposes that subjectively experienced and/or objectively 
attributable suffering among members of a society must lead to a desire for the alleviation and 
liberation from social evils, which the analyser (the Critical Theorist) imputes to his/her patient; 
Honneth explains, “all the thinkers belonging to the inner circle of Critical Theory expect in their 
addressees a latent interest in rational expectation or interpretation, since only winning back an 
interpretation rationality can satisfy the desire for liberation from suffering” (2004: 355). The 
culmination of this perspective on Critical Theory’s application is therefore ultimately directed 
towards providing the means for a given society to thematize and reason through its own 
problems, and ultimately, to learn. The approach is to be understood as a form of reflection 
within a historically effective mode of reason, encapsulated within a cultural model, and, as 
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Honneth insists, it should not give up the normative motif of a rational universal, the idea of a 
social pathology of reasons or the concept of emancipatory interest.  
An application of the above methodological procedure may be found in Honneth’s 2014 (English 
Translation) work, ‘Freedom’s Right’. Drawing on the structural sociological theories of Talcott 
Parsons and Emile Durkheim, in combination with an interpretation of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of 
Right’, a theory of justice is developed to explain the reproduction of values and principles which 
constitute the foundations of a democratic life. The procedure employed in the analysis is termed 
‘normative reconstruction’; “this procedure implements the normative aims of a theory of justice 
through social analysis, taking immanently justified values as a criterion for processing and 
sorting out the empirical material” (2014: 6). Such a procedure is both, on the one hand, 
normative, in that institutions and practices will be judged according to their normative capacity 
for the social embodiment and realization of socially legitimated values, and reconstructive, on 
the other hand, in the sense that only those social routines and institutions deemed 
indispensable for social reproduction are selected for analysis.  
Placing the principle of freedom at the top of the hierarchy of modernity’s values, Honneth 
emphasizes the structural conditions of contemporary societies which produce a sociologically 
informed understanding of what Hegel described, as ‘ethical life’; “anything that contradicted 
the universal values and ideals of modern society’s normative requirements by representing 
merely particular values or embodying backward ideals could not be viewed as suitable objects 
of normative reconstruction” (2014: 8). He then introduces the more comprehensive idea of 
‘social freedom’, which theorizes those social conditions that must be realized for freedom to 
truly operate. He claims that values associated with such an idea of freedom are already 
immanently present, yet simultaneously denied, in the institutional settings of personal 
relationships, the market economy and the democratic public sphere. Social freedom offers a 
solution to the pathologies of legal (negative) freedom and moral (reflexive) freedom, where the 
methodological procedure of normative reconstruction seeks not to affirm and/or reinforce 
current practices and institutions, but to correct and transform them (2014: 8).   
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The approach of normative reconstruction, therefore, must always offer room for criticizing 
social reality; as Honneth argues, “the point cannot be merely to uncover and reconstruct 
instances of already existing ethical life, rather it must be possible to criticize these findings in 
light of embodied values” (2014: 9). This constitutes the very basis of reconstructive criticism. If 
there is an instance of an ethical life, to adopt Hegel’s concept, representing universal ideals or 
values in the shape of institutionalized practices, these same ideals and/or values may be drawn 
upon in order to criticize given practices as being unsuited to what they are supposed to be 
representative of (2014: 9). In regard to this understanding of the reconstructive approach, he 
claims “we do not confront given institutions and practices with external criteria, the same 
standards according to which these institutions and practices are picked out of the chaos of social 
reality are used to criticize insufficient, still imperfect embodiments of universally accepted 
values” (2014: 9).  
This approach provides a clear illustration of how a reconstructive methodology may proceed in 
critical analysis, developing a sharp conceptualization of social pathologies as a focal point of 
critique, and, importantly in relation to the present work, which seeks to follow the logic of the 
deformation of reason in the historical process. It represents an example of the way in which 
deficient forms of social self-understanding, orientations, practices, relations and institutions are 
targeted and new possibilities, modes of organization and transformative potential are disclosed 
and contained in the immanent context. The transcendent form of reconstructive critique, on the 
other hand, seeks to negatively expose unjustifiable features of socio-practical ideas of reason or 
cultural models, thus positively disclosing surpluses of meaning held within, that go unnoticed in 
the situation (Strydom, 2011a: 157). It is this latter form of reconstructive critique that will be 
taken forward as the basis of the explanatory analysis. In the following, therefore, the 
transcendent principles of legitimation and responsibility will be reconstructed as the key 
generative features in the construction of an Irish crisis-narrative.  
Honneth ultimately recognizes social pathologies as second-order phenomena, blocking the 
actualization of reason at the first-order level of social action. Viewing the present work from the 
perspective of the three-step procedure of normative reconstruction and applying it to the 
specific empirical problem at hand, the democratic conceptualization of legitimation may begin 
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to be subject to critical reassessment, combined with the normative idea of co-responsibility. 
Firstly, in detecting problems through the observation of Irish public discourse, a narrative was 
identified which was found to be severely deficient in terms of meeting democratic justificatory 
requirements. The explication of causal mechanisms that work to systematically deform or 
damage conditions of mutual recognition is central to the reconstructive procedure here. In the 
remaining chapters, I will analyze, specifically, the core problem of non-thematization, a 
characteristic feature of a conservative cultural model, as a blockage to the prospect of 
generating alternative perspectives on the response to the crisis, disabling such contents from 
entering the normative stream of public discussion and debate. It is, therefore, at this level of the 
macro-cultural order that the pathology, in Honneth’s sense, is identified. In essence, I have 
argued, drawing from a collective learning perspective, that the institutional response to the 
2008 Irish crisis represents the conservative restriction of public discourse, specifically in the 
consideration of an alternative response and, ultimately, the blocking of social change. In 
developing this argument, specifically theorizing what exactly is being blocked in this context, the 
concepts of the legitimacy and responsibility are introduced by means of an immanent critique 
of the actual discourse, however, critically, the unrealized potential contained in these ideas were 
also disclosed on the transcendent plane, thus anticipating the present reconstructive stance.   
It is through a combination of the foundational concept of immanent transcendence with the 
methodology of reconstruction that Critical Theory sets out the situational parameters within 
which the real mechanism. It is the specification of the contingent obstacle blocking the process 
of practical realization of structural possibilities, that allows for the location and identification of 
the generative problem or pathology to be explained. Of particular significance here, following 
Strydom, are those contingently intervening, interfering, impeding, retarding, deforming or 
blocking forces, factors, structures or related processes which only a “historical-sociological 
materialist or realist theory of society is able to specify and identify and thus make available as 
explanans in a causal explanation that can contribute to a critique of an undesirable, unjustifiable, 
pathological state of affairs” (Strydom, 2011: 138). Reaching down to the deep level of structural 
rules and causal mechanisms, therefore, the reconstructive approach to the actual situation 
signals towards a critical juncture where intervention could possibly stimulate transformation of 
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reality, as in the present context of the aftermath of the Irish financial crisis. The critique that 
follows, which depends on the depth-structures revealed by the reconstructive procedure, led 
by a distinctive cognitive theory of society, zones in on an instance of powerful interference of a 
societal structure or causal mechanism which could prove to be decisive for a successful and 
meaningful transformative critique. 
In order to follow through with a reconstructive critique, the principle of co-responsibility will be 
combined on the transcendent-normative level with the democratically conceived process of 
legitimation, thus resulting in the counterfactual formulation of a co-responsible mode of 
legitimation. As the reflexive blocking of alternative and/or innovative social positions and 
opinions from entering public discourse in Ireland has been identified as generated at the macro-
cultural level of the cognitive order, specifically, as I have claimed, through the ideological 
domination of an historically embedded form of conservatism, the analysis will now move to 
explicate this dimension. A radicalization of the Critical Theory perspective will be brought 
forward in the remaining chapters by means of embracing recent developments in cognitive 
sociological theory, thus advancing the critique in a radicalized direction. The objective in 
adopting such an approach will be to describe the way in which the cognitive-cultural order, in 
the Irish setting, has formed in such a way as to disable the possibility of learning, in a democratic 










Re-Evaluating Irish Public Discourse in Light of the Theory: The Structuring of 
Communication and Diagnosis of Pathology in the Crisis Response 
 
Before proceeding with the reconstructive critique, it is necessary to reiterate those specific 
elements that will be subject to reconstruction. This will involve re-evaluating the empirical 
material introduced in the opening chapters and revisiting the means by which the relevant 
principles of legitimation and responsibility are rooted out of the discourse. The analysis, 
however, will proceed within the parameters set out by the critical-cognitive theoretical 
framework developed earlier. This approach contextualizes the communicative structures 
involved in shaping the mechanisms of public discourse and also captures the dimensions of 
learning, and the associated learning pathologies and blockages, reproduced by cultural models 
within the structure of the cognitive order of society.  
The critical aspects of the cognitive framework will now be recapitulated in order to highlight the 
key dimensions for understanding the positioning of cultural models, the role they play in 
structuring communication, and the diagnosis of learning pathologies, which disrupt or block 
normative innovation. The framework constitutes a hierarchical structure, at the top of which is 
the cognitive order, which encompasses the full range of established transcendent principles for 
the organisation of social life, below this is the level of cultural models, which, divided into two 
distinct categories in the present work, allows for the immanent realisation of the potentials 
contained within the overarching structure above it. Collective learning processes function as the 
mediating mechanism between each of the three levels, that is by means of communicative 
structures that connect the cognitive order to cognitive-cultural models and to the immanent 
cultural models at the micro level. To imagine the reconfiguration of normative transcendent 
principles, in this case legitimacy and responsibility, and to theorize the potential emergence of 
different cultural models capable of carrying a novel configuration, requires going beyond 
negative, realist approaches, and embracing a reconstructive position. Because, it is the infinite 
potentiality reflected in the unobstructed combinations of cognitive principles – appealed to 
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saliently in situations of crisis and/or moments of conflict, contained in the macro-cultural 
structure of the cognitive order – that allows for this framework to be a fruitful approach for 
critical empirical analysis.  
The cultural model is the key analytical component here. Through moulding a specific form of 
public discourse, which follows a conservative direction in the Irish case, this concept gives shape 
to political norms and identities, in turn becoming stabilized and reproduced over time. It is, 
furthermore, in the context of public confrontation with the established conditions of a political 
and public culture that transformation, specifically through processes of innovative, discursive 
communication and learning, may occur. Crisis situations offer opportunities for such processes 
of social and political change to be initiated, however, this is crucially dependent upon a public 
culture capable of critical, reflexive engagement required in order to generate alternatives, and 
to thematize narratives that expose the contradictions and injustice of the existent state of 
affairs. Such alternative narratives failed to crystallize and resonate in the Irish context as it is 
shown to lack the political and public culture necessary for the discursive innovation required for 
this form of democratic learning. In complete contrast to this counterfactual sketch, conservative 
cultures function to contain and suppress such transformative processes, such cultures in fact 
endeavour to promote forms of non-thematization. The Irish case, therefore, encompasses the 
conditions of collective learning that correlate with a form of non-learning, sustained by a model 
of public discourse that blocks the exploration of alternatives. 
The communicative structures, which facilitate the collective learning process within this 
framework, by drawing down cognitive order principles to the immanent level of social conflict 
and contestation, allow for cultural models to shape public discourse. As outlined in Chapter 5, 
these structures range from positive conditions of consensus, rational dissensus and 
compromise, to negative conditions of domination where some group or groups successfully 
repress the interests or values or other, i.e. hegemony and permanent conflict. These latter two 
communicative structures correlate with collective learning pathologies, following the Miller and 
O’Mahony formulations. The structuring of communication tends to take discursive effect in 
various combinations; for example, O’Mahony argues, “certain social issues may be subject to 
bargaining; others to rational dissensus; some issues are prone to indivisible type conflict; moral 
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norms underlie consensus formation; repressive hegemony excludes or minimizes the impact of 
certain innovative ideals” (2013: 315-6). The collective learning pathologies that emanate from 
the communicative structures of repressive hegemony and permanent conflict indicate that just 
procedures and moral norms have become bypassed, and non-moral norms dominant, in 
discourse. Such circumstances may lead to generally repressive and authoritarian mode of 
imbalanced integration, as in the case of the society generated out of Irish conservatism. In that 
context, as reflected in the preceding empirical work on Irish public discourse and political 
culture, counterfactual appeals to validity beyond the existing normative rationality is completely 
shut down in favour of a normative facticity orchestrated by a repressive social power, reflected 
in the structure of the Irish cultural model. 
 
7.1 A Critique of Legitimation and Blame in Irish Public Discourse  
To illustrate a reconstructive critique and to understand and explain the deeper-lying causes of 
non-thematization, which is reflected by the ideological restriction in the exploration of 
alternatives in the Irish response to the crisis, I will now revisit and apply the approaches of Van 
Leeuwen and Hansson. As the principles of legitimation and responsibility are now contextualized 
as making up normative components within the cognitive order, it is possible to diagnose the 
pathologies and blocking mechanisms at work in the actual situation using these approaches. The 
purpose of the reconstruction, following Honneth’s procedure, is to identify the deformation of 
reason in specifying the processes that constrain its historically available potential. The critique 
of non-normative legitimation and blame, therefore, in the Irish case is combined with an 
explanation of those discursive processes that obscure the sources of the associated normative 
principles. In what follows here, Van Leeuwen’s discursive modes of legitimation and Hansson’s 
critical analysis of the discourse of blame avoidance will be applied, thus highlighting specific 






- Authorization: The Role of the Irish Media  
The authority of expertise and tradition, which Van Leeuwen identifies as a form of legitimation 
in addressing a ‘why’ question, will be brought forward as specifically relevant to the discourse 
in the Irish case. This refers to the selection and prioritization of certain experts in Irish media 
discourse in the response to the financial crisis, and secondly, to a political culture in which the 
authority of tradition is seen as particularly powerful. In general, the lack of any sustained public 
discussion regarding the possibility of alternative responses to the crisis will be highlighted as 
symptomatic of both these forms of legitimation.  
This part of the analysis will focus on the media’s role in the inflation of the housing bubble up to 
2008, the government’s subsequent rescue of the banking system, and the representation in the 
Irish media of European institutions and the IMF in promoting a severe austerity programme 
thereafter. In each of these crucial moments, it is difficult to discern any possible alternative 
strategies that may have been useful in dealing with the crisis – for example ‘debt default’ in the 
case of the bank guarantee – and explore why they were not apparent in the public debate and 
discussion. The essential argument is, following Julien Mercille (2015), that “in each case, it is 
shown how the media have largely sided with government policy and corporate interests while 
opposing fairer strategies” (2015: 2). This reflects a fundamental ‘democratic deficit’ in the way 
in which the crisis was responded to in Ireland. The public were effectively disregarded or 
blindsided in considering the measures that were to be implemented. This highlights the way in 
which the Irish media’s representation of the crisis essentially echoed elite interests.  
The Irish media’s role in the inflation of the Irish housing bubble to begin with, and its 
unchallenged support for the subsequent response to its collapse, reflect examples of Van 
Leeuwen’s modes of expert authority and the authority of tradition, and ultimately contribute to 
the justification narrative that emerged in the aftermath of the crisis. Between 2000 and 2007, 
the Irish Times alone published over 40,000 articles about the economy, only 78 (0.2%) of them 
made reference to the idea of a ‘bubble’ and the dangers associated with such a trend. As the 
global economic turmoil intensified in late 2007, and the severe crisis was looming, the media 
relied on ‘experts’ from the financial and real estate industry to describe what was taking place, 
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with an almost invariably sanguine outlook on the future of the property market and the 
construction industry in Ireland. There was an ostensible reliance on the ‘views of experts’ in the 
Irish print media and the legitimacy of their expertise was made clear by their stated credentials. 
Mercille, in regard to this, uses the example of a November 2007 survey of six ‘property experts’, 
all of whom held top positions within the very industry they sought to appraise and with which 
their fate was entangled (2015: 38). Expert legitimation was not only employed to try and 
maintain the public’s confidence in the Irish property market, it was also used, he demonstrates, 
to great effect in discrediting those who were critical of the narrative; those of note in the latter 
regard, economist, Prof. Morgan Kelly and, journalist, David McWilliams (2015: 39). There was a 
clear distinction drawn in Irish media discourse on the type of expert to be taken seriously and 
those commentators that were to be dismissed as engaging in negative scaremongering. The 
experts’ opinions contributed to the elaboration of a narrative which played a significant role, 
not only in relation to the causes of the crisis, but in terms of informing and positioning actors 
for the response to it, specifically in relation to ‘what now needs to be done’.  
Despite the increased frequency of ‘expert’ contributions in news media on the security of the 
property market and the underlying strengths of the Irish economy, when the property bubble 
burst and the crisis took hold in late 2008, a shift in the narrative therefore becomes apparent. 
This new motif reflected a change, specifically towards legitimating the response of the Irish 
government to the financial collapse. As Mercille states, “the media largely supported the 
government and business agenda, endorsing the bank guarantee, recapitalization with few 
strings attached, and NAMA”, and furthermore, “the press gave relatively limited support to 
Scandinavian-style nationalization, which would have been fairer than the government plan” 
(2015: 47). It is in relation to the latter point, referring to the denial of alternatives through a 
highly restrictive mode of public communication that the second mode of authorization, that of 
tradition, as a form of legitimation may be introduced. The authority of tradition, according to 
Van Leeuwen’s typology, in which rules of tradition are enforced by everyone in a given society, 
is brought to bear on the situation. 
That alternative proposals to addressing the financial crisis were not explored in the Irish media 
to any significant extent points towards a form of legitimation operating through the authority 
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of tradition – it may be understood as an implicit answer to the ‘why’ question in Van Leeuwen’s 
terms. Take, for example, the development of the narrative in relation to the NAMA proposal. As 
noted above, this was a prominent feature of public debate throughout 2009 and generated 
entrenched positions in relation to both ‘for’ and ‘against’. Dismissing a viable alternative in the 
form of a ‘good bank’ strategy, put forward by the main opposition party, Fine Gael, in early 2009, 
which would have proposed the creation of new state-managed banks and the winding up of the 
existing failed financial institutions, NAMA (the ‘bad bank’) became the dominant proposal in the 
media. Mercille claims, “any scheme that involved letting the banks fail or forcing the 
bondholders to incur losses was virtually excluded from the debate” (2015: 66). The narrative 
developed according to the idea that NAMA did not actually have to be explained, as it was, 
according to an Irish Independent article, “the only plausible option open to the Government” 
(Brennan, 2009). Mercille’s work convincingly supports this perspective; 
A Sunday Times editorial was also explicit, stating that ‘No option now but to bank on the 
NAMA deal’, while another, entitled ‘Be positive: NAMA might just work’, opined that the 
government ‘must get the benefit of the doubt on NAMA, even if it is not perfect (Mercille, 
2015: 66) 
The above quotation exemplifies the position that the Irish media had taken in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, and moreover, the form of legitimation that was contained in the discourse. 
The narrative which emerged in connection with this position exposes a distinct mode of 
authorization at work in the legitimation process; firstly, in relation to a dependence on a certain 
type of expertise in the lead to the collapse of the property bubble, and secondly, in relation as 
to how the crisis ought to be responded to, pertaining to a reliance on tradition or ‘the way things 
are/have to be’.    
The concept of authority, specifically emphasizing the principle of leadership in terms of political 
authority, also constitutes an important element in a conservative culture. In this sense, it may 
be inferred that to question such authority in this context is to fundamentally challenge the 
society itself. In the case of Ireland, there is an ‘authoritarian mindset’ observed in relation to the 
development of its distinctive political culture. This refers not just to the central role of 
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nationalism in the wake of the formation of the state, or the unavoidable presence of the Catholic 
church in all state institutions, but to the inherited loyalty to one’s specific political group in the 
development of the party-political system.  
 
- Moral Evaluation: The Reflection of Underlying Norms 
The instances of political intervention, outlined in Chapter 1., and the corresponding narrative 
developed by way of justification for the response to the crisis must be understood in their 
appropriate normative context. There are two essential components, which converge in an 
interdependent way in the discourse of legitimation, thus providing the basis of the moral-
evaluative perspective in the Irish case. The first relates to the dominant global economic 
rationality of neoliberalism and, the second to a conservative political culture. It may be observed 
that in relation to their respective positions on such ideas as equality, justice, citizenship and a 
mode of governance committed to market principles, they find common ground in the post-crisis 
situation, causing diminution of both the culture and institutions of democracy. This combination 
of a commitment to the global ideological project of neo-liberalism and a political culture of 
conservatism generates a moral order characterised by anti-democratic impulses, critically 
however, in spite of the fact that both perspectives also claim to be proponents of democracy 
itself.  
The position represented in the discourse related to moral evaluation, in this sense, reflects a 
highly elitist and exclusionary form of democratic legitimacy. The justifications given for the 
political interventions in response to the crisis exemplify this. The form of legitimation, therefore, 
to use Streeck’s terms, prioritize market justice over social justice. The two rationalities, revealed 
in the course of the crisis-narrative, inadvertently converge to extend a cannibalism of 
democracy, to the point where the institutions and culture of democracy itself become devoid of 
meaning.  Focusing on the discourse alone, one is unable to bring the critique any farther at this 
point, without a deeper historical and cultural approach to delineate the generative conditions 
that allow for a mutual understanding of what constitutes common-sense – the moral 
perspective, which anticipates the reconstructive analysis to come – and the democratic stakes 
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raised in relation to the implications of the crisis are becoming more distinct. Perceiving the 
measures taken in response to the crisis in Ireland as being illegitimate, from a democratic moral-
political perspective, its sole objective was to defensively maintain the status quo. This, however, 
is not just confined to that specific instance, where the crisis has revealed otherwise latent 
processes, but representing the continuation of illegitimate features of Irish society at a systemic 
level. The next step must be the construction of what a legitimate, democratic communicative 
politics might, under alternative conditions, look like. This is where the reconstructive position 
discloses a horizon of possibility. 
 
- Rationalization: Crisis as Opportunity  
Van Leeuwen identifies two forms of rationalization in the discursive modes of legitimation, 
instrumental and theoretical. Taking up the instrumental, ‘means and ends’ form of rationality, 
the legitimation purposes of the crisis-narrative become clearer in relation to two important 
perspectives represented in the discourse; that the economic boom of the early-2000s must be 
seen as a tangible triumph for Ireland, and not just the outcome of financial speculation and the 
expansion of the shadow-banking sector into all areas of government; and secondly, the 
measures implemented in response to the crisis are justified by virtue of the notion that all in 
Irish society benefitted from the economic growth and therefore ‘we’ all had a moral obligation 
to compensate for it. In applying this understanding of legitimation; explanations and 
justifications given in the course of public discourse for responses to the financial crisis in Ireland, 
specifically by way of cuts to public services, were rationalised on the basis of certain goals, uses 
and effects pertaining to institutionalised practices (instrumental rationalisation). The discourse 
of theoretical rationalization, in Van Leeuwen’s sense, is also relevant on the basis of a natural 
order of things in the Irish context, suggesting an underlying form of class-based logic at work. 
This form of legitimation, subjected as it is to processes of communicative manipulation and/or 
distortion, is employed in Irish political discourse to contain public debates, rather than seeking 
to resolve differences of opinion through the mechanisms of critical democratic engagement 
with a public.  
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Adam Masters’ (2009) ‘snapshot’ frame analysis of a selection of key speech acts pertaining to 
the political management of the financial crisis in Ireland, between April 2008 and March 2009, 
supports the claim that a narrative developed in Ireland to focus a significant portion of the blame 
for the crisis on the public sector. From the outset, the crisis rhetoric of key Irish political actors 
focused on directing public attention away from themselves and towards the reckless activities 
of international, particularly US, financial institutions; on the one hand, as an external source of 
the crisis, and the public sector, specifically in relation to the ‘social partnership’ agreement, as 
the source of endogenous problems on the other. In relation to the latter, by linking the crisis to 
the need for public sector reform, the government were attempting to exploit the situation in 
generating popular support for pushing through measures for reduced state ‘interference’ in 
matters of economic management.  
Masters’ frame analysis highlights two specific instances in which the context of the crisis is used 
as an opportunity to push for public sector, welfare and education ‘reform’ – this may be 
understood as a euphemism for the dismantling of welfare programmes. Firstly, in his budget 
statement on 15 October 2008, Taoiseach Brian Cowen framed the crisis as being ‘on a scale last 
seen in the 1930s’, and therefore ‘unprecedented times call for unprecedented action’ (2009: 
137). Framing the crisis in such terms sought to justify the extent of the reforms deemed 
necessary, i.e. public expenditure cuts, that would be proposed in the budget, and furthermore, 
through emphasising the need to take these decisions immediately and not ‘wait until the storm 
is over’, convince his audience, the general public, to follow the government’s lead.  Crucially, in 
light of the fact that public service reform was emerging as a major government initiative in 
responding to the crisis, Cowen acknowledged no responsibility in contributing to the actual 
causes of the financial collapse, persisting instead that the preceding period of economic growth 
was a success for his Fianna Fail government (2009: 137).  
A second instance of exploiting the crisis situation to promote ‘reform’ is the Finance Minister, 
Lenihan’s ‘Statement on the economy’, delivered to Seanad Eireann (The Senate) on 5 December 
2008. The speech, introduced by acknowledging the severity of the financial crisis and the 
deteriorating condition of the government’s fiscal situation, emphasised a ‘reform’ agenda, 
reinforcing the broader narrative of the crisis response (2009: 138). ‘We are in very difficult 
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times’, Lenihan proclaimed, ‘a major gap has emerged between spending levels and tax receipts’ 
because of the global financial crisis, resulting in, he specified, a projected government deficit of 
€3.5 billion for 2008 and €4.7 billion for 2009. Pointing to ‘sub-prime mortgage debt’ as the root 
cause of the crisis and the general deterioration of the global economic environment, he 
proceeded by focusing on the introduction of a range of measures to review spending in the 
public sector. Lenihan, in this particular speech act, carefully employs language that would not 
inflame rumbling public resistance to the suggested ‘reforms’. It is worth tracing the analysis 
directly in the following;  
Lenihan asserted that ‘everybody in this room [the Seanad] is a public servant’ and ‘the 
kind of demonization of the Public Service that has featured in public debate…including 
political parties’ had been deplorable. This linguistic move shifted the blame for any 
perceived attack on the public sector to his political opponents (Masters, 2009: 138)   
Here is an excellent example of what may be referred to as the communicative technique of 
‘blame-deflection’, which will be elaborated upon in the proceeding section in relation to the 
principle of responsibility. Lenihan, through positively identifying himself as a public servant and 
denouncing those who demonize the public sector in general in the course of political debate, is 
skilfully elaborating the nationalist sense of ‘us’ and ‘our’ moral obligations in relation the context 
of the crisis-response, while simultaneously attempting to score political points against his 
parliamentary opponents. The Irish government, despite Lenihan’s rhetoric, and with significant 
support from the mainstream media, were nonetheless persistent in placing a significant amount 
of blame for the financial crisis on the public service, which, as the discourse developed, had 
expanded during the economic boom to an extent that could no longer be afforded. It was also 
widely maintained, and often intensely argued, that fundamental change was required to reign-
in the over-expenditure in Irish public sector (Ruddock, 2008). Of course, and this is exploited in 
much of the political leaders’ crisis-rhetoric, there had been a long-run and increasingly tenuous 
relationship between this dominant representation of public services and the wider Irish public, 
fuelled to a significant extent by a chorus of voices in the media, and the crisis situation presented 
an opportunity to seize upon this muddled setting to ‘reform’ what was seen as an inefficient and 
wasteful set of institutions. 
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In relation to the role of the public itself, the language of blame in the crisis discourse seemed to 
actually succeed in generating a collective acceptance, or at least acquiescence, towards the 
measures implemented in response to the financial collapse which were contrary to any 
understanding of democratic justice. From the outset, political elites, through a carefully 
orchestrated use of crisis-management rhetoric, sought to emphasise this collective culpability, 
or perhaps more suitably a ‘collective guilt’, persistently appealing to ‘we’ and ‘us’ in public 
speech acts. Although there were isolated instances of resistance in Irish society, particularly 
from those unions representing public service workers, a concerted movement which went 
beyond resistance – offering a coherent alternative to the socialisation of private debt at the 
expense of social welfare programmes, public health and education, and the subsequent 
austerity programme – was absent at the crucial point in time.  
The purpose of highlighting the development of the ‘reform’ agenda as a significant theme in the 
overarching crisis-narrative, in the speech acts of key political actors, and the intertwined 
discourse conveying the collective sense of national responsibility for the crisis, is to highlight the 
specific mode of legitimation at work. Rationalisation, therefore, in the sense of analysing 
reasons given in the course of public communication for decisions taken in response to the crisis, 
will now be presented as the mode of legitimation in relation to the development of this 
component of the narrative.  
 
- Mythopoesis  
A brief example in relation to legitimation of this kind, in the context of the response to the 2008 
crisis, may be the sharp contrast drawn in Irish political discourse between Ireland and Iceland, 
mentioned in Chapter 2 as a comparative example of an alternative crisis response. Regarding 
the former, a core feature of the response, according to an extensive series of advisory reports 
by the National Economic and Social Council of Ireland (2009) entitled, ‘Ireland’s Five-Part Crisis: 
An Integrated National Response’, was the restoration of the state’s reputation in global financial 
markets. From this perspective, persuading other EU member-states, international institutions 
and markets that Ireland remained a ‘competitive’ place to invest was paramount, far 
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outweighing principles associated with any kind of democratic justice, and a narrative therefore 
developed accordingly. Ireland, by repaying all of its debt, much of which actually constituted 
odious debt, would be rewarded in time for ‘doing the right thing’ and maintaining the legitimate 
order; a moral tale. Conversely, Iceland, a comparable case in regard to the inflation and collapse 
of a massive credit bubble, as discussed in Chapter 2, represented a cautionary tale to be 
communicated to the Irish public. Iceland would be cast as a ‘basket case’ destined for financial 
ruin. In contrast to this representation, however, by resisting international pressure from the IMF 
and the British government to repay vast sums of private debt to foreign banks, and immediately 
commissioning a detailed public banking inquiry, which would not take place in Ireland until 
January 2016, Boyes (2009) refers to the Icelandic response as actually creating an exceptional 
‘human narrative’ in the context of the international meltdown, demonstrating that citizens do 
not have to be powerless victims in the spokes of the machinery of global finance.  
 
- Blame Avoidance in Irish Public Discourse: Obscuring Responsibility  
The modes of legitimation were introduced in the preceding section in order to characterize a 
discursive feature of the crisis-narrative in relation to a specific normative principle. A critical 
aspect which may be identified in the discursive component outlined above, recognized most 
clearly within the moral evaluation and rationalisation modes of legitimation, is that of blame or, 
more precisely, discursive strategies of blaming. The techniques of blame-avoidance and 
transference were seen to be evident in the course of justifications presented for measures taken 
to reduce government expenditure on the Irish public services in the wake of the financial crisis, 
and, as events unfolded, developed into an essential element of the crisis-narrative itself. The 
general disorientation and confusion of the crisis-context presented an opportunity to attribute 
blame in public discourse, therefore revealing an explicit moral component in relation to the 
responsibility for the crisis.  
As with the case of forms of legitimation, the processes of blaming and strategies of blame-
avoidance constitute essential building blocks in the construction of the dominant crisis narrative 
in Irish public discourse. The interrelated modes of legitimation were highlighted as having played 
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a key role in the communication of the response to the crisis, specifically in regard to the type of 
expertise represented in Irish media, the promotion of a certain perspective on moral evaluation, 
the exploitation of the crisis context by political elites to ‘reform’ public services and, lastly, the 
formulization of moral and cautionary tales conveyed in public discourse. In the following 
paragraphs, decisive instances of blaming and the deployment of blame-avoidance strategies will 
be highlighted and analyzed using Hansson’s framework. This will then lead to the development 
of a normative distinction in relation to which the implications for the principle of responsibility 
may be highlighted.  
Hansson uses texts produced by government officeholders in the UK between 2008 and 2013 in 
order to show how his framework may be applied to empirically explicate moments of discursive 
blame avoidance (2015: 3). Following a detailed sketch of the way in which the above mentioned 
linguistic tools are deployed by way of initially identifying ‘backgrounded agency’ in government-
produced texts and an account of the broader context in which such texts are generated, here 
closely following the work of Hood (2011) in relation to specific blame-avoidance strategies in 
public administration, the framework is integrated and abductively advanced within the 
empirical analysis itself. Through an intensively linguistic approach, Hansson selects a number of 
key speech acts which he correlates to a typology of blaming strategies, developed by means of 
the integrative framework. There are nine such strategies that may be identified in the discourse; 
‘total blame denial’, pertaining to an explicit refutation of a problem or given accusation; 
‘excuses’, which involves the recognition of a problem or wrongdoing, but also includes possible, 
often emotive, public explanations; ‘justifications’, Hansson argues, is where an actor turns 
blame into public credit through a form of positive self-presentation; ‘problem denial and 
counter-attack’, which constitutes a combination of the first two strategies; ‘drawing a line’ 
relates to the acknowledgment of a problem along with a preemptive apology, which is often, he 
suggests, accompanied by an explicit positive self-presentation; ‘changing the subject’, which one 
may argue correlates with the notion of agenda-setting, here pertains to what is referred to as 
‘topic control’, in one sense, and manipulation of the audience, in another; ‘restricting 
information’, one may obviously infer, relates to the purposeful restriction of publicly relevant 
information in order to avoid or deflect blame; ‘lying doggo’ relates to avoidance interaction, as 
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he states, ‘opting out of conversation or opting for one-way communication’; and finally, 
‘working behind the scenes’, which relates to linguistic and non-linguistic means of coercion 
aimed at an opponent (2015: 19). 
1. The first illustration of blame-avoidance in the development of the Irish crisis narrative, 
accessed through the official website of the Irish government, Oireachtas.ie, is a speech 
delivered by Minister for Finance, Lenihan, on February 4, 2009. At a crucial moment in 
the unfolding of the financial crisis, the stated intention here was to pass a parliamentary 
motion supporting proposed expenditure measures, already announced by the 
government, to “restore greater balance between revenue and expenditure”, and, to 
affirm “confidence in the economic strategy of the Government”. Employing Hansson’s 
framework, there is a combination of discursive blame-avoidance strategies evident in 
this instance of political communication. To begin with, excuses, that is, admitting the 
existence of a problem but rejecting causal agency and/or intentionality, are present in 
the introductory remarks of the speech. Hansson suggests, in relation to this strategy, 
that “these explanations may play on the audience’s emotions, especially their feelings of 
compassion, for instance, by claiming that ‘events were beyond our control, or, that 
‘these were unforeseeable circumstances, or claiming ignorance and victimhood as 
someone suffering from an unfortunate lack of relevant information, possibly evoking the 
Bad Apple frame” (2015: 11). Lenihan’s emphasis on ‘exceptional circumstances’ and the 
need to “follow the lead of the government…in the interests of our nation and state” 
relates directly to this mode of blame avoidance. Ireland was here portrayed as the victim 
of a global crisis, “we are experiencing an international recession of unsurpassed severity, 
prompted in turn by the worst crisis in international financial markets for 60 years”, and 
the notion that ‘we’ must all “show social solidarity to tackle the unprecedented 
downturn together” strongly reflects this sentiment. With justifications, a second 
discursive strategy, closely related to the first but with the addition of an element of 
positive self-presentation, the speech moved towards redirecting blame. By evoking a 
kind of ‘rescue narrative’ in relation to the government’s acknowledgment of the severity 
of the problem and their willingness to ‘do the right thing’, Lenihan now focused on public 
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expenditure; “As we have to get our cost base down, we have to focus our energies on 
spending at this stage. The simple arithmetic is that social welfare spending comes to 20 
billion of the approximately 55 billion the Government spends on current goods and 
services”. In addition to the logic of the ‘rescue narrative’, which appears in several of 
Hansson’s discursive strategies, there was a ‘matter of factness’ logic presented here; the 
government’s actions were now being portrayed as unquestionably necessary. The denial 
of any plausible alternatives was becoming an explicit feature of the narrative at this 
point. 
The latter third of the speech, again drawing on Hansson’s typology, highlighted a strategy 
of counterattack in the discourse, which, as mentioned above, combines the strategies of 
excuses and justifications, but crucially, is accompanied by negative other-presentation 
(2015: 13). Lenihan here began to transfer or deflect blame; “There are those who, 
instead of advancing constructive policies, prefer to focus their energies on trying to fix 
blame rather than the problem. There are those who look on and claim, ‘I told you so’, 
suggesting we are the authors of our own misfortune” and, “I can recall few cries in recent 
years from those opposite for less spending, lower social welfare increases, higher taxes 
and more levies. If this side of the House can acknowledge the past, surely those opposite 
can stop pretending they were on the side of the angels at all times”. This shifting of blame 
was certainly directed towards political opponents, namely, the main opposition parties 
at the time, Fine Gael and Labour. Lenihan utilized this closing part of the speech to 
identify two groups more deserving of blame than had been appreciated up to then; the 
‘I told you so’ group, which would have mainly constituted Labour parliamentarians and 
public commentators and intellectuals, such Morgan Kelly and David McWilliams, and, 
what may be referred to as, the ‘on the side of the angels’ group, which would have been 
composed mainly of Fine Gael and Independent parliamentarians, who, as Lenihan’s 
speech insisted, were supportive of government policy up until the financial crisis and 




2. The second instance of political communication which will be presented as a key 
illustration of the blaming strategies extant in the development of a crisis narrative in 
Ireland is a statement delivered by John Hurley, then Governor of the Central Bank and 
Financial Services Authority of Ireland (CBFSA), on March 10, 2009, to a Joint Oireachtas 
Committee on Economic Regulatory Affairs. Public attention at this point had indeed 
become drawn towards questions regarding the role of financial regulation during the 
preceding years of hyper economic growth in Ireland, and it was in this context that 
Governor Hurley’s speech, and particularly the blame deflection techniques employed 
within it, must be understood. Rich in crisis rhetoric, as Masters (2009) points out, the 
opening statement epitomized the ‘blame game’ nature of much of the political discourse 
in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis. 
Similar to Lenihan’s speech act, Hurley’s statement was introduced using a combination 
of discursive techniques, such as excuses and justifications, in order to frame a brief 
history of the recent ‘disruption to global financial markets’. Referring to the crisis merely 
as a ‘disruption’, and in the next paragraph, as a ‘slowdown’, signifies that the intention 
here was to acknowledge the existence of a problem but to downplay its broader 
significance and, relatedly, the role Irish financial regulation could possibly have played. 
Global economic conditions, the regulatory action of the EU and the Irish government 
would be the focus of Hurley’s blame. In regard to the first of these, he states, “The extent 
of the turmoil has been far worse than was envisaged and it is still very unclear when the 
crisis will end and what the ultimate effects will be. The financial crisis has fed directly 
into developments in the global economy”. A justification, according to Hansson’s 
framework, the Governor was here trying to absolve himself and the general approach to 
financial regulation in Ireland as having any significant bearing on how the crisis was 
unfolding. In fact, he argued in the statement, in accordance with this strategy of blame 
avoidance, that the CBFSA ought to be commended for implementing ‘sound economic 
management’ in response to the crisis; therefore, attempting to transform the blame into 
political credit. Hurley focused much of his attention in this statement on the EU, what he 
referred to as ‘the Eurosystem’. The intention here was to place blame for failure of 
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regulation of the financial system squarely on the EU; referring to a group report from the 
European Commission on ‘Cross Border Financial Supervision’, he stated, “The Group 
concluded in its review that there have been real and important supervisory and 
regulatory failures. They suggest two initiatives to repair the supervisory and regulatory 
system within the EU”. The intended inference to be drawn here it that the Irish Central 
Bank was acting within the rules of the Eurosystem and, therefore, the blame must rest 
with the latter. It was following the opening statement, during questions from the 
Oireachtas committee members, that Hurley engaged decisively in blame-transference 
strategies, insisting that the Irish government must ultimately bear responsibility for the 
severity of the 2008 crisis (Irish Independent: 2009a, 2009b). According to Hansson’s 
framework, it may be argued that the Governor Hurley was attempting to avoid blame by 
changing the subject (Hansson, 2015: 16). In this sense, his engagement in the discourse 
violated the maxim of relation by providing irrelevant, or perhaps misleading, information 
to deflect blame, transferring it to other actors involved.  
 
3. The final speech act, to illustrate the discursive blaming strategies in the crisis narrative, 
is an address delivered by then Taoiseach, Brian Cowen, on June 15 2010, to the 
parliament, making the case for a ‘motion of confidence’ in the Fianna Fail/Green Party 
coalition government. Accessed through the official Irish government website, 
taoiseach.ie, the timing of the speech is, again, vital and the language saturated with 
features of crisis rhetoric and blame avoidance. Following the establishment of NAMA 
and preceding the bailout agreement with the EU/IMF later that year, this represents 
probably the most uncertain period of time in the crisis; as Conor McCabe (2010: 169) 
points out, the Irish government had essentially put up “the entire Irish state as collateral 
for the crushing liabilities of six private banks”. Although the government won the vote of 
confidence, solely by virtue of continued support from their parliamentary coalition 
partners, the Taoiseach’s speech is revealing in its construing of legitimacy in relation to 
the crisis response and in its assignment of blame.  
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As with the preceding two cases, the general frame within which this speech may firstly 
be understood is in regard to the legitimacy of the government’s response to the crisis; 
there was no alternative, the ‘tough decisions’ in relation to public expenditure were 
absolutely necessary and ‘we’ – once again noting the frequency of this highly symbolic 
pronoun from the opening section – will benefit from this ‘decisive action’ and 
‘leadership’ as a nation. Taking up, once more, Hansson’s blame framework, the strategy 
of excuses and justifications feature strongly in the opening paragraphs. Chiming with the 
broader narrative in Irish political discourse, the global nature of the crisis and Ireland’s 
highly dependent position within it were emphasized; “This recession has changed the 
financial world. The lesson we need to learn from it is that we are in a competitive global 
market-place and soft solutions are not going to provide the basis for sustainable 
growth”. As with Hurley’s speech, the initial focus on the blameworthiness of systemic 
problems associated with international financial regulation, evoking also the victim 
frame, quickly moved towards positive self-presentation; Cowen stated, “Today we are 
held up as an example and people are talking about the Government’s resolve and 
capacity to deal with problems that we have been confronted with”. Note here, 
specifically, the implication of a difference between the exogenous origins of the crisis 
and the absent acknowledgment of endogenously produced systemic problems.  
As with the Lenihan speech, features of blaming explicitly come into focus when 
references are made to political opponents; according to Hansson, the strategies of 
drawing a line and changing the subject are employed here. Firstly, in defending the 
government’s choices to drastically reduce public expenditure and following a brief 
acknowledgment of “policy errors” during the economic boom, Cowen attempted to 
transfer blame to the opposition; “The irony of politics today is that the opposition parties 
criticized us during the good years for spending too little…When you are merely chasing 
votes, the truth makes an uncomfortable companion”. Containing a strong element of 
positive self-presentation in relation to the “hard-won credibility which the country has 
now gained internationally” as a result of the response taken to the crisis, there is a play 
on the audience’s emotions, specifically, that of fear; Hansson describes this element of 
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the strategy as argumentum ad populum (2015: 15). Cowen insisted that a change of 
government, or indeed any alternative, would threaten Ireland’s economic recovery; the 
main opposition parties were being blamed here for promoting unrealistic and populist 
solutions to the crisis, “the policies being espoused by Fine Gael and Labour are more 
about chasing popularity rather than confronting reality”. In regard to changing the 
subject, the second blaming strategy evident in this case, Cowen abandoned the language 
of crisis in the final section of the speech and attempts to begin to elaborate a narrative 
of recovery; “So now the country is on the road to recovery. It is important we do not 
jeopardize that journey. Rather we need to stay disciplined, focused and committed. 
There is no coherent policy platform being put forward by the opposition”. Again, blame-
avoidance was achieved here through switching the focus back onto the perceived 
incoherence of the opposition’s argument and also, critically, evoking the fear of 
jeopardizing what has been gained by the “journey” travelled and the hope of a possible 
brighter future, “on the road to recovery”.  
 
These three speech acts reflect the prevalence of blame, and strategies of blame-avoidance, in 
Irish public discourse. Critically, this represents a discursive mechanism that obscures the higher-
level cognitive order principle of responsibility. The empirical features outlined, in relation to 
both modes of legitimation and strategies of blame avoidance, are operating at the lowest, 
immanent level in the cognitive order of society. In this context, the cultural model is reproducing 
communicative structures that restrict the normative thematization of the principles being 
obscured. The communicative structure of repressive hegemony best articulates the obstructive 
forms of discourse outlined above, in which, contrary to the aim of forming a consensus in the 
course of discursive communication, the outcome is determined by the unchallenged belief that 
the values of a particular group serve the good of all. The conservative non-thematization of 
alternative responses to the crisis reflect the dissensus learning pathology at work in the Irish 
cultural model. Importantly, the claim here is not to suggest that the ideology of conservatism is 
inherently pathological, however, in the context of the crisis, when there was a need to publicly 
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thematize alternatives that could potentially have embraced some form of substantive political 
and/or social change, it was discursively blocked.  
Although discursive legitimation of the Irish crisis narrative, which bypassed normative forms of 
legitimation, and the prevalence of blaming has been depicted as dominant features in the 
discourse of the crisis response, there is, when assuming a reconstructive perspective, always a 
potentiality. The possibility of overcoming collective learning pathologies, reinforced by 
communicative structures within a cultural model can be achieved through normative innovation 
and radical forms of thematization. This is fundamental to the reconstructive procedure, to 
identify those alternative sources of thematization, which introduces beliefs, commitments and 
evaluations to public discourse that were previously only latently present. This, of course, points 
in the direction of diverse forms of social movement, carriers of reconstructive potentials that 
engage in various forms of cultural and normative innovation that challenge the established 
structure of the cultural model.   
 
7.2 Resistance in the Irish Public Sphere: The Source of Potentiality   
Although the discourse represented a distinctive set of conditions corresponding to a narrative 
of justification, the manner in which the public itself responded is pivotal. Mixed messages 
emanating from Irish political elites throughout the latter half of 2008 in relation to, on the one 
hand, the prospect of a severe financial crisis and prolonged economic recession, and, on the 
other, the notion of a ‘soft landing’, which predicted a comparatively insignificant economic 
fallout, meant that by the announcement of the Bank Guarantee in September, there was an 
acute sense of uncertainty and confusion regarding the prospective impact of what was taking 
place11. Despite these challenging conditions, a coordinated public resistance, specifically against 
                                                          
11 ‘Mixed messages’ refer to the way in which political leaders, specifically, the Finance Minister, Brian Lenihan, the 
Taoiseach, Brian Cowen, and the Governor of the Irish Central Bank, John Hurley, presented confusing, and often 
contradictory, accounts of what the implications of the immanent financial crisis would be for Ireland. This, I argue, 




reductions in government spending in relation to health care, education and social welfare 
constituted an important feature of the wider narrative of the crisis in Ireland. 
In a postscript to his 2009 book, ‘Ship of Fools’, journalist Fintan O’Toole makes the argument 
that the Irish government’s response to the financial crisis may be characterized by the 
communicative techniques of fear, obfuscation and distraction. From this point of view, the 
generally muted reaction of the Irish public to the political interventions becomes more 
understandable. Indeed, the fear of a total economic collapse and the risk and confusion related 
to the possible consequences of alternative macro-economic approaches rendered the measures 
implemented as appearing necessary. It was, however, in regard to specific decisions related to 
the immanent prospect of massive cuts in government spending as a result of the financial 
turmoil, that the public was to cultivate a response of its own. Focusing therefore on the public’s 
discursive role in the crisis, which was shaped by organizing collective resistance to the 
government’s proposed public expenditure cuts, two protest movements, the ‘Older People’s 
Uprising’ and the student protests against the re-introduction of university fees, will be presented 
to illustrate this critical dimension of the crisis narrative.  
These protest movements must be understood in the context of the general climate of fear and 
intimidation, a feature of the conservative cultural model. Although indeed constituting a 
recognition of the perceived injustices of the crisis-response and creating space for the 
consolidation of oppositional discourses, they nonetheless reflect both positive and negative 
implications in the distinctive Irish context. In relation to the former, they positively uncover a 
reconstructive learning potential through the recognition of suppressed tensions which are made 
manifest and expressed in concrete societal struggles, yet, in a negative sense, they 
simultaneously reflect the relatively low level of opposition discernible in Irish public discourse. 
Considered in relation to the wider backdrop of the international response to the global financial 
crisis, discussed in Chapter 2, which saw the development of the Occupy Movement in the United 
States in 2011 and, in Europe, the emergence of sustained social movements against the 
imposition of austerity programmes.  
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Such social movements represent the horizon of possibility disclosed by communication 
communities that reach beyond their existing self-understanding and associated practical 
rationality. This creates real discourses that may incorporate the structural outcomes of learning 
processes that point beyond existing knowledge and normative arrangements. O’Mahony (2013), 
drawing off Peirce, points out that this form of learning involves “thinking of the real 
communication community as exploring systematic, and interrelated functional, moral, legal, and 
ethical horizons that point beyond its existing normative rationality” (O’Mahony, 2013: 305). In 
the present context, which takes as its normative point of reference the principle of legitimacy, 
this idea of ‘going beyond’ the dominant narrative suggests the actual building of an already, 
cognitively anticipated, normative order. Following this critical-normative lead, I will articulate a 
model of co-responsible legitimation, which establishes a counterfactual formulation of 
legitimacy combined with a transcendent notion of responsibility. Both emanating from a critique 
of different features of the discourse itself, this formulation will facilitate the normative 
reconstruction of the Irish model of legitimation.   
Although the resistance movements in Ireland did not succeed in transforming the dominant 
crisis narrative, there is still important learning processes taking place through ideal innovation 
and argumentation within these communication communities. At stake in such societal conflict 
is the future direction of collective learning that are either adaptations of, or challenges to, 
existing practical rationality. O’Mahony (2013) delineates three gradations of learning in the real 
communication community which indicate shifts in the state of knowledge by drawing from 
counterfactual potentials in the ‘unlimited’ communication community, for instance, to re-frame 
a situation of injustice or illegitimacy. These gradations, therefore, provide the critical impetus 
for reconstruction at the societal level, and also allow for distinctions to be developed at the 
analytical level from the perspective of collective learning. Firstly, a kind of historical, or 
incremental learning deriving from the established understanding of the transcendent-cognitive 
order, allows for the challenging of the prevailing order of public legitimacy and the legitimated 
power relations between social groups within the historically embedded normative order, 
therefore, drawing from the existing epistemic and social resources. A form of comparative 
learning refers to a second gradation in the real communication community that concerns 
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engagement with the cultural models of other communication communities – social movements 
in the US and Europe that emerged at the same time – thus opening up learning potentials that 
have been transposed elsewhere. Lastly, a form of fundamental, or imaginative, learning reflects 
a communication community that is farthest from the existing practical social rationality and 
nearest to the counterfactual horizon of the unlimited communication community (2013: 307).  
Although these distinctions in gradations of learning may often overlap, occurring simultaneously 
in the long gestation process of social change, it is the former two, what I refer to as historical 
and comparative forms of learning that are most evident in the Irish case. The latter may be 
understood in relation to the responses taken by other countries to the financial crisis. For 
instance, the example of Iceland is crucial here; the ‘pots and pans’ revolution of 2009, which 
constituted a sustained social movement, succeeded in changing the government and by 
extension the proposed response to the crisis, which was perceived as unjust. The democratic 
expression reflected here, specifically in relation to the transformative role of active citizenship 
and participatory inclusion, represented a potential source of comparative learning in the Irish 
case. Historical learning, relatedly, in this case, is comprised of impediments related to the 
sociological phenomenon of embeddedness – in essence, this refers to the absence of a capacity 
for fundamental learning in the general mode of collective learning in Ireland.  
The first specific example of public resistance, reflected in the discourse, also highlighted as an 
instance of successful public demonstration to the imposition of unjust measures in response to 
the financial crisis, is the ‘Older People’s Uprising’, which emerged in opposition to the 
abolishment of the automatic entitlement to medical cards for Irish citizens over seventy years 
of age. Announced in the emergency budget, 14 October 2008, the rationale for the decision was, 
according to Minister Lenihan, in regard to the need to “rein back ineffective universal 
entitlements” in the face of the rapidly developing global crisis (Lenihan, 2008). Despite the 
rhetoric of ‘pulling together’ and ‘playing our part according to our needs”, the announcement 
sparked mass protest almost immediately, with 15,000 older people and supporters marching on 
the parliament a week later. Rosie Meade (2015), in critically analyzing the development of this 
specific protest movement, identifies it as a defining event in the country’s transition to an 
economic recession, exposing deep contradictions and troubling continuities in Irish political 
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discourse and practice (Meade, 2015: 162). Core to Meade’s argument is the contention that the 
narratives which sought to frame such events, construed as an ‘exceptional period’, were an 
‘oversimplification’ of the public mood. The inference to be drawn here is that “there was little 
in the way of dissent in Ireland, that conflicts over economic, cultural and social policy were a 
notable feature of Irish society, and that alternative ways of thinking and being were practiced 
by social movements, community groups and individuals across the state” (2015: 1-2).  
The so-called ‘Older People’s Uprising’ constituted two key moments; firstly, Age Action Ireland 
organized a public meeting on 21 October 2008, attended by 1800 people, and secondly, a march 
on the house of parliament which was coordinated a day later. The latter received significant 
media attention as it happened to coincide with a large student demonstration, highlighted 
below. Meade contends that by exploiting the populist, clientelistic and, one may add, parochial 
nature of Irish politics, protesters very successfully targeted elected representatives to demand 
the proposal be discarded, quoting the message from the Irish Senior Citizens Parliament, “Get 
out there! Get working! Get talking to your local politicians and demand that this be withdrawn” 
(Meade, 2015: 163). The movement undoubtedly highlighted the effectiveness of the older 
people’s lobby in Ireland; 
Carrying banners declaiming ‘Older and Bolder’ or wearing tee-shirts with the AAI logo, 
they performed their shared spirit of collective purpose, while, for some at least, picketing 
clinics or shouting down TDs signified a willingness to transgress the polite norms of 
political engagement (Meade, 2015: 65) 
Although the protest movement, through demonstrating an exceptional collective capacity to 
mobilize and picket, succeeded in its aim of winning concessions with regard to welfare eligibility 
thresholds, also raising the idea of a politically sensitive and mobile elderly population, Meade 
argues that it brought out more fundamental concerns about Irish political culture. The Older 
People’s Uprising, she claims, revealed that ‘counter-conduct’ – the Foucauldian concept – works 
with and within certain constraints (2015: 176-77). In that sense, Meade posits that “protesters 
did not claim or hold out for new political horizons: instead, they projected the clientelist bargain 
on the national stage” (2015: 178). Therefore, in the wake of the Older People’s Uprising, wider 
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discourses about welfare and the ways in which social policy is generally thought about and 
represented in Ireland remained largely unchanged, as indeed did the course of the impending 
crisis (2015: 177).  
A second example of coordinated resistance to the government’s response to the crisis is 
illustrated by the students’ protests against university tuition fees. In line with the national 
responses to the crisis elsewhere in Europe, reduction in public expenditure in education was, 
almost immediately, an element of the Irish government’s approach (Irish Independent: 2008). 
The re-introduction of university fees, which had been removed since 1996, would become the 
most publicly contentious measure in this regard and, more importantly, resulted in a well-
organized and sustained protest campaign among Irish university students, organized by the 
Union of Students in Ireland (USI). From late 2008 onwards, both the USI and a newly established 
campaign group, Free Education for Everyone (FEE), engaged in blockading universities, picketing 
constituency offices of local politicians and, of course, coordinating large protest marches in 
Dublin, drawing considerable public attention. An estimated 10,000 students from colleges and 
universities around Ireland protested outside the houses of parliament on 21 October 2008 
against the re-introduction of tuition fees. Although the resistance could perhaps be recognized 
as having been successful in relation to its objective of preventing the general re-introduction of 
university fees, with notable increases in annual registration fees at many institutions and the 
expenditure reductions in various grant schemes, it was far from completely successful. Most 
significantly, the momentum generated by both protest movements failed to change the 
trajectory of the crisis-response in Ireland. Although they represented a degree of success on 
specific issues, they failed to consolidate and crystallize into a wider movement, which could have 
offered a political platform for an alternative response to the crisis.   
Civil and industrial unrest were certainly features of the immediate fallout from the financial crisis 
in Ireland. Disconnected from one another, however, and relatively short-run, protests against 
the government’s response were focused on specific instances where, mainly workers, by means 
of a general strike and/or a sit-in (e.g. the case of Waterford Crystal and the trade union rally in 
Dublin at the beginning of 2009) sought to resist the imposition of measures which were 
perceived as unjust. Although it would take some time before these such instances of public 
187 
 
resistance would be translated into mainstream politics in Ireland, eventually gaining resonance 
through the development of ‘anti-austerity’ discourses and the organization of political parties, 
specifically around matters of social and economic justice, the critical interventions in the crisis 
had been made and ultimately implemented with little resistance. An important distinction to be 
borne in mind at this stage, which will be developed upon later in the critique, is in relation to 
ideas of organized resistance, which often spring up in opposition to perceived threats to such 
things as workers’ rights and core elements of the social welfare system, and social movements, 
understood as innovative temporary public spaces in which moments of collective creativity 
provide society with new ideas, identities and even ideals (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991: 4). The 
latter ought to represent important moments of societal learning and, in the context of a crisis, 
seize upon the democratic potential for reconstructing an alternative vision for society.   
Although there was indeed limited success in transforming the crisis discourse in this direction, 
the very idea of attempting to resist the imposition of the government’s proposed austerity 
programme revealed the latent existence of another perspective on what may constitute a 
legitimate response to the crisis. In essence, it showed that there are other, future-oriented 
democratic interests at stake in this moment, which contest the legitimacy of the given approach. 
The dominant thematization of the crisis, however, through the development of a narrative 
which sought to justify the political interventions outlined above, hegemonically determined the 
way in which events would be construed in public discourse and, ultimately, contained the wider 
public reaction. This narrative, which maps the discursive unfolding of the crisis over time, 
illustrates the way in which disparate interpretations and explanations of what was taking place 
came to consolidate into a coherent justificatory structure, reinforcing the underlying normative 
order.  
The political interventions which constituted the key elements of the Irish state’s response to the 
crisis, reflecting also the general crisis-management strategy implemented, corresponds to the 
initial mechanism of selection in Jessop’s diagnostic schema. The privileging of certain discourses 
for the interpretation of events and the legitimation of the decisions taken in response to this 
are illustrated within the three defining moments above. The legitimacy of the response, it will 
be argued below, correlates directly with the authority and perceived expertise of the political 
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leaders interpolating the events in public discourse. Control, therefore, over the crisis discourse 
was decisive and, as illustrated above also, this was maintained by seizing the agenda and 
generating resonant discourses in each of the key moments. The retention of resonant 
discourses, constituting the second mechanism in the evolution of the crisis, corresponds to the 
potential for effective institutionalization and integration. This depends, fundamentally, on the 
specific conditions of society at a given time, the discourse is retained because it resonates in the 
Irish context as the appropriate and legitimate way of responding to the crisis. By recursively 
strengthening the appropriate discourse in relation to the institutional crisis-response, the 
counter-arguments against the government’s approach become weakened, but critically, not 
eliminated.  
The public resistance highlighted here constitutes an important, yet latent element in the crisis 
narrative, which allows for a reconstructive potentiality to be realized in Irish society. Reflecting 
an alternative, normative form of learning in which the principles of legitimacy and responsibility 
are discursively reworked in the actual situation, these developments harbour possibilities that 
are shown to be blocked by the dominant interests reflected in the establishment narrative. The 
public discourse that shaped the narrative of the Irish institutional response to the crisis signifies 
distinctive social conditions and therefore a distinguishable mode of collective learning. From a 
normative reconstructive perspective, these conditions of learning that produced the narrative 
identified in the crisis discourse have deep roots in normative culture. The next chapter, drawing 
from Honneth’s methodological procedure of reconstruction, will attempt to develop upon the 
normative potential carried and expressed by resistance movements to reformulate the 
principles of legitimacy and responsibility in order to disclose a transcendent potential contained 







A Reconstruction of Legitimation and Responsibility:                                                     
Disclosing the Democratic Potential of a Co-Responsible Mode of Legitimation 
 
Having identified those elements in Irish public discourse, which are understood here as blocking 
mechanisms to the full realization of the principles of legitimation and responsibility, the present 
chapter, following Honneth’s reconstructive procedure, seeks to develop the normative 
potentials contained in the cognitive order. As the historically available potential of reason is 
reflected in the content of this overarching macro structure, the mechanisms blocking the 
collective realization of this potential is located at the immanent level of the cultural model, in 
which non-normative communicative structures lead to learning pathologies that reproduce the 
conditions of non-thematization. The purpose of the chapter is, therefore, firstly, to explicate the 
normative contents in the transcendent dimension of the cognitive order that allow for the 
reconstructive position to be adopted, specifically relevant to legitimation and responsibility, 
and, secondly, to suggest the mechanisms and structures that require reconstructive treatment 
in the Irish case of the response to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.  
Reconstruction, as it will be deployed here, refers to the description of the normative principles 
at stake in the situation in their ideal transcendent form. In this sense, legitimation and 
responsibility must be theoretically elaborated in order to draw out the potential they contain, 
which is being denied in the actual situation. This relates directly to immanent transcendence, 
the guiding concept of Critical Theory. The immanent described in the previous chapter by the 
disrupting mechanisms of Irish public discourse and which reflects the reality of a conservative 
cultural model in which the normative principles are refracted in a distinctive direction, will now 
be placed in contrast to the transcendent impression of the principles that represent an untapped 
potential harbouring the possibility of normative innovation. In order for such innovation to take 
place, the thematization of the principles must be a constitutive part of public discourse, which 
requires collective learning that can transform communicative structures.    
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8.1 The Ideals of Legitimation and Responsibility: A Normative Reconstruction   
The Irish crisis narrative represents a distinctive mode of public discourse, which in turn reflects 
a mode of discourse reflexively incapable of thematising alternative responses to what was taking 
place, as shown in the previous chapter in relation to non-normative legitimation processes and 
the prevalence of blame avoidance. The way in which events were construed in public 
communication, therefore, sought to legitimize a specific type of response to the Irish public. The 
careful management and framing of communication strategies was paramount in order to restrict 
the emergent, competing and/or alternative discourses from gaining significant resonance to 
challenge the dominant narrative, reflecting conditions of communication that constitute the 
reproduction of blocked processes of collective learning. Critically, however, this latent 
generation of a counter-narratives presents a significant challenge, specifically in relation to the 
principle of legitimacy conveyed through the dominant narrative. 
As the narrative is discursively revealed through empirical observations of processes of public 
discourse, the generative, causal level, to which the specific forms of legitimation, and the 
conditions of justification may be linked, are contained in the cultural model. The identification 
of distinctive modes of legitimation, following Van Leeuwen’s adaptation of Habermas, reflects 
the development of a narrative that is the product of a distinctive cultural model. By that, it is 
understood, the constitutive elements contained in the ideas of authority, morality, rationality 
and symbolism, are reflected in the discourse of a certain dominant position on the process of 
legitimation. Taking a reconstructive perspective on each aspect; the dependence on expert and 
traditional authority overshadows the possibility of a proper democratic form of political 
authority; the moral-evaluative component of the narrative seeks to comprehend the 
justificatory basis for the political interventions outlined in Chapter 1., which put the interests of 
the financial system above all else, thereby highlighting the absence of democratic justice; 
although rationalization, as a mode of legitimation, is introduced above in relation to the 
justification for drastic ‘reforms’ to public services, it also reveals an explicit attempt to seize the 
crisis as an opportunity to further an ideological programme, which in turn discloses a 
reconstructive potential; finally, the symbolism conveyed in the narrative, the reward and 
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punishment for practices deemed either good or bad, is a salient feature of the discourse, 
supporting what is contained in the preceding forms of legitimation.     
The link between modes of legitimation and the idea of a narrative may be normatively 
developed in relation to the concept of justification. Boltanski and Thevenot (2006) help to draw 
an initial distinction here in untangling the concepts of legitimacy and justification12. In 
attempting to understand the imperative to justify as the basis of coordinating human social 
relations, they point out that it is not fully satisfactory to employ the notion of ‘legitimization’ in 
certain contexts, as it tends to confuse justification with forms of deceit “by rejecting the 
constraints of coordination and resorting to a relativism of values” (Boltanski and Thevenot, 
2006: 37). Boltanski and Thevenot proceed by highlighting two major difficulties in the 
‘construction of legitimacy’ from the perspective of justification. The first concerns the problem 
of order, specifically the requirement of reaching agreement that might lead to the constitution 
of a given social order. The conditions, they postulate, which allow for legitimate forms of 
justification to be established – where, for instance, two persons are challenging one another 
over the unequal importance of two facts that are being compared – may enter into tension with 
the governing principle of that order, thus possibly resulting in the development of relations of 
‘domination’. A second major difficulty in the ‘construction of legitimacy’, Boltanski and Thevenot 
point out, relates to the ‘plurality of forms of agreement’; “How is that plurality possible when, 
as many have noted, universality seems to be a necessary condition of legitimacy?” (2006: 39). 
The solution to these difficulties, they argue, is to explicate the constraints with which a higher 
principle must observe in order to be acceptable and consequently applied in justification (2006: 
39).  
The form of legitimacy therefore reflected in the specific case of Ireland’s response to the 2008 
crisis indicates an unjustified legitimacy. The concept of power, which is discursively understood 
as a neutral societal resource offers an expository component here. If power is not continually 
regenerated in discourse and thus constantly renewed, it degenerates into a form of domination, 
i.e. rule without justification, in which a social order is maintained through ideology and/or fear 
                                                          
12 Simone Chambers (2010) explains the way in which the concepts of justification and legitimacy fold into each 
other in contemporary liberalism, especially in its Kantian version.  
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alone (2011: 970). Therefore, a critique of power, which involves the problematization of the 
existing space of reasons and justifications, is required to break open “rigid, encrusted 
justification narratives and reciprocally untenable clusters of reasons” (2011: 970). Power, 
furthermore, “is an expression of a binding of others through reasons; it collapses, together with 
the authority on which it is founded, when it no longer rests on acceptance” (2011: 970). The 
‘encrusted’ justification narrative, therefore, revealed in the case of the Irish crisis-response, 
constitutes an example of ideological domination in Forst’s terms. In that sense, ideologies are 
justifications of relations of rule or domination that have become insulated from critical challenge 
by distorting the space of reasons and presenting the existent relations of rule or domination as 
‘natural’ (2011: 970). As observed earlier in relation to the key moments of the Irish crisis-
response, where public discussion and engagement remained highly restricted, coupled with the 
broader mode of the non-thematization characteristic of a conservative cultural model, the 
narrative in this instance obviates normative democratic justification, depending almost entirely 
upon the legitimacy of the background social order.     
The empirical observations of Irish public discourse I have made fall some distance short of the 
reconstructive normative dimension against which they will ultimately be judged. The vital 
emancipatory interest carried discursively in the account of the resistance movements above, 
although not sustained, and the broader deliberative transformations that the political system 
has experienced in the years since the crisis, indicate the existence of a critical potentiality, still 
persistent in the Irish context, which open up a transcendent horizon of possibility13. In order to 
elaborate on what is held in this possibility, I will now develop the concept of legitimation in a 
reconstructive manner. Drawing on the field of political theory once again, specifically, the 
normative approach of democratic theory, I will follow Joshua Cohen in exploring the ‘ideal of a 
deliberative democracy’ and consider the normative implications for a legitimate democratic 
social order. Cohen offers a comprehensive impression of what is entailed by a regulative 
                                                          
13 Such deliberative transformations which have taken place in the Irish political system include, the emergence of 
a critique of austerity (People Before Profit and the Anti-Austerity Alliance), a new emphasis on parliamentary 
committees, a sustained social movement in resisting the imposition of water charges, the establishment of a 
‘citizens assembly’ to discuss critical social issues, and finally the emergence of a minority government which has 
cultivated a new mode of consensus in Irish politics.  
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principle of democratic legitimation, developed in relation to the procedure of public 
deliberation. 
By a deliberative democracy I shall mean, roughly, an association whose affairs are 
governed by the public deliberation of its member. I propose an account of the value of 
such an association that treats democracy itself as a fundamental political ideal and not 
simply as a derivative ideal that can be explained in terms of the values of fairness or 
equality of respect (Cohen, 2003: 342) 
To introduce the notion of a deliberative democracy, Cohen takes up three elements of John 
Rawls’ discussion of democratic politics in a just society, particularly in relation to whether the 
term itself is naturally explained as a fair system of social cooperation. Firstly, a fundamental 
requirement for any well-ordered democracy entails alternative conceptions of what may be 
considered, ‘the good life’ (2003: 343). An ideal pluralist scheme, Cohen explains in regard to 
Rawls’ perspective, “public explanations and justifications of laws and policies are to be case in 
terms of conceptions of the common good…and public deliberation should aim to work out the 
details of such conceptions” (2003: 343). Secondly, the ideal democratic order must satisfy 
egalitarian implications which are manifest to the citizens themselves. Aside from the obvious 
need for opportunities and powers in this context to be independent of economic or social 
position to allow for fair access to participation, Cohen adds, it is also “to ensure that the equality 
of citizens is manifest and to declare a commitment to that equality “as the public intention” 
(2003: 343). The third element of Rawls’ prescription for a democratic social order concerns the 
need to provide a basis for self-respect, to encourage the development of a sense of political 
competence and to “contribute to the formation of a sense of justice” (2003: 344). This relates 
to the way in which a democratic politics should shape the way the members of a society 
understand themselves and their legitimate interests (2003: 344).  
In developing these features, Cohen explains, Rawls pursues a formal and an informal line of 
argument. The former relates to the idea that “parties in the original position would choose the 
principle of participation with the proviso that the political liberties have their fair value”, 
however, it is in regard to the latter, which Cohen focuses on and develops in regards to the 
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ordering of political institutions on the basis of the principle, “justice as fairness”, that will be of 
concern here (2003: 344). The implication here is that if one accepts the ideal of a fair system of 
cooperation, then our political institutions themselves should conform “to the requirement that 
terms of association be worked out under fair conditions” (2003: 344). According to Cohen, 
therefore, the informal argument proposes the original position to serve as an abstract model to 
generate fair conditions, and by extension, strive to mirror our political institutions, in contrast 
to, he points out, “an initial-point situation in which regulative principles for those institutions 
are selected” (2003: 345). It is on this basis, that the three conditions of a democratic society 
follow a natural sequence according to the ideal of fairness, Cohen contends Rawls’ fair system 
of cooperation and puts forward his own proposal for how these conditions may be 
accommodated, focusing instead on the presupposed ideal of public deliberation.   
The contention is that, in attempting to develop the conditions Rawls sets out, assuming that the 
ideal of fairness can be ‘mirrored’ in the fairness of political institutions one should instead 
“proceed by seeking to mirror a system of ideal deliberation in social and political institutions” 
(2003: 345). Cohen, therefore, theorizes the notion of a deliberative democracy in the ideal of 
democratic association, in which the justification of that association proceed through public 
argument and reasoning among equal citizens. He argues, “citizens in such an order share a 
commitment to the resolution of problems of collective choice through public reasoning and 
regard their basic institutions as legitimate in so far as they establish the framework for free 
public deliberation” (2003: 346). He then proceeds by outlining a formal, substantive account of 
deliberative democracy, presenting an ideal deliberative procedure, containing five essential 
features; that it constitutes an ongoing and independent association with an indefinite future; 
that citizens share the view that the appropriate terms of association provide a framework for, 
or are the results of, their deliberation; that it is a pluralistic association, concerned with sharing 
a commitment to the deliberative resolution of collective problems but, simultaneously, 
recognizing divergent aims and interests; and lastly, understanding deliberative procedures as 
the source of legitimacy, that the results of the deliberation process be manifest and the 
outcomes evident; that there is a mutual recognition of the capacities to deliberate, i.e. to engage 
in public reasoning.   
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To this normative account of democratic legitimation, which characterizes the conditions of a 
deliberative procedure in a social order that is regulated by deliberative forms of collective 
choice, Cohen adds an “ideal deliberative procedure” (2003: 346). The intention here, by 
explicating the conditions required for deliberative decision-making through the formal 
conception, is to highlight the properties that the associated democratic political institutions 
should embody (2003: 346-7). Cohen initially cites three general aspects of deliberation in regard 
to the ideal procedure; “there is the need to decide on an agenda, to propose alternative 
solutions to the problems on the agenda, supporting those solutions with reasons, and to 
conclude by settling on an alternative” (2003: 347). Crucial to the project at hand, he argues, that 
the outcomes of any deliberative procedure are democratically legitimate only if they could be 
the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals; “the ideal deliberative procedure is 
a procedure that captures this principle” (2003: 347). There are four components to be outlined 
here; (1) deliberation is free in that, firstly, the participants are bound only by the results of their 
deliberation and, secondly, that they act from those results; (2) deliberation is reasoned, to 
reference Habermas, “no force except that of the better argument is exercised” (1975: 108); (3) 
in this ideal procedure, parties are both formally and substantively equal, meaning, “everyone 
with the deliberative capacities has equal standing at each stage of the deliberative process”; (4) 
the aim of deliberation is to arrive at a rational consensus, “to find reasons that are persuasive 
to all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of 
alternatives by equals” (2003: 347-8). This four-part ideal procedure is developed further by 
raising, and then replying to, corresponding substantive issues about democratic association, 
namely, problems related to sectarianism, incoherence, injustice and irrelevance. Cohen’s notion 
of democratic association as a fundamental political ideal in itself – through a critique of Rawls, 
the development of an ideal procedure for deliberation and the theorization of the requirements 
for the institutionalization of such a procedure – establishes a normative conception of 
legitimation as a regulative principle.  
Advancing a reconstructive formulation of responsibility now, Karl-Otto Apel presents the most 
appropriate, and most advanced, perspective. Apel re-conceptualizes the traditional notion of 
responsibility, which he perceives as rooted to the idea of individually accountable actions. He 
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argues that, in order to face the novel challenges of collective responsibility that human beings 
face in modern society, the concept must be considered in the functional context of existent 
institutions and social systems. Arriving ultimately at the concept of co-responsibility, this idea 
suggests that all should be equally responsible for coordinating collective action by having equal 
access to discursively participate in determining solutions to the profound challenges of 
contemporary civilization (O’Mahony, 2015: 7). O’Mahony argues, contextualizing Apel’s 
perspective within the broader academic discourse on responsibility in relation to the earlier 
work of Simon Caney and Hans Joas, that “discursively achieved co-responsibility emphasizes a 
mechanism for realizing shared responsibility that does not depend on ontologically fixed 
categories of the individual (Caney) or the collectivity (Joas) that might carry it, though individual 
responsibility can be realized in a mediated form through the discursively controlled operation 
of institutions” (2015: 7). Apel’s proposal of co-responsibility, therefore, presents a concept 
which is not a directed phenomenon that constitutes the imposition of substantive principles by 
some form of elite, but is communicatively conceived as a reciprocal process involving the giving 
and taking of reasons by all affected parties (2015: 8). 
In order to further elucidate this concept of co-responsibility, it is necessary to examine the steps 
taken in Apel’s own formulation. In line with the methodological focus of Critical Theory 
delineated above, a transcendental-pragmatic component is developed as a response to the 
global problems represented in the concept of co-responsibility (Apel, 1993: 506). Apel’s 
formulation is based in the possibility of realizing a normative principle of co-responsibility that 
depends upon the institutional conditions in which that regulative principle is communicatively 
generated. Discursively organizing and practicing co-responsibility, he argues, through world-
wide networks of formal and informal dialogues, conferences, commissions and boards, depends 
fundamentally on a “generalization and projection of the function of democracy”. Moreover, 
despite the fact that the substance of much of this world-wide dialogue constitutes little more 
than negotiations and bargaining among various groups, he insists, given the “glare of publicity” 
within which these events take place, they must at least pretend that they are dealing with their 
problems by reasonable arguments and, by doing so, are representing the interests of all those 
people affected (1993: 512). An appropriate interpretation of democracy is, therefore, 
197 
 
fundamental to developing an ethics of responsibility suitable to the novel challenges of modern 
society. As with the concept of legitimation, understood also as a regulative normative principle 
in this context, responsibility is employed initially by way of a negative critique, then elaborated 
in a reconstructive manner. The intention in both cases is to diagnose problematic features of 
Irish public discourse regarding the response to the 2008 financial crisis and, in this second move, 
disclose reconstructive potentials which are merely alluded to that situation.  
As the objective is therefore, in analyzing modes of legitimation as part of a discernable narrative 
in the course of public communication for the response to the crisis, to reconstructively imagine 
counterfactual horizons of possibility, Apel’s distinction, appropriated from Peirce, between the 
real and unlimited communication community is indispensable. The unlimited communication 
extends beyond the real communication community as an idealized horizon, confirming the 
validity of utterances in relation to the criteria of truth, truthfulness and sincerity. The dynamic 
between the real and counterfactual horizons of communication, represents a consistent 
reaching beyond of the existent forms of self-understanding and knowledge. From the standpoint 
of actual societal discursive process, “the further question arises as to how real discourses might 
incorporate the structural outcomes of learning processes that point beyond existing knowledge 
and normative arrangements” (O’Mahony, 2013: 305). The real communication community, 
which may be characterized by processes of ideal innovation and argumentation, in determining 
the directionality of societal learning, indicates which interpretation of counterfactual elements 
are drawn down from the transcendent order in changing the state of knowledge in reality.    
The critical insight offered in Apel’s development of the concept of co-responsibility is therefore 
that it emphasizes ‘democratic practical reason’ as being understood only by means of a 
communicative reason (O’Mahony, 2015). His conceptual elaboration of the principle of 
responsibility presents a mediated theory in which a new ethic of responsibility may be imagined, 
not confined to dimensions of micro or macro instances of ethical rationality, but evolving, 
through processes of cultural and democratic innovation, out of distinctive cognitive forms of 
societal communication. The task is to explain, in the given communicative setting of Irish public 
discourse, how counterfactual ideas, specifically the principles of democratic legitimacy and co-
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responsibility, failed to gain any normative traction in the context of the response to the crisis, 
when they are most desperately needed.  
In developing the principle of responsibility in the transcendent domain, a cosmopolitan 
perspective on the concept is considered, which will help to illustrate the normative dimension 
in this reconstructive methodological procedure. Bearing an intrinsic relation to the social 
principle of responsibility, Fine (2007) outlines a number of key commitments around which the 
cosmopolitan approach gravitates; these include, overcoming the national presuppositions and 
prejudices within the social sciences and the reconstruction in this light of the core concepts 
employed; recognizing that “humanity has entered an era of mutual interdependence on a world 
scale and the conviction that this worldly existence is not adequately understood within the 
terms of conventional social science”; and, the theorization of normative and prescriptive 
approaches to ‘world citizenship’, ‘global justice’ and ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ (Fine, 2007: 2).  
Beck and Grande (2007), characterizing the approach as an alternative political vision – in the 
context of globalization – to the dominant neo-liberal focus on the market, submit the idea of 
cosmopolitanism as a radical, innovative response to the looming economic and political crises 
in Europe. A post-national model of democracy, constituting new horizons for European 
integration, the cosmopolitan perspective fundamentally represents a very specific approach to 
dealing with ‘otherness’ in society, and among societies. They argue, “differences should neither 
be arranged hierarchically, nor should they be replaced by common norms, values and standards, 
rather they should be accepted as such and even have positive value placed on them” (Beck and 
Grande, 2007: 71). It is important to emphasize at this point that the concept of cosmopolitanism 
is not confined to a definition in spatial terms, and its basic principles may be revealed and 
applied everywhere, at every level and in every sphere of political activity; “it is exactly such a 
generalized concept of cosmopolitanism that provides the key to an understanding and shaping 
of new forms of political rule beyond the nation-state that have developed in Europe hitherto” 
(2007: 72). Responsibility, therefore, viewed through the prism of cosmopolitanism, constitutes 
an attempt to grasp socio-cultural innovation from a critical perspective, developing a position in 
line with the concept of immanent transcendence, within and beyond society.     
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Delanty (2006), moving towards a theory of ‘critical cosmopolitanism’, contributes a crucial 
distinction here. The ‘cosmopolitan imagination’ is presented as the means by which cultural 
models may be reconstructed to transform the social world. This approach, going beyond the 
mere acceptance of the conditions of diversity, is therefore articulated in “cultural models of 
world openness” through which societies undergo transformation; he explains, “the 
cosmopolitan imagination can arise in any kind of society and at any time but it is integral to 
modernity, in so far as this is a condition of self-problematization, incompleteness and the 
awareness that certainty can never be established once and for all” (Delanty, 2006: 25). While 
the creative conflict and combination of different forces at work in society – core/periphery, 
local/global – constitute an important aspect of cosmopolitanism, it is, Delanty argues, modernity 
itself that represents its central dynamic (2006: 38). Though the processes of globalization 
certainly enhance this dynamic, it is the different societal and civilizational forms of modernity –  
fundamental to its move towards self-transformation, held in the potentiality of human agency 
to radically transform the present in the image of an imagined future – that constitutes the 
essence of cosmopolitanism. 
It is modernity itself, therefore, that holds the reconstructive potential for social and cultural 
transformation; according to Delanty, it is a transformative condition in itself. However, this, 
again, as previously mentioned, begs the fundamental question, following Eder, that if societies 
learn, why is the world still so hard to change? If cosmopolitanism, as an intrinsic feature of 
modernity, signals a condition of self-confrontation and incompleteness, and a general tendency 
towards self-problematization, how is it that it remains unrealized and deeply repressed in such 
contexts as Irish political culture? The principle of responsibility is here shown to be some 
distance from the cosmopolitan idea. This indicates, as it will be developed upon in the 
proceeding analysis, a cultural model that is lopsided towards a contradictory form of 
institutionalized responsibility, in which individual responsibility is fore grounded above all, 
pathologically manifested as blame games in the discourse of the crisis. Co-responsibility, 
furthermore, and indeed a cosmopolitan understanding of responsibility, require a demanding 
reciprocal recognition of different principles of responsibility somehow present in the situation. 
The dominant conservative political culture in Ireland, as reflected in the distinctive political style 
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and class structure, precipitates a trend of non-thematization in Irish public discourse. It is this 
tendency that blocks any form of self-problematization, which may in turn lead to the forms of 
democratic transformation.  
A co-responsible mode of legitimation, therefore, represents a transcendental combination. That 
is, between the normative insights on the concept of justification narratives and the possibility 
of a deliberative democracy, on the one hand, and the reformulation of responsibility in Apel and 
the theory of cosmopolitanism, drawing from Delanty, on the other, ultimately constituting an 
alternative cultural model to the conservative hegemony evident in the Irish case. This 
counterfactual model of legitimacy has, therefore, been made conceivable by a critique of the 
response to the financial crisis, disclosing novel reconstructive potentialities. Overcoming the 
distinctive modes of legitimation, and mechanisms of blame, therefore, in Irish normative 
culture, manifested in its public discourse, requires a theorizing a new form of learning – a non-
pathological form of learning based on cultural innovation and the communicative structure of 
rational dissensus.  
By presenting the idealized, counterfactual forms of legitimation and responsibility, culminating 
in the co-responsible mode of legitimation, the extent to which their diminished realization in 
the Irish context of public discourse is made explicit. This basis for reconstruction is made possible 
by appealing to the principles as cognitive order principles, harbouring an unlimited potential 
that can be normatively realized in combination with one another by new communicative 
structures. It is, therefore, through transforming the structures at the level of the cultural model 
that innovation can begin to take place on the societal plane. This is the key point, the Irish 
cultural model blocks normative innovation in specific ways, highlighted in the previous chapter, 
but, from a cognitive perspective there always a potentiality for learning, which can generate 
new communicative structures and transform the cultural model.  The next section will attempt 
to illustrate the way in which the cognitive framework can be used to reconstruct the Irish 




8.2 Reconfiguring the Cognitive Order: A Reconstruction of the Crisis-Response in Ireland 
The critical-cognitive approach offers a unique perspective on culture as a multi-dimensional 
reflexive structure composed of dynamic and relatively stable components which become 
activated in the form of communication structures, collective learning processes and pathologies. 
This in turn allows for the maintenance or transformation of the components that make up the 
culture model itself, and the resultant norms and identities that represent the constitutive 
elements of modern society. This cognitive approach will now be put to use, reassessing the 
empirical-theoretical critique developed throughout on the Irish response to the 2008 crisis. This 
will, on the one hand, be intended to illustrate the application of the theoretical framework, and 
to exemplify its critical-explanatory value, and, on the other, advance the reconstructive critique 
itself, illuminating aspects of the situation which have remained, up to now, undisclosed.    
The operation of legitimation and responsibility as specific cognitive principles in the crisis 
discourse indicate the available generative structural competences, or, alternatively, following 
Celikates (2006), the ‘structural reflexivity deficits’ in public discourse in Ireland in the twenty-
first century. They also indicate both existing generative structures of ‘downstream’ cultural 
structure formation and institutionalization by means of the incursive and recursive functions of 
the cognitive order. Such functions depend on capacities for transcendental reflection in the 
sense of future-oriented reflexive self-critique as collective learning. It should be stressed here 
that, qua capacities, Ireland has available to it the full range of cognitive principles and associated 
sense-making capacities of modernity. However, to the contrary, qua competence, it exhibits, on 
particular issues, and more generally, a highly restricted range of generative powers. Irish public 
culture exhibits a highly restricted interpretation of the various available cognitive principles, a 
consequence, I have argued, of the conservativism which animates its public discourse. The 
actual selection is not made at the level of the cognitive order, but ‘lower’ down the cultural 
structure in the formation of cultural models through discursive struggles and selection 
mechanisms. It is at these lower, immanent levels, that the cognitive order is either enabled or 
blocked.  
Drawing further from the critical reconstruction, based on the short-run observation of discourse 
and the long-run historical analysis, it is therefore possible to identify underlying conditions 
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affecting public discourse and cultural model formation. These also include the 
cosmopolitan/national division, the increasing role of finance capital and the financialization of 
society, the economic dependence on the construction industry and house-prices, the 
colonization of the public sphere through international media conglomerates, the 
instrumentalization of reasoning, the rise of new forms of right-wing thinking, and the long-run 
forms of domination and hegemony in the class system. Ultimately, this indicates the 
degeneration of democratic public discourse and the emergence of profound communication 
pathologies and blockages. These factors indicate the second-order explanation for what has 
been identified as a first-order problem. The primary level of explanation lies in the tilting of the 
cultural model in a conservative direction. This has had profound implications for the cognitive-
generative structural capacity to shape the direction of social change in the case of Ireland. The 
direction of force from the cultural model upwards, towards the cognitive order, and downwards 
leads to conditions of domination of large sections of the population that are effectively 
disenfranchised and who do not enjoy many of the other conditions of modern democracy. The 
existence of such wide-ranging domination at the level of the cultural model, built upon a 
structure of pathologies and blockages, is in turn connected directly to the secondary explanatory 
structure provided by the various factors listed in the last paragraph. What is suggested here is 
that cognitive principles, separately and jointly, are discursively mediated in the light of 
normative, evaluative, emotional, and interest-related cultures, as they make their way into 
socio-political life. On this basis, it is shown how the cleavages that emerge at the cultural model 
level ultimately derives from discursively achieved mediation of cognitive principles with a view 
to selective combinations. 
This view to selective combinations represents the outcome of the formation of distinctive 
cultural models, critically reflected here in the Irish case through the representation of the 
cognitive cultural model of democracy. It is in this respect that the cognitive principles of 
legitimacy and responsibility are normatively brought to the fore in the re-assessment of the 
crisis response. It is, specifically, in the blocking/enabling dynamics between the cultural models-
level and the cognitive order that the co-responsible form of legitimation is reconstructively 
constituted. The essential problem relates to a type of legitimacy model – representative elitism 
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– that configures responsibility in a conservatively hegemonic way – within the Irish cultural 
model. This has the effect of diminishing responsibility both in the sense of an inclusive 
conceptualization of justice but also in relation to the general ‘sustainability’ of the society. Co-
responsible legitimation seeks to remedy both defects of this narrow model and the narrow, 
conservative kinds of collective learning on which it is founded, i.e., authoritarian or regressive 
learning. Certainly, systems of deliberative democracy and the horizons of discourse ethics 
provide a kind of orientation towards what it would be like but, even without their full 
development, the counterfactual perspective allows a reconstructive insight into more general, 
and perhaps more easily correctible deficiencies of the irresponsible culture of democracy and 
the narrowness of current procedures in the Irish case. The fundamental problem in this context 
is that the public sphere, which is essential to democratic learning processes and to establishing 
a reconstructive horizon, does not function very effectively and is unable to get at the true moral 
and ethical causes of the severity of the crisis. 
The crisis response, finally, analyzed from the perspective of the critical-cognitive approach, 
illustrates the incongruent relationship between the cultural model of Irish conservatism and the 
potentiality of future democratization. The latter is a process that depends on a vibrant public 
discourse, guided by communicative structures that facilitate the continuous exploration 
differences and, in times of crisis, constitutes a repertoire of cognitive potential which society 
can draw from in overcoming systemic failures. In contrast, the conservative cognitive model 
characterizes a mode of public discourse, reflected in the unfolding of the Irish crisis narrative, 
which encapsulates a repressive communicative structure that seeks to contain and restrict the 
exploration of alternatives. It is a condition, deeply embedded in Irish culture, that is beleaguered 
with contradiction and a society unable, and unwilling, to grasp the opportunity to change. The 
conservative model, therefore, contrary to the perception of a rather dull mode of engagement 
which seeks to contain public discourse, actually constitutes a highly sophisticated, yet subtle set 
of cognitive mechanisms deployed culturally to resist social change. 
The cognitive principles of legitimation and responsibility were identified as core to the analysis 
in the case of Ireland, constituting the essential elements of the reconstructive critique. By 
observing the narrative of the crisis-response in Ireland, which indicated problems relating to 
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these specific elements – for instance, the absence of alternative positions being seriously 
considered in the public debate – the construction of legitimation through a distinctive mode of 
public discourse was identified. The principle of responsibility was then introduced and explored 
through a critical assessment of the prevalence of blaming, and blame avoidance, in Irish public 
discourse, therefore anticipating the critical disclosure of another, related form of pathology, 
disrupting the realization of a democratic mode of responsibility. The approach taken to both 
principles represents a fundamental, and critically valuable, perspective offered by an 
appropriation of the cognitive order concept. That is, contrasting societal interpretations of the 
same elementary cognitive principles, which correlate in the present case to a distinction 
between the conservative reality of Irish normative culture and the unexplored reconstructive 
potential contained within innovative, discursive forms of collective learning of a new cultural 
model. Through the reconstructive procedure of critique, therefore, legitimation was reframed 
counterfactually as an essential democratic principle, following Habermas in the main, and 
responsibility was reframed, also in a counterfactual register, following Apel, as co-responsibility. 
These principles were then combined at the transcendent level, embracing the range of potential 
existing in the cognitive order of society, and critically brought to bear on the situation through 
the theorization of a co-responsible form of legitimation.  
The distinction, which is captured in the foundational Critical Theory concept of immanent 
transcendence, is played out in the thesis between this normative-counterfactual reconstructive 
standard of co-responsible legitimation, and the conservative reality reflected in the mechanisms 
of Irish public discourse. I therefore make the argument that it is the normative culture of 
conservatism, encapsulated in the development of Irish political and public culture through the 
twentieth century, that constitutes the blocked learning processes in this case. To overcome and 
transform these conditions of learning, would be to reflexively transform the structure of 
communication and, ultimately, reconfigure the selective combinations of the cognitive order. 
The absence of proposed alternative responses to the financial crisis indicates the restricted 
available generative structural competences, or, to put it differently, structural reflexivity 
deficits, of public debate in Ireland. In developing this critique, therefore, implications regarding 
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the domination of the ideology of conservatism came into focus as a source of a regressive 
structure of communication.  
Conservatism, generally, refers to a political and societal position which is oriented towards what 
happens to be in existence at a given time and its preservation. Following its conceptual 
development as a feature of the contemporary political field through an account of its essential 
foundations in the work of Freeden, it is often a position which is difficult to pinpoint due to its 
malleable nature. Clearly, however, it represents a perspective which stands diametrically 
opposed to the reconstructive position developed here, which imagines transcendent-
counterfactual horizons as playing a decisive part in social relations. With the principle of 
tradition given pride of place in the social order, the conservative position takes its cultural 
bearings, as a rule, from the basic values of the family and the promotion of personal 
responsibility. I therefore equate the domination of conservatism in Irish normative culture with 
the reproduction of blocked learning processes by closing off the exploration differences, which 
could potentially lead to conditions of rational dissensus, and, specifically relevant to the case of 
Ireland’s response to the crisis, deficient thematization in public discourse, which blocks off the 
possibility of normative cultural innovation and the exploration of radical democratic alternatives 
as a more general response to the present status quo.  
Placing this distinction into a broader sociological framework, it may be claimed that the 
dominant conflict-mediating cultural model of modern society is represented by a new 
adversarial structure, conservative technocrats (techno-conservatism) versus new social 
movements. This cultural model has certainly become more salient in public discourse in the 
post-crisis context, with the intensification of longer-run debate over austerity and Keynesian 
expansionary economic policies, however it remains indeterminate in terms of what the future 
holds, beyond the crisis aftermath. Although it reflects the immense global socio-economic 
changes of the last 40 years or so – generating a much more diverse set of cultural positions and 
interests beyond the old left-right distinctions – the resolution to this new arrangement cannot 
be a return to the neo-corporatist, post-war agreement, even if such intermediating structures 
will continue to play an important role. The effects of this new cultural model depend on the 
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relative power of the various communicative structures that underpin their formation in different 
contexts.    
Care must of course be taken in employing such a generalizing concept, given the degree of 
differentiation of practices in modern society, however, I contend that the form of conservatism 
reflected in Irish public discourse – sustained by a communicative structure of repressive 
hegemony – in the aftermath of the crisis constitutes a distinctive ideological position that is 
fundamentally inadequate in dealing with the complex and varied challenges we face in the 
twenty-first century. This is, therefore, an urgent problem and it demands, particularly on the 
part of the critical sociologist, asking deeper questions regarding the possibility of a different 
future. For the past number of years, Ireland has been held up as a success for the techno-
conservative response to the financial crisis on the transnational plane, referred to as “Europe’s 
poster child for austerity” (Roche et al., 2017: 107). Despite this rhetoric, however, social and 
economic inequality have increased exponentially in Ireland since the crisis, accompanied with a 
further dismantling and degeneration of welfare state provisions, and the correlated 
immiseration of the most vulnerable in the society (Wickham and Hearne, 2017).  
We are entering a period of time in which the very future of society is becoming a matter of 
contestation and debate. The dominant stance reflected in the Irish normative culture must be 
transformed if it is to democratically engage with the implications of this challenge, which are of 
profound importance. This critical juncture has highlighted the absence of an innovative, 
discursive form of learning, which is, however, now coming more to the fore through the 
activation of new social movements. Society must be reconstructed from below, with authentic 
emancipatory practices, brought forward with a democratic purpose. This, however, requires 
overcoming the pathological – regressive, defensive, ideological and authoritarian – forms of 
collective learning reflected in the response to the crisis, and initiate the cultivation of a form of 
cosmopolitan solidarity. This, furthermore, necessitates a rejection of reductionist fallacies which 
depict society in essentialist and unchangeable terms, for a complex, contingent view of social 






This thesis has sought to exploit the response to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis to develop a 
critique of Irish society. The conjectural moment, which the crisis represents, offers an 
opportunity for learning, not just in relation to how the crisis came about and how it ought to be 
resolved, but to reflect on the conditions of learning themselves, that would delve deeper into 
the socio-economic, cultural and political structures sustaining the very system that led up to the 
point of crisis. In essence, the argument is that the crisis could possibly have been responded to 
differently. In exploring this counterfactual idea, which is based more on what is absent in the 
response to the financial crisis in Ireland, in the domain of public discourse, a justification 
narrative was identified, following the key political interventions in the crisis, which sought to 
legitimize the response. This was then placed in the broader European context, which delineated 
an integration strategy that followed a commitment to processes of financialization, specifically 
through the latter half of the twentieth century. By placing Ireland in this wider context, a 
comparative perspective was established, which discussed the experiences of Greece and Iceland 
as cases where the legitimacy of the crisis response was publicly challenged – in the case of the 
latter, with a significant degree of success, whereas the former resulted in a tragic outcome. The 
final empirical chapter above (Chapter 3), which pertains to the analysis of the crisis response, 
highlighted the principles of legitimacy and responsibility as key elements emerging from the 
discourse. These elements were revealed dialectically – in the case of the former, through the 
discursive modes of legitimation, which were shown to normatively restrict the democratic 
principle of legitimacy, and, in the case of the latter, through an analysis of the discourse of blame 
in the context of the crisis narrative, which severely obscured the principle of responsibility. 
The theoretical and methodological orientations of the work follow in the tradition of Critical 
Theory. The perspective adopted also highlighted the need to go beyond that tradition in order 
to fulfil the potential of the approach itself when applied empirically. Beginning with the concept 
of the public sphere, the theoretical framework then introduced a theory of collective learning, 
which, following Habermas and Miller, involves the idea of learning pathologies, key to the 
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proceeding analysis. The remaining elements of the theoretical framework constituted the 
development of the cultural model in the context of a cognitive sociology, ultimately resulting in 
the introduction of the cognitive order, which would eventually allow for the empirical problem 
at hand to be reframed in novel critical terms. In terms of methodology, the thesis adopted a 
procedure of reconstruction, following Honneth, as a ‘methodology of inquiry’ that aligned with 
the empirical-theoretical approach pursued from the outset. Fundamental to the enterprise of 
Critical Theory, reconstruction in this sense makes use of the empirical information, gained 
through a combination of methods in earlier chapters, unearthing a normative potential in the 
concrete situation, which goes unrealized due to learning blockages at work in Irish society. In 
this specific case, this referred to the principles of legitimacy and responsibility, ultimately 
proposing the possibility of a co-responsible mode of legitimation.           
The remaining two chapters, 6 and 7, combined the theoretical elements with the relevant 
dimensions of the empirical situation to proceed with a critique of Irish society, facilitated by the 
response to the 2008 crisis. Chapter 6, therefore, delineated the conditions of learning within the 
Irish cultural model, focusing specifically on the problem of normative repression, resulting from 
an emphasis on nationalism and class within the political culture, and, in a second move, on the 
problem of conservatism as the dominant ideology. At issue here was not some inherent 
pathology associate with conservatism, but the particular form of Irish conservatism, which was 
shown to be adept at sustaining long-lasting contradictions, specifically in relation to the 
realization of socio-economic rights. For example, in the context of the aftermath of the crisis, 
Ireland passed some of the most liberal pieces of legislation ever put forward, while inequality 
and social deprivation, reflected most explicitly in homelessness figures since the crisis, have 
increased exponentially. Finally, these observations are ‘fed through’ the critical-cognitive 
theoretical framework developed earlier. By explicating the various levels in the cognitive order 
of society, the identification of pathologies operating within this structure becomes possible. In 
this case, the problem is located at the level of the cultural model, where the relevant principles 
bearing on the situation – legitimacy and responsibility – are being blocked or distorted in the 
course of learning processes and, therefore, remaining normatively unrealised in Irish society. 
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In conclusion, Ireland certainly represents a unique case in terms of responding to the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis and its aftermath. From economic miracle, to one of the first ‘victims’ of 
the Great Recession, to eventually becoming the European success story of economic recovery, 
this exceptional narrative may now be viewed quite differently. In the aftermath of the crisis, 
Ireland seems to have been shielded somehow from the rise of populism across Western liberal 
democracies, reflected in the rise of the far-right in Europe and the interminable chaos associated 
with Brexit phenomenon in the UK since 2016. Although this may indeed be taken as a positive 
reflection of the strength of Irish democracy, which having survived the financial crisis, and 
accepted the sacrifices in order to return to prosperity, it may also be understood as a reflection 
of the extent to which Ireland is dependent on events elsewhere. This relates both to a continued 
dependence on an economic model based on foreign direct investment and inflated real estate 
and also in the sense of the ideals carried by social movements, which promote emancipatory 
social and political change. Ireland, therefore, may be considered a ‘laggard’, denying learning 

















 Alan, Ahearne (2015). ‘Witness Statement at Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking 
Crisis’, Houses of the Oireachtas, Session 61 
 
 Apel, Karl-Otto (1993). ‘Discourse Ethics as a Response to the Novel Challenges of Today’s 
Reality to Coresponsibility’, The Journal of Religion, 73 (4), pp. 496-513  
 
 Barrett, Alan and McGuiness, Seamus (2012). ‘The Irish Labour Market and the Great 
Recession’, CESifo DICE Report 2 
 
 Beck, Ulrich and Grande, Edgar (2007). ‘Cosmopolitanism: Europe’s Way Out of Crisis’, 
European Journal of Social Theory, 10 (1): pp. 67-85  
 
 Bielenberg, Andy (2010). ‘The Industrial Elite in Ireland from the Industrial Revolution to 
the Frist World War’, in Lane, Fintan (ed). Politics, Society and the Middle Class in Modern 
Ireland. London: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
 Blythe, Mark (2013). Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press  
 
 Bohman, James (1998). ‘Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy’, 
Journal of Political Philosophy, 6 (4), pp. 400-425 
 
 Boltanski, Luc and Thevenot, Laurent (2006) On Justification. London: Princeton 
University Press 
 
 Bouin, Olivier (2018). ‘The End of European Integration as We Knew it: A Political Economy 




 Brown, Terence (1985). Ireland: A Social and Cultural History 1922-1985. London: Fontana 
Press 
 
 Cahill, Ann; O’Brien, Paul; Regan, Mary (2010). ‘Historic day as EU/IMF officials 
arrives…though Taoiseach stills denies they are not here to bail out State’, The Irish 
Examiner, 19 November  
 
 Castells, Manuel (ed) (2018). Europe’s Crises. Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
 Caughey, Devin; O’Grady, Tom and Warshaw, Christopher (2019). ‘Policy Ideology in 
European Mass Publics, 1981-2016’, American Political Science Review, 1-20. 
doi:10.1017/S0003055419000157 
 
 Celikates, Robin (2009). ‘Recognition, System Justification and Reconstructive Critique’, 
In Reconnaissance, identite et integration sociale, sous la direction de Christian Lazzeri et 
Soraya Nour   
 
 Celikates, Robin (2015) ‘Learning from the Streets: Civil Disobedience in Theory and 
Practice’, in: Weibel, Peter (ed). Global Activism: Art and Conflict in the 21st Century. 
Cambridge: MIT Press 
 
 Celikates, Robin; Kreide, Regina; Wesche, Tilo (eds) (2015). Transformations of 
Democracy: Crisis, Protest and Legitimation. London: Rowman and Lithfield International  
 
 Chiapello, Eve and Fairclough, Norman (2002). ‘Understanding the new management 
ideology: a transdisciplinary contribution from critical discourse analysis and new 
sociology of capitalism’, Discourse and Society, 13: 185-207 
 
 Chomsky, Noam (2011). ‘The Legitimacy of the Financial System and State Capitalism’, in 
Dobos, Ned; Barry, Christian and Pogge, Thomas (eds) Global Financial Crisis: The Ethical 




 Cleary, Joe and Connolly, Claire (2005). The Cambridge Companion to Modern Irish 
Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
 
 Cohen, Joshua (2003). ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’ in, Matravers, Derek and 
Pike, John (eds.) Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. London: 
Routledge 
 
 Coulter, Colin and Coleman, Steve (eds.) (2003). The End of Irish History? Critical 
Reflections on the Celtic Tiger. Manchester: Manchester University Press 
 
 Cowen, Brian (2008). Address by the Taoiseach, Mr. Brian Cowen TD, to the CBI-IBEC Joint 
Business Council Dinner in Trinity College Dublin, 2 October, Department of the 
Taoiseach. 
 
 Dabrowski, Marek (2009). ‘The global financial crisis: Lessons for European integration’, 
Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE), 12 
 
 Department of Finance (2009). Report on the Special Group on Public Service Numbers 
and Expenditure Programmes, vol 1, 16 July: Department of Finance  
 
 Dobos, Ned: Barry, Christian and Pogge, Thomas (eds.) (2011). Global Financial Crisis: The 
Ethical Issues. New York: Palgrave MacMillan 
 
 Doyle, Killian and Burke-Kennedy, Eoin (2010). ‘Irish Application for IMF/EU Rescue 
Package Approved’, The Irish Times, 21 November 2010 
 
 Eder, Klaus (1987). ‘Learning and the Evolution of Social Systems. An Epigenetic 
Perspective’, In, M. Schmid and F. M. Wuketis. Dordrecht: Reidel (eds), Evolutionary 




 Eder, Klaus (1992). ‘Contradictions and Social Evolution: A Theory of the Social Evolution 
of Modernity’, in H.Haferkamp and N.J. Smelser (eds) Social Change and Modernity. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 320-49 
 
 Eder, Klaus (1996). The Social Construction of Nature: A Sociology of Ecological 
Enlightenment. London: Sage Publications 
 
 Eder, Klaus (1999). ‘Societies Learn and yet the World is Hard to Change’, European 
Journal of Social Theory, 2 (2): 195-215 
 
 Eder, Klaus (2007). ‘Cognitive Sociology and the Theory of Communicative Action: The 
Role of Communication and Language in the Making of the Social Bond’, European Journal 
of Social Theory, 10 (3): 389-408 
 
 Eder, Klaus (2014). ‘The EU in search of its people: The birth of a society out of the crisis 
of Europe’, European Journal of Social Theory, 17 (3): 219-237 
 
 Epstein, Gerald .A. (ed.) (2005). The Financialization of the World Economy. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar  
 
 Eyerman, Ron and Jamison, Andrew (1991). Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach. 
Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
 Farmer, Tony (2010). Privileged Lives: A Social History of Middle Class Ireland 1882-1989. 
Dublin: A.&A. Farmer Ltd. 
 
 Ferree, M. M., Gamson, W. A., Gerhards, J., and Rucht, D. (2002). ‘Four Models of the 




 Ferriter, Diarmaid (2010). ‘The Stupid Propaganda of the Calamity Mongers’?: The Middle 
Class and Irish Politics, 1945-97’, in Lane, Fintan (ed.) Politics, Society and the Middle Class 
in Modern Ireland. London: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
 Fine, Robert (2007). Cosmopolitanism. Oxon: London 
 
 Fine, B. (2012). ‘Financialization on the Rebound’, Actuel Marx, 51 (1): 73-85 
 
 Fischer-Lescano, Andreas (2011). ‘Critical Systems Theory’, Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, 38 (3): 3-23 
 
 Flynn, Brendan (2007). The Blame Game: Rethinking Ireland’s Sustainable Development 
and Environmental Performance. Dublin: Irish Academic Press  
 
 Forst, Rainer (2007). The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of 
Justice. New York: Columbia University Press 
 
 Forst, Rainer (2011). ‘The ground of critique: On the concept of human dignity in social 
orders of justification’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 37 (9): 965-976  
 
 Forst, Rainer (2014). Justification and Critique: Towards a Critical Theory of Politics. 
London: Polity  
 
 Fossum, John Erik and Menendez Agustin Jose (eds) (2012) The European Union in Crises 
or the European Union as Crises? Oslo: ARENA  
 
 Freeden, Michael (1996). Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 
 





 Garvin, Tom (1996). 1922: The Birth of Irish Democracy. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 
 
 Geuss, Raymond (1981). The Idea of a Critical Theory; Habermas and the Frankfurt School. 
London: Cambridge University Press 
 
 Girvin, Brian (1993). ‘Social Change and Political Culture in the Republic of Ireland’, 
Parliamentary Affairs, 46 (3): 380–398 
 
 Grossman, Emiliano and Woll, Cornelia (2014). ‘Saving the Banks: The Political Economy 
of Bailouts’, Comparative Political Studies, 47 (4): 574-600 
 
 Habermas, Jurgen (1972). Knowledge and Human Interests. Boston: Beacon Press 
 
 Habermas, Jurgen (1976). Legitimation Crisis. London: Heinemann 
 
 Habermas, Jurgen (1979). ‘Conservatism and Capitalist Crisis’, New Left Review 115 
 
 Habermas, Jurgen (1984). Theory of Communicative Action (Volume 1): Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society. London: Heinemann 
 
 Habermas, Jurgen (1988). ‘Morality and Ethical Life: Foes Hegel’s Critique of Kant Apply 
to Discourse Ethics’, Northwestern University Review of Law, Vol 83 (1): 38-54   
 
 Habermas, Jurgen (1989). The Theory of Communicative Action (Volume 2): Lifeworld and 
Systems, a Critique of Functionalist Reason. London: Polity 
 
 Habermas, Jurgen (2006). ‘Political communication in the media society; does democracy 
still enjoy an epistemic dimension’, Communication Theory 16: 411-26 
 





 Harvey, David (2010). The Enigma of Capital: and the Crises of Capitalism. London: Profile 
 
 Hobolt, Sara and Tilley, James (2014). Blaming Europe?: Responsibility Without 
Accountability in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
 Honneth, Axel (2004). ‘A social pathology of reason: on the intellectual legacy of Critical 
Theory’, in Rush, Fred (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp 336-60 
 
 Honneth, Axel (2014). Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life. 
Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
 Honohan, Patrick (2009). ‘Resolving Ireland’s Bank Crisis, Economic and Social Review, Vol 
40, No. 2 
 
 Irish Independent (2008). ‘Students to Protest Against Threat of Fee Reintroduction’ Irish 
Independent, 22 October 
 
 Irish Independent (2009a). ‘Banks ignored warnings on lending risks, says governor’, Irish 
Independent, 11 March 
 
 Irish Independent (2009b). ‘Economy to shrink by more than 6pc, TDs told’, Irish 
Independent, 11 March 
 
 Irish Times (2010). ‘Timeline – How it came to this’, Irish Times, 22 November, p. 6  
 
 Jayadev, Arjun; Mason, J.W and Schroder, Enno (2018). ‘The Political Economy of 
Financialization in the United States, Europe and India’, Development and Change, 0(0): 
1-22 
 




 Jessop, Bob (2004). ‘Critical Semiotic Analysis and Cultural Political Economy’, Critical 
Discourse Studies, 1:2: pp159-174 
 
 Kelly, Morgan (2007). ‘On the Likely Extent of Falls in Irish House Prices’, UCD Centre for 
Economic Research, Working Paper 07/01 
 
 Kelly, Morgan (2009). ‘The Irish Credit Bubble’, UCD Centre for Economic Research, 
Working Paper 09/32   
 
 Kitchin, Rob: Gleeson, Justin: Keaveney, Karen and O’Callaghan, Cian (2010). ‘A Haunted 
Landscape: Housing and Ghost Estates in Post-Celtic Tiger Ireland’, National Institute for 
Regional and Spatial Analysis, Working Paper 59 
 
 Klein, Naomi (2007). The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. London: Penguin  
 
 Landemore, Helene (2015). ‘Inclusive Constitution-Making: the Icelandic Experiment’ The 
Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol 23, No. 2: pp166-191 
 
 Lane, Fintan (ed.) (2010). Politics, Society and the Middle Class in Modern Ireland. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan  
 
 Levine, Rhonda (ed.) (1998). Social class and Stratification: Classical Statements and 
Theoretical Debtes. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC.  
 
 Lynch, Kathleen; Cantillon, Sara and Crean, Margaret (2017) ‘Inequality’. In Roche, William 
K, O'Connell, Philip J. and Prothero, Andrea (Eds.) Austerity and the Recovery in Ireland: 
Europe's Poster Child and the Great Recession. Oxford: Oxford University Press.pp. 252-
271. 
 
 Macartney, Huw (2013). European Democratic Legitimacy and the Debt Crisis. London 




 Machamer, Peter; Darden, Lindley and Craver, Carl F. (2000). ‘Thinking about 
Mechanisms’, Philosophy of Science, 67 (1): 1-25 
 
 Mannheim, Karl (1936). Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of 
Knowledge. London: Routledge 
 
 Mansbridge, Jane (2005). ‘Cracking Through Hegemonic Ideology: The Logic of Formal 
Justice’ Social Justice Research, Vol. 18, No. 3: pp335-347 
 
 Matsaganis, Manos (2018). ‘Making Sense of the Greek Crisis, 2010-2016’, In Castels, 
Manuel et, al. (ed). Europe’s Crises. Cambridge: Polity  
 
 Mason, Paul (2009). Meltdown: The End of the Age of Greed. London: Verso 
 
 Masters, Adam (2009). ‘Republic of Ireland: from Celtic tiger to recession victim’. In: Hart, 
Paul’t and Tindall, Karen (eds) Framing the Global Economic Downturn: Crisis Rhetoric and 
the Politics of Recessions. Canberra: ANU Press 
 
 Mavridis, Symeon (2018). ‘Greece’s Economic and Social Transformation 2008-2017’, Soc. 
Sci, 7(9): 1-14  
 
 McCabe, Conor (2010). Irish Banks and the Great Housing Scam. Irish Left Review (online) 
 
 McCabe, Conor (2011). Sins of the Father: The Decisions that Shaped the Irish Economy. 
Dublin: The History Press Ireland    
 
 McDonald, Henry. (2013) ‘Ireland becomes first country to exit eurozone bailout 
programme’. The Guardian, Friday 13 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/dec/13/ireland-first-




 Meade, Rosie and Dukelow, Fiona (2015). Defining Events: Power, Resistance and Identity 
in Twenty-First-Century Ireland. Manchester: Manchester University Press 
 
 Mercille, Julien (2014). ‘The Role of Media in Fiscal Consolidation Programmes: The Case 
of Ireland’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 38: 281-300 
 
 Meyer, John W.; Boli, John; Thomas, George and Ramirez, Francisco (1997). ‘World 
Society and the Nation-State’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol 103, No. 1: pp 144-181  
 
 Miller, Max (2002). ‘Some Theoretical Aspects of Systemic Learning’, Sozialersinn, 3: 379-
421 
 
 Miller, Max (2005). Worlds of Capitalism: Institutions, Governance and Economic Change 
in the Era of Globalization. London: Routledge  
 
 Mills, C. Wright (1956). The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press 
 
 Mirowski, Philip and Plehwe, Dieter (eds.) (2009). The Road from Mont Pelerin: The 
Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective. London: Cambridge University Press 
 
 Mirowski, Philip (2014). Never Let a Serious Crisis go to Waste: How Neo-Liberalism 
Survived the Financial Meltdown. London: Verso 
 
 Mouffe, Chantal (2000). The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso  
 
 Nyberg, Peter (2011) ‘Misjudging Risk: Causes of the Systemic Banking Crisis in Ireland’, 
Report for the Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland. Irish 
Government Publication 
 
 O’Flynn, M., Monaghan, L. F. and Power, M., J. (2014). ‘Scapegoating During a Time of 




 O’Mahony, Patrick and Delanty, Gerard (2001). Rethinking Irish History: Nationalism, 
Identity and Ideology. Hampshire: Palgrave 
 
 O’Mahony, Patrick and Steffen-Schafer, Mike (2005). ‘The Book of Life in the Press: 
Comparing German and Irish Media Discourse on Human Genome Research’, Social 
Studies of Science, 35: 99 
 
 O’Mahony, Patrick (2009). ‘Sociological Theory, Discourse and Cognitive Construction of 
Participation’, Comparative Sociology, 8: 490-516 
 
 O’Mahony, Patrick (2011). ‘Social Positions and Dynamics within the Cognitive Order of 
Irish Environmental Discourse’. In: O’Mahony, Patrick and Keohane, Kieran (eds.) Irish 
Environmental Politics after the Communicative Turn. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press 
 
 O’Mahony, Patrick (2012). ‘Cosmopolitanism and the construction of cultural models in 
contemporary Europe’, Irish Journal of Sociology, 20 (2): pp 111-31 
 
 O’Mahony, Patrick (2013). The Contemporary Theory of the Public Sphere. Oxford: Peter 
Lang  
 
 O’Mahony, Patrick (2014). ‘Europe, Crisis and Critique: Social Theory and Transnational 
Society’, European Journal of Social Theory, 17 (3): 238-257 
 
 O’Mahony, Patrick (2015). ‘Climate Change: Responsibility, democracy and 
communication, European Journal of Social Theory 
 
 O’Malley, Eoin (2011). Contemporary Ireland. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
 O’Riain, Sean (2012). ‘The Crisis of Financialisation in Ireland’, The Economic and Social 




 O’Riain, Sean (2014). The Rise and Fall of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger: Liberalism, Boom and Bust. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
 O’Riain, Sean (2017). ‘Ireland’s recovery: explanation, potential and recovery’, In 
Heffernan, Emma; McCale, John and Moore-Cherry, Niamh (eds.) Debating Austerity in 
Ireland: Crisis, Experience and Recovery. Dublin: Royal Irish Academy  
 
 O’Sullivan, Eoin (2016). ‘Ending Homelessness in Ireland: Ambition, Adversity, 
Adaptation’, European Journal of Homelessness, 10 (2): 11-39 
 
 Powell, Benjamin (2003). ‘Economic Freedom and Growth: The Case of the Celtic Tiger’, 
Cato Journal, 22 (3): 431 
 
 Robbins, Geraldine and Lapsley, Irvine (2014) ‘The Success Story of the Eurozone Crisis? 
Ireland’s Austerity Measures, Public Money and Management, 34 (2): 91-98 
 
 Roche, William; O’Connell, Philip and Prothero, Andrea (eds.) (2017). Austerity and 
recovery in Ireland: Europe’s poster child and the great recession. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
 
 Salomon, Margot (2015). ‘Of Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions’, LSE 
Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 2 
 
 Sawyer, Malcolm; Brown, Andrew; Spencer, David and Veronese-Passarella, Marco (2016) 
‘The Processes of Financialization’, Financialisation Economy Society and Sustainable 
Development (FESSUD)  
 
 Schmid, Michael (1982). ‘Habermas’ Theory of Social Evolution’. In: Thompson, John and 




 Schnyder, Gerhard and Siems, Mathias (2013). ‘The Ordoliberal Variety of Neoliberalism’. 
In; Konzelmann, Suzanne J. and Fovargue-Davies, Marc (eds.), Banking Systems in the 
Crisis: The Faces of Liberal Capitalism. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 250-268 
 
 Shaver, Kelly (1985). The Attribution of Blame: Causality, Responsibility and 
Blameworthiness. Berlin: Springer-Verlag  
 
 Streek, Wolfgang (2014). Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. 
London: Verso 
 
 Strydom, Piet (1999). ‘The Challenge of Responsibility for Sociology’, Current Sociology, 
47 (3): 65-82 
 
 Strydom, Piet (2007). ‘Introduction: A Cartography of Contemporary Cognitive Social 
Theory’, European Journal of Social Theory, 10 (3): 339-356 
 
 Strydom, Piet (2009). New Horizons of Critical Theory; Collective Learning and Triple 
Contingency. Delhi: Shipra Publications 
 
 Strydom, Piet (2011a). Contemporary Critical Theory and Methodology. London: 
Routledge 
 
 Strydom, Piet (2011b). ‘Towards a Cognitive Sociology for our Time: Habermas and 
Honneth or Language and Recognition… and Beyond’, Irish Journal of Sociology, 19 (1): 
pp176-198 
 
 Strydom, Piet (2012). ‘Cosmopolitanism, the Cognitive Order of Modernity, and 
Conflicting Models of World Openness: On the Prospects of Collective Learning’. In A. Giri 





 Strydom, Piet (2013) ‘On the Cognitive Order of Society: Radicalising the Ontological Turn 
in Critical Theory’, Pragmatics & Cognition 
 
 Touraine, Alain (1971). The Post-Industrial Society. Tomorrow's Social History: Classes, 
Conflicts and Culture in the Programmed Society. London: Random House 
 
 Touraine, Alain (1977). The Self-Production of Society. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 
 
 Touraine, Alain (1981). The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
 Touraine, Alain (2014). After the Crisis. Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
 Trenz, Hans-Jorg (2015). ‘Towards a Cognitive Sociology of the Public Sphere’, European 
Journal of Social Theory, 18: pp221-226 
 
 Tyler, Tom (2005). ‘Introduction: Legitimating Ideologies’, Social Justice Research, Vol. 18, 
No.3: pp211-215 
 
 Van Leeuwen, Theo (2007). ‘Legitimation in Discourse and Communication’, Discourse 
and Communication, Vol. 1(1): pp91-112 
 
 Watson, Dorothy; Maitre, Bertrand; Whelan, Christopher and Williams, James. ‘Child 
poverty in a period of austerity’, In. Heffernan, Emma; McHale, John and Moore-Cherry, 
Niamh (eds.) (2017) Debating austerity in Ireland: crisis, experience and recovery. Dublin: 
Royal Irish Academy 
 
 Welch, Stephen (1993). The Concept of Political Culture. London: St. Martin’s Press 
 
 Wessler, Hartmut (ed) (2008). Public Deliberation and Public Culture; The Writings of 




 Whelan, K. (2010). ‘Policy lessons from Ireland’s latest depression’, Economic and Social 
Review, 41: 424-440 
 
 Wickham, J. and Hearne, R. (2017). ‘Cherishing all Equally 2017: Economic Inequality in 
Ireland’. Report for Tasc – Think-tank for Action on Social Change  
 
 Zurn, Christopher (2011). ‘Social Pathologies as Second-Order Disorders’. In; 
Petherbridge, Danielle (ed) Axel Honneth: Critical Essays: With a Reply by Axel Honneth. 
Leiben: Brill Academic Publishers  
 
